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Early in his presidency, Barack Obama announced that setting a new beginning in US-Muslim 
relations would be a top-priority of his administration. To what extent did President Obama’s 
foreign policy actually represent a paradigm shift in the traditional US foreign policy toward the 
Muslim world, and especially toward the Greater Middle East? This research assesses change or 
continuity in the foreign policy of the United States toward arguably one of the most geo-
strategically important regions of the world.  
To provide an exhaustive answer to our research question, we undertake a study of US foreign 
policy at three different levels: foreign policy rhetoric, foreign policy practice, and the relationship 
between the two. First, we demonstrate that US rhetoric has been consistently influenced by the 
time-honored idea of national exceptionalism and its foreign policy spin-off, the myth of innocence. 
Second, with regard to US practice, we argue that the national interest is a multifaceted concept and 
a fundamental driver of foreign policy. We also identify the core national interests that have 
traditionally informed US foreign policy toward the Greater Middle East: access to the region’s 
energy resources, containment of hostile powers, policies to counter terrorism and the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction, the special relationship with Israel, and democracy promotion. 
Third, we show that US Middle East policy has often been characterized by a noticeable disconnect 
between foreign policy rhetoric and foreign policy practice. 
Finally, we analyze President Obama’s Middle East policy to assess whether it represented a 
significant break with the tradition of US foreign policy toward the Greater Middle East. In order to 
do that, this research focuses on the transformative events that upset the region in 2011, and 
especially on a comparative analysis of the first Obama administration’s response to the popular 



























Hope and change. These words have been the trademark of the Barack Obama administration since 
the days of its electoral campaign. In what became known as the Yes, We Can Speech, presidential 
candidate Obama declared: “Yes, we can, to justice and equality. Yes, we can, to opportunity and 
prosperity. Yes, we can heal this nation. Yes, we can repair this world. Yes, we can.” Besides 
characterizing Barack Obama’s statements, ideas of hope and change also dominated campaign ads, 
bumper stickers, t-shirts, and pins. The leitmotif of the Obama team’s public rhetoric was one 
emphasizing its willingness to represent a turning point from the previous George W. Bush 
administrations.1 
On 4 June 2009, standing before a predominantly Muslim audience at Cairo University, Egypt, 
President Obama stated: 
“I am honored to be in the timeless city of Cairo […] We meet at a time of tension between 
the United States and Muslims around the world […] [T]ension has been fed by colonialism 
that denied rights and opportunities to many Muslims, and a Cold War in which Muslim-
majority countries were too often treated as proxies without regard to their own aspirations. 
Moreover, the sweeping change brought by modernity and globalization led many Muslims to 
view the West as hostile to the traditions of Islam […] This has bred more fear and mistrust 
[…] This cycle of suspicion and discord must end […] I have come here to seek a new 
beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world; one based upon mutual 
interest and mutual respect.”2 
The Cairo Speech will probably be remembered as the most famous example of President Obama’s 
public commitment to set a new beginning with the Muslim world. However, Obama’s public 
outreach to Muslim communities started before his signature speech in Cairo. In January 2009, 
during his Inaugural Address, the US president had already notified Muslims that the United States 
would “seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect.” After that, two 
months later in Ankara, while addressing the Turkish Parliament, President Obama declared: “The 
United States is not, and will never be, at war with Islam […] We seek broader engagement based 
on mutual interest and mutual respect. We will listen carefully, we will bridge misunderstandings, 
                                         
1 Barack Obama, “Yes, We Can Speech,” January 8, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/08/us/politics/08text-
obama.html?pagewanted=all. 




and we will seek common ground. We will be respectful, even when we do not agree.” Upon taking 
office, the US president had openly committed his administration to mend the (mis)perceptions 
existing between the United States and the Muslim world. The primary goal of this research is to 
investigate whether the first Obama administration succeeded or not in setting a new beginning in 
US-Muslim relations. More to the point, we are going to assess the extent to which President 
Obama’s foreign policy represented a paradigm shift in the traditional US foreign policy toward the 
Muslim world.3 
In Cairo, along with promising to set a new beginning, Obama also acknowledged that previous US 
foreign policies toward the Muslim world had spawned fear and mistrust and had generated a cycle 
of suspicion and discord. The findings of two different 2007 survey polls showed the degree of 
suspicion and discord that existed at the time between Americans and Muslims around the world. 
The first survey, on Muslims’ attitudes toward the United States, revealed that an average of 75.5 
percent of respondents in Morocco, Egypt, Pakistan, and Indonesia (four predominantly Muslim 
countries) had a negative view of the US government; 79 percent of respondents thought a US 
foreign policy goal was to weaken and divide Islam; and 64 percent believed that the United States 
wanted to spread Christianity in the Middle East. The second survey investigated the attitudes of 
Americans toward Muslims and Islam. According to its findings, 35 percent of Americans (up from 
29 percent in 2002) had a negative view of Muslims; a plurality of 45 percent believed that Islam 
encouraged violence more than other religions (39 percent disagreed with such a statement); and 
when asked to describe their impression of Islam in a single word, 40 percent of respondents chose 
the word “fanatical”. This was the distinctly ill-relationship between the United States and the 
Muslim world President Obama inherited when he took office.4 
Obama’s message of hope and change was warmly welcomed by domestic and international public 
opinions alike. Domestically, the US public gave him an initial approval rating of 68 percent; 
placing Obama near the top of the list of the US presidents elected after the Second World War (at 
the same level of President Dwight Eisenhower and only behind President John Kennedy, who 
obtained a higher rating of 72 percent). Internationally, the Nobel Committee awarded Obama the 
Nobel Peace Prize for 2009, notably only a year after his inauguration. Moreover, Barack Obama’s 
                                         
3 Barack Obama, “Inaugural Address 2009” (White House, January 20, 2009), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/President_Barack_Obamas_Inaugural_Address; Barack Obama, 
“Remarks by President Obama to the Turkish Parliament” (White House, April 6, 2009), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-turkish-parliament. 
4 Program on International Policy Attitudes, Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and Al Qaeda 
(University of Maryland, April 24, 2007), http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr07/START_Apr07_rpt.pdf; 




election to the US presidency had a positive effect on the image of the United States around the 
globe. A noticeable exception was that of the Muslim world where the US image showed very little 
signs of improvement. However, even in Muslim countries where the United States remained 
usually unpopular, significant percentages of the people polled expressed personal confidence in the 
newly elected US president. For example, in Egypt and Jordan, where the favorable ratings of the 
United States were only at 27 and 25 percent respectively, 42 and 31 percent of the respondents to a 
2009 poll said they were confident President Obama would “do the right thing in world affairs.”5    
How did President Obama manage to raise such high expectations? Why did his message have such 
strong appeal? 
Certainly, change and hope are common features of electoral campaigns, not only in the United 
States but all over the world. Almost every candidate to a political office is ready to criticize the 
policies of his or her predecessors and to pledge to be different, although they often end up 
following very similar paths. Whatever the ability of a politician to be different, words of change 
and hope hold an especially solid grip in times of crisis. A country may perceive a crisis when it is 
experiencing a serious challenge to its military might, to its economic power, or to the integrity of 
its fundamental values. As of 2008, the United States was experiencing a mixture of them all. The 
long and costly military commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq showed the limits of the US 
capability to undertake two simultaneous regional armed conflicts. US economic supremacy was 
increasingly challenged by both new competitors (especially China) and a huge and growing federal 
debt. The US image as the most efficient model of economic development had been tarnished by 
the global financial crisis that many observers saw as primarily American made. Finally, some 
policies of the G.W. Bush’s Global War on Terror, as for example the use of interrogation 
techniques considered by many as torture, were deeply at odds with the perception of the United 
States as the global champion of democracy and human rights. Meanwhile, the international 
community was also experiencing a time of crisis. Indeed, as argued by academic John Gaddis, the 
administrations of G.W. Bush thought the necessary response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the 
United States was a “shock and awe” strategy aimed at shaking up the very foundations of the 
international system. However, Gaddis continued, such a strategy had not included a necessary 
                                         
5 Gallup Poll, Obama’s Initial Approval Ratings in Historical Context, January 26, 2009, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/113968/Obama-Initial-Approval-Ratings-Historical-Context.aspx; “Nobelprize.org,” 2009, 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/press.html; Andrew Kohut, “Briefing to the House 
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight,” March 4, 2010, 
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1512/restoring-americas-reputation-globally-gains-may-be-fragile; Pew Global Attitudes 




“reassurance” part intended to put the pieces of the international system back into place.6 
Additionally, in 2008 the world had just started to witness what would eventually be a long period 
of marked global economic decline, referred to by some as the Great Recession. Given such a 
gloomy picture, it is little wonder that promises like we can heal this nation and we can repair this 
world were enthusiastically welcomed.7 
Nevertheless, simply assuming that the eight years of the G.W. Bush presidency were entirely 
responsible for the grim situation would be both morally unjust and scientifically inaccurate. 
Particularly, the tension President Obama referred to in the Cairo Speech was the result of several 
decades, and not years, of US foreign policies toward the Muslim world. 
When it comes to foreign policy, in fact, US presidents have always wrestled to find an acceptable 
balance between the protection of the strategic national interest and the promotion of the ideal 
national interest. Although both constitute the US national interest broadly defined, the history of 
the United States is punctuated by examples where the pursuit of strategic interests –realist and 
socio-economic ones- conflicted with the advancement of ideal interests –values and ideas.8 There 
is an extensive literature supporting the view that such a conflict has been especially evident, 
although not unique, in the case of the US foreign policy toward the region of the Greater Middle 
East.9 According to former US Ambassador Mark Indyk et al., when dealing with the Greater 
Middle East “every [US] president since Franklin Roosevelt has struck that balance in favor of the 
[strategic] national interest, downplaying the promotion of America’s democratic values because of 
the region’s strategic importance.” Similarly, Middle East expert Kenneth Pollack noticed that “in 
the Middle East, Washington set [the promotion of ideal interests] aside, both because it feared that 
their application to the Middle East would produce Arab States inimical to American interests and 
                                         
6 John L. Gaddis, “Grand Strategy in the Second Term,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 1 (February 2005): 2–15. 
7 Bruce Jones, “The International Order and the Emerging Powers,” in The Arab Awakening (Washington DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2011); Thomas Carothers, Democracy Policy under Obama: Revitalization or Retreat? 
(Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012); Open Society Foundations, Globalizing 
Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition, 2013, 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/globalizing-torture-20120205.pdf; John L. Gaddis, “Grand 
Strategy in the Second Term”; David Wessel, “Did ‘Great Recession’ Live Up to the Name?,” Wall Street Journal, 
April 8, 2010, sec. Capital, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303591204575169693166352882.html. 
8 The concept of the US national interest, and the distinction among its realist, socio-economic, and ideal components, 
are thoroughly discussed in Chapter Two on US foreign policy practice. 
9 For the specific purpose of this research the term Greater Middle East loosely refers to the region stretching east-to-
west from Afghanistan to North Africa and north-to-south from the Levant to the Arabian Peninsula. 
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because we [the United States] always had immediate concerns in the region that required the 
cooperation of America’s [autocratic] Arab allies.”10 
At least two assumptions about the promotion of US ideal interests in the Greater Middle East lie 
behind the US tendency to support autocratic regimes rather than backing democratic reforms in the 
region.11 
The first assumption is that more democratic political systems in the Greater Middle East will 
eventually empower public opinions largely hostile to US policies, and, consequently, make US 
cooperation with Middle Eastern governments much more difficult. For a long time, in fact, the 
United States pursued Middle East policies that were highly unpopular among local populations; 
text-book examples are the longstanding US unconditional support for Israel and the 2003 invasion 
and subsequent occupation of Iraq. Successive US administrations were effective in advancing such 
unpopular foreign policies while maintaining collaborative relations with autocratic Middle Eastern 
rulers. US officials feared that more democratic political systems could have the negative effect, 
from a US perspective, of creating Middle Eastern leaderships more responsive to local public 
opinions and less accommodating to US preferences. The second assumption about democracy in 
the Greater Middle East concerns the implicit belief among US policymakers that Muslims and 
Islam are somehow incompatible with democracy. Jeane Kirkpatrick, US ambassador to the United 
Nations in the early 1980s, made this untold assumption public when she reportedly said: “The 
Arab world is the only part of the world where I have been shaken in my conviction that if you let 
people decide, they will make fundamentally rational decisions. But there, they do not make 
rational decisions, they make fundamentalist ones.” The fact that, over time, Islamist movements 
became the most popular oppositions to the autocratic regimes of the Greater Middle East only 
reinforced concerns in the United States about Muslims’ incompatibility with democracy. 
Meanwhile, local rulers skillfully nurtured and used US fears for their own benefit. They 
                                         
10 Mark S. Indyk, Kenneth G. Lieberthal, and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Bending History: Barack Obama’s Foreign Policy 
(Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), 142; A similar argument is made by Rashid Khalidi in his Sowing 
Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East (Beacon Press, 2009); Odd Arne Westad, The 
Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (London: Cambridge University Press, 
2007); Nicolas Bouchet, “The Democracy Tradition in US Foreign Policy and the Obama Presidency,” International 
Affairs 89, no. I (2013); Alyssa Elridge, “No Exit: The Bush Doctrine and Continuity in U.S. Middle East Policy,” The 
Stanford Journal on Muslim Affairs 3, no. 2 (2013), http://stanford.edu/group/avicenna/cgi-bin/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/Journal-3.2.pdf; Kenneth M. Pollack, “Understanding the Arab Awakening,” in The Arab 
Awakening (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), 8. 
11 Democracy is an inherently difficult concept to define and it is beyond the scope of this research to offer a 
comprehensive definition of it. However, in the US public discourse, democracy promotion is commonly associated 
with the spread of the time-honored US values of freedom, self-determination, protection of human rights, elected-
leaders, accountability, and a government that reflects the will of the people. This is also the working definition of the 
concept of democracy used in this research. 
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systematically warned US policymakers that the only alternative to their pro-West (although 
undemocratic) rule would be the rise to power of anti-West Islamic fundamentalists. Therefore, 
successive US administrations, deeply wary of Islamic fundamentalism, found it convenient to 
support autocratic, but friendly, regimes over democracy promotion. Of course, not all US officials 
accepted the two previous assumptions as the best conceptual lenses through which the United 
States should view democracy in the Greater Middle East. Many area experts and diplomatic 
personnel in the field repeatedly tried to provide a more nuanced analysis of the complex realities of 
the region. However, their views generally failed to gain traction among US policymakers. As a 
result, from the end of WWII, the United States pursued a Middle East policy that favored the 
maintenance of cordial relations with autocratic regimes over the promotion of democratic reforms; 
at least when the former was perceived in Washington as being instrumental to protect US strategic 
interests in the region.12 
Perhaps unexpectedly, it was precisely the first G.W. Bush administration that represented an 
exception, although brief, to this default position. In November 2003, President G.W. Bush stated:  
“Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the 
Middle East did nothing to make us safe -because in the long run, stability cannot be 
purchased at the expense of liberty. As long as the Middle East remains a place where 
freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence 
ready for export. And with the spread of weapons that can bring catastrophic harm to our 
country and to our friends, it would be reckless to accept the status quo.”13 
Two years later, during a trip to Egypt, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reaffirmed the same 
concept: “For 60 years, my country, the United States, pursued stability at the expense of 
democracy in this region, here in the Middle East, and we achieved neither. Throughout the Middle 
East the fear of free choices can no longer justify the denial of liberty.” Despite the initial 
enthusiasm, the G.W. Bush administration rapidly abandoned its so-called Freedom Agenda when 
faced with Islamist electoral gains in Egypt and Palestine; in particular after the Islamist group 
Hamas, deemed a terrorist organization by the White House, won the 2006 Palestinian legislative 
                                         
12 Martin Kramer, Arab Awakening and Islamic Revival: The Politics of Ideas in the Middle East (New Brunswick, 
New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1996), 269; Fawaz A. Gerges, Obama and the Middle East (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2012); James Gelvin, The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2012); Marc Lynch, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East (New York: Public 
Affairs, 2012); The Brookings Institution, The Arab Awakening (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/books/2011/thearabawakening. 




elections and formed a distinct government in the territory of the Gaza Strip. Disillusioned by 
events in Egypt and Palestine, the G.W. Bush administration reverted to the more familiar policy of 
favoring the protection of US strategic interests over the promotion of US ideal interests.14  
As a consequence, the US policy toward the Greater Middle East has been characterized by a clear 
disconnect between foreign policy rhetoric, that usually praises the promotion of US values, and 
foreign policy practice, that mainly prioritizes the protection of US strategic interests. Professor 
John Mearsheimer described this disconnect as a “discernible gap” existing between a US foreign 
policy rhetoric grounded on lofty liberal principles and a US foreign policy practice that follows a 
cold realist logic. Over time, such a disconnect has had unintended negative effects: it has generated 
frequent charges of US hypocrisy and double standards, has severely damaged the image of the 
United States among Muslim communities, and has bred a fertile ground for extremist organizations 
to find recruits willing to undertake terrorist attacks against US citizens and assets. Negative 
perceptions of the 2003 invasion of Iraq are a case in point. At that time, in fact, a common view 
among Muslim communities was that the G.W. Bush administration had used the issue of 
democracy promotion as a justification for the invasion of the Gulf country only to divert public 
attention from the administration’s manifest failure to find weapons of mass destruction - the main 
initial justification for the US decision to intervene in Iraq.15 
In addition to being an area of the world where the conflict between US strategic and ideal interests 
has been especially evident, the Greater Middle East is also a region that US policymakers have for 
a long time considered of vital importance. In this respect, the Obama administration represented no 
exception. In fact, in his pursuit for a new beginning President Obama was not moved solely by 
lofty principles and a willingness to amend past wrongs but, rather, the 44th president of the United 
States saw very practical benefits deriving from improved US-Muslim relations, in particular with 
regard to US Middle East policies. Bridging the divide between the United States and Muslim 
communities had the potential to result in more support, or at least less antagonism, to the presence 
of US troops in Afghanistan and Iraq (two Muslim-majority countries); it could lead to a more 
cooperative environment where to undertake the wider effort against international terrorism; it 
could help building the international consensus needed to contain Iran and its nuclear power 
aspirations; it could improve the ability of the United States to secure access to the region’s energy 
                                         
14 Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks of the Secretary of State at the American University in Cairo,” June 20, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/4109902.stm. 
15 John Mearsheimer, “Liberal Talk, Realist Thinking,” University of Chicago Magazine, February 2002, 
http://magazine.uchicago.edu/0202/features/index.htm; Charles W. Kegley, ed., The New Global Terrorism: 
Characteristics, Causes, Controls (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2003); Shibley Telhami, “Arab Public Opinion: 
What Do They Want?,” in The Arab Awakening (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), 15. 
14 
 
resources; and it could perhaps facilitate the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict by making it 
politically easier for both Arab leaders and their Israeli counterparts to engage in negotiations with 
each other. In 2009, despite all the talk about the Obama administration’s “pivot” toward Asia and 
the so-called US energy revolution (two policies that should have supposedly ushered in a period of 
US disengagement from the Greater Middle East), stabilization operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
fighting international terrorism, Iran’s nuclear program, access to Middle Eastern energy resources, 
and the Arab-Israeli peace process were unquestionably top priorities in the US foreign policy 
agenda and they continued to be very topical issues well into President Obama’s second term.16      
Because it provides compelling evidence of the longstanding conflict existing between different US 
national interests, because of the very controversial nature of some US regional foreign policies, 
and because of its persistent strategic relevance for US policymakers, we believe that the study of 
US foreign policy toward the Greater Middle East holds special importance. Moreover, as the 
Greater Middle East is overwhelmingly inhabited by Muslims, this research can provide valuable 
insights into the nature of the US foreign policy toward the broader Muslim world. 
Before assessing if President Obama’s foreign policy created a significant paradigm shift in the 
tradition of US foreign policy toward the Muslim-majority countries of the Greater Middle East, 
this research defines and analyzes the two fundamental components of the United States’ foreign 
policy: its public rhetoric and its practice. On the one hand, we maintain that US foreign policy 
rhetoric has been characterized by a distinct and potent national narrative that we call the myth of 
US innocence. This narrative depicts the United States intervening on the international stage always 
in reaction to external events or threats, constantly committing to just causes, and acting invariably 
with good intentions and for the noblest purposes. On the other hand, the foreign policy practice of 
the United States has advanced the country’s national interest that, in turn, is the result of a complex 
interaction of multiple, and sometimes conflicting, interests. We group these different interests in 
three principal clusters: realist, socio-economic (together referred to as strategic interests), and ideal 
interests. As mentioned above, we hold that conflict between practice and rhetoric, and between 
                                         
16 Barack Obama, “The National Security Strategy of the United States 2010,” May 26, 2010; Barack Obama, “Remarks 
by President Obama in Address to the United Nations General Assembly 2013” (White House, September 24, 2013), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/24/remarks-president-obama-address-united-nations-general-
assembly; Kenneth M. Pollack and Ray Takeyh, “Near Eastern Promises,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 3 (June 2014); 
Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “The U.S., Asia and the Middle East: A Convergence of Interests,” Baker Institute Blog, 
May 9, 2014, http://blog.chron.com/bakerblog/2014/05/the-u-s-asia-and-the-middle-east-a-convergence-of-
interests/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=*Mideast%20Brief&utm_campaign=2014_The%20




strategic and ideal interests, has been a distinctive feature of the US foreign policy toward the 
Greater Middle East. 
Once we have analyzed the particular features of US foreign policy rhetoric and offered historical 
evidence about the traditional interests of US foreign policy practice in the Greater Middle East, we 
can finally move to the assessment of the Obama presidency’s own record and see if his 
administration delivered the change the president promised in June 2009.  
After more than six years since the Cairo Speech enough policy water has passed under the bridge 
to allow a well-informed evaluation of the first Obama administration’s foreign policy record. 
Eminent scholars and experts have written works on President Obama’s Middle East policy. Some 
authors have engaged in a renewed debate about US declinism, that is about the perception of the 
declining power of the United States in the international system. Christopher Layne argues that US 
quest for “extraregional hegemony” is unsustainable in the long term. It will inevitably lead to 
overexpansion and the stimulation of countervailing forces. Stefan Halper singles out China as the 
most likely challenger to US hegemony. Halper holds that the post-WWII international system 
based on the so-called Washington Consensus will be eventually replaced by Beijing’s state 
capitalism. Adam Quinn’s analysis suggests that US power, measured in terms of its advantage over 
other countries in economic and military capacity, will be shrinking significantly over the next 
decades. Robert Kagan takes a complete opposite stance and calls US decline a “myth”. Kagan 
maintains that US decline is not “inevitable” and that, as in the past, the United States is likely to 
survive this latest time of crisis and “emerge stronger and healthier than other nations”. In this 
research, we acknowledge that, upon taking office, the Obama administration faced considerable 
military, economic, and political difficulties. However, we argue that by 2011 the United States was 
still the single most powerful actor in the international system and decisions taken in Washington 
continued to affect millions of people beyond US borders.17 
Other authors have focused their attention on the issue of change and continuity between the Barack 
Obama and the George W. Bush administrations. Robert Singh argues that, despite an early attempt 
at a policy of engagement, the Obama administration generally maintained, and sometimes even 
expanded, some more aggressive and forward-leaning aspects of G.W. Bush’s foreign policy. 
                                         
17 Christopher Layne, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana,” International Studies 
Quarterly 56 (2012): 203–13; Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate 
the Twenty-First Century (New York: Basic Books, 2010); Adam Quinn, “The Art of Declining Politely: Obama’s 
Prudent Presidency and the Waning of American Power,” International Affairs 87, no. 4 (2011): 803–24; Robert Kagan, 




Richard Jackson’s analysis highlights substantial continuity between Obama and G.W. Bush, 
especially with regard to the overall structure and practices of US policy of counterterrorism. Even 
sympathetic works, such as that of Martin Indyk et al., concede that lack of change from G.W. Bush 
to Obama “has been most evident in regard to war fighting on the one hand and democracy 
promotion in the Middle East on the other”. Jeffrey Bader disagrees and holds that President 
Obama’s foreign policy represented a rupture with G.W. Bush’s. Bader contends that the Obama 
administration’s policy of engagement with China is a particularly telling example of such a 
rupture. Our research provides additional evidence about continuity in US foreign policy. We could 
not detect any significant paradigm shift in US Middle East policy during the first Obama 
administration. In particular, there was no compelling evidence supporting the argument that 
President Obama actually set a new beginning in US-Muslim relations. However, our research goes 
beyond the narrow goal of comparing the Obama and the G.W. Bush administrations. The purpose 
of this work is to put the events of the 2011 Arab Awakening in a broader historical context. We 
offer evidence of historical continuities in US foreign policy that date back to as early as the 
formation of the United States in the XVIII century.18  
Yet other authors have analyzed the Obama administration’s foreign policy through the lenses of a 
particular theory of International Relations. Adam Quinn provides an examination of US foreign 
policy from both a classical and a structural realist perspectives. Trevor McCrisken offers a 
constructivist interpretation of Obama’s War on Terror. Timothy Lynch highlights the influence of 
liberal theories on President Obama’s foreign policy decisions. Doug Stokes and David Maher 
apply Marxism to explain the current role of the United States in global politics and the 
international political economy. Although we recognize the undeniable value of these works, we 
argue that monotheoretical analyses of a topic as complex as US foreign policy are likely to obscure 
more than they reveal. For example, realist analyses, especially structural realist ones, are 
particularly suited to stress the importance of systemic factors (i.e. the international distribution of 
power) in influencing foreign policy whereas they overlook the relevance of important domestic 
variables. Similarly, constructivist approaches assign a critical role to ideational factors (i.e. 
identities, norms, narratives) while paying less attention to more traditional, realist variables of 
                                         
18 Robert Singh, Barack Obama’s Post American Foreign Policy: The Limits of Engagement (London: Bloomsbury, 
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Routledge, 2014); Indyk, Lieberthal, and O’Hanlon, Bending History: Barack Obama’s Foreign Policy, 259; Jeffrey 
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power politics. We share Christopher Layne’s opinion that a more nuanced approach is needed to 
fully grasp the multifaceted nature of US foreign policy.19  
In order to provide such a more nuanced approach, this research undertakes a systematic analysis of 
the first Obama administration’s policy toward the Greater Middle East through the specific prism 
of the tension existing between US foreign policy rhetoric and US foreign policy practice. In other 
words, we study change in foreign policy at three distinct but interrelated levels. At the level of 
foreign policy rhetoric, that is in the ideas and values expressed in public statements and documents 
by public officials. At the level of foreign policy practice, that is in the actual foreign policies 
implemented on the ground. At both levels, detecting the increasing or decreasing disconnect that 
may exist between foreign policy rhetoric and practice. As we will show, change at each level is 
likely to have significant effects on the broader foreign policy of the United States. By investigating 
the possibility of policy change at three levels, this research goes beyond the previous works of 
other scholars and produces a more accurate assessment of the continuities and discontinuities in 
US Middle East policy during the first term of the Obama presidency.  
Moreover, this research contributes to the debate on US foreign policy in three important ways. The 
first contribution is theoretical. We design an analytical framework based on the interaction of five 
core national interests (access to Middle Eastern energy resources, containment of hostile powers, 
policies to counter terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the special 
relationship with Israel, and democracy promotion) that helps to explain most major decisions of 
US foreign policy in the Greater Middle East since the end of WWII. The second contribution is 
conceptual. We carry out a methodical study and produce clear definitions of critical concepts such 
as the US national interest, the idea of US exceptionalism, and the foreign policy narrative of US 
innocence. The third contribution is empirical. We produce a detailed analysis of the transformative 
events of the 2011 Arab Awakening in five Arab countries (Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, and 
Syria) and of the Obama administration’s response to them.  
It took some time and careful thinking to identify the best case study to test the US president’s 
performance in setting a new beginning in US relations with the Muslim world. A number of 
thought-provoking and stimulating options were on the table. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
                                         
19 Adam Quinn, “Realism and US Foreign Policy,” in Obama and the World, ed. Inderjeet Parmar, Linda Miller, and 
Mark Ledwidge, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2014); Trevor McCrisken, “Ten Years on: Obama’s War on Terrorism in 
Rhetoric and Practice,” International Affairs 87, no. 4 (2011): 781–801; Timothy Lynch, “Obama, Liberalism, and US 
Foreign Policy,” in Obama and the World, ed. Inderjeet Parmar, Linda Miller, and Mark Ledwidge, 2nd ed. (London: 
Routledge, 2014); Doug Stokes and David Maher, “Marxism and US Foreign Policy,” in Obama and the World, ed. 
Inderjeet Parmar, Linda Miller, and Mark Ledwidge, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2014); Christopher Layne, The Peace 
of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006). 
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were surely among them. However, they both were a legacy of the previous G.W. Bush 
administrations and not the result of an independent decision by President Obama. Despite the 
indisputable academic appeal of controversial topics such as the closure of the Guantanamo Bay 
detention facility, the use of torture during interrogations, and drone strikes to target terrorists, the 
option of the US Global War on Terror was discarded for the same reason. Then, there was Iran and 
the country’s nuclear program. The topic seemed very promising insofar as at the beginning of his 
mandate President Obama publicly declared to be ready to start with the Islamic Republic of Iran an 
“engagement that is honest and grounded in mutual respect.” In an interview with the UAE-based 
television channel Al Arabiya the US president stated that if Iran unclenched its fist, it would find 
an extended hand from the United States. Nevertheless, we concluded that the US-Iranian 
relationship was too narrowly focused on the issue of nuclear proliferation to represent an all-
encompassing case study. Finally, although the crisis in Sudan, that resulted in the division of the 
country and in the creation of the new independent state of South Sudan in July 2011, also 
represented a potential case study, its implications for the international community and the United 
States were minor issues compared to the others under consideration.20 
Hence, we eventually settled for an analysis of the so-called Arab Awakening.21 There are five 
main reasons behind this choice. First of all, these popular uprisings against autocratic regimes 
across the Greater Middle East were unexpected, at least in terms of their timing and magnitude, 
and exploded two years after President Obama took office. The US response, therefore, was not an 
obvious legacy of previous US administrations. Secondly, the Arab Awakening offered a historic 
opportunity to President Obama to reverse a vicious cycle of misperceptions in US-Muslim 
relations and set the new beginning he had envisioned in Cairo. In fact, the US president faced the 
challenge to strike a difficult balance between the longstanding US policy of support for local 
autocratic regimes and the wholehearted embrace of calls for democratic reforms. Thirdly, the Arab 
Awakening had and will continue to have major implications for the current and future influence of 
the United States in the region. These pro-democracy popular uprisings shook the very foundations 
of the Pax Americana in the Greater Middle East. The United States’ two main Arab allies in the 
                                         
20 Barack Obama, “Videotaped Remarks by the President in Celebration of Nowruz,” March 20, 2009, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/VIDEOTAPED-REMARKS-BY-THE-PRESIDENT-IN-
CELEBRATION-OF-NOWRUZ; Reuters, Obama Urges Iran to “Unclench Fist,” 2009, 
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21 While it is true that the 2011 popular uprisings mainly affected Arab countries, some effects were also felt in non-
Arab countries such as Turkey and Iran. Despite being Arab, the countries that experienced the full-blown Awakening 
are undoubtedly an integral part of the Greater Middle East with which they share both Muslim-majority populations 
and US foreign policies driven by similar US national interests. Therefore, for the specific purpose of this research, 
studying the US foreign policy response to a popular uprising demanding democratic reform in Arab Egypt or in non-
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region, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, were both affected by the revolts. In Egypt, the decades-long 
autocratic regime led by President Hosni Mubarak was overthrown and initially replaced by a 
democratically-elected Islamist government. In Saudi Arabia, the Al Saud royal family felt 
seriously threatened and reacted by taking active steps to curb protest movements across the Persian 
Gulf (as a case in point, Saudi troops were deployed in neighboring Bahrain in March 2011 to 
support the local regime’s crackdown on the opposition). The deposition of Hosni Mubarak also 
cast serious doubts on the future of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, and consequently, on 
the prospect of a resolution of the wider Arab-Israeli conflict. On top of that, the Arab Awakening 
brought to light existing tensions within the Muslim world itself, above all between Shiite and 
Sunni communities, as sectarian clashes in Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria clearly showed. These 
tensions only added concern about the future stability of such a volatile, yet strategically important, 
region of the world. Fourthly, we decided to study the Arab Awakening because events occurring in 
the Greater Middle East do matter to US public opinion. According to a 2012 survey, 73 percent of 
Americans still identified that area of the world as the major source of future threats to the United 
States compared to only 19 percent identifying Asia, and seven percent elsewhere. A final reason 
that makes the case of the Arab Awakening particularly significant is that we have probably not yet 
felt the full impact of these popular uprisings. The forces that have been unleashed by the turmoil in 
the Greater Middle East will likely affect the region for years, or decades, to come. In fact, unless 
local governments address the underlying causes of popular grievance that generated the uprisings 
in the first place, it is probable that both the countries that experienced regime change and those that 
resisted it in 2011 will face future waves of unrest.22 
 
Studying Foreign Policy 
Before beginning our analysis of the foreign policy of the United States specifically, we thought 
useful to examine the general concept of foreign policy.  
Defining political activities is a difficult task and the case of foreign policy makes no exception. A 
first definition maintains that “foreign policy exists in the space created by states’ existence and by 
their very lack of omnipotence. Its rationale is to mediate the impact of the external on the domestic 
and to find ways of projecting a particular set of concerns in a very intractable world.” This 
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definition points out foreign policy’s raison d’être. Another definition sheds light on the “content” 
of foreign policy and on the actors involved in it: “foreign policy involves goals, strategies, 
measures, methods, guidelines, directives, understandings, agreements and so on, by which national 
governments conduct international relations with each other and with international organizations 
and non-governmental actors.” A last definition highlights the decisive role played by human 
decision-makers: “[foreign policy consists of the] decisions taken by human decision-makers with 
reference to or having known consequences for entities external to their nation-state.”23  
Drawing on the insights of the previous definitions, in our research we consider a state’s foreign 
policy to be the set of official policies that national policymakers undertake in order to advance 
their country’s main objectives (referred to as the national interest) and that have some kind of 
intended consequence outside national borders.24 
Foreign policy is commonly regarded as an exceptional issue area not only by specialists but also by 
policymakers and the general public alike. The relevance of this exceptionality is particularly 
evident if we consider democratic societies, as in our case of the United States. Indeed, specific 
needs of foreign policy are more likely to create tensions with some democratic standard procedures 
of general policymaking than the needs of any other policy area. In the words of an attentive XVIII 
century observer, French aristocrat Alexis de Tocqueville, “foreign politics demand scarcely any of 
those qualities which are peculiar to a democracy; they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of 
almost all those in which it is deficient.” Such an interpretation of foreign policy was also 
emphasized by James Madison, one of the founding fathers of the United States, “the management 
of foreign relations appears to be the most susceptible of abuse, of all the trusts committed to a 
Government, because they can be concealed or disclosed, or disclosed in such parts and at such 
times as will best suit particular views; and because the body of the people are less capable of 
judging and are more under the influence of prejudices, on that branch of their affairs, than of any 
other.” The tensions stemming from this exceptionality include those between the needs of 
realpolitik and the rule of law, security concerns and requirements of due process, secrecy and 
transparency, discretion and accountability, and preference for unified direction and pluralism. The 
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exceptional nature of foreign policy also makes the job of foreign policy analysts harder insofar as 
“in the world of foreign policy […] the actual decisions (and indecisions) made may not be 
immediately observable to the analyst. Indeed, they may be secret, and may remain so for decades 
due to national security concerns.”25  
In order to study this exceptional subject, our research makes wide use of insights drawn on that 
tradition of writing known as Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). Academics Robert Jackson and Georg 
Soerensen offer a first basic definition of FPA: “foreign policy analysis is a study of the 
management of external relations and activities of nation-states, as distinguished from their 
domestic policies.” Another useful definition of FPA by Foreignpolicyanalysis.org, a University of 
Missouri’s reputable publication, holds that: “in the simplest terms, [Foreign Policy Analysis] is the 
study of the process, effects, causes, or outputs of foreign policy decision-making in either a 
comparative or case-specific manner.” With regard to this second definition, we argue that it would 
be more accurate to substitute the expression “decision-making” with “policymaking”. In fact, the 
former is only one phase of the latter and it focuses the attention too narrowly on the decision itself, 
while it downplays other critical phases of the process such as the agenda setting and the policy 
implementation.26  
Foreign Policy Analysis as a discipline is commonly considered a subfield of International 
Relations (IR). There has been a lively debate over the years on whether IR theories are an 
appropriate instrument for studying states’ foreign policy. Kenneth Waltz, the founder of 
Neorealism, says that the main goal of IR theories is to try to explain the nature of the international 
system and its effects on patterns of outcomes of states’ interactions such as conflict and 
cooperation, and war and peace. Although Waltz acknowledges that IR theories also provide some 
explanations for individual states’ behavior, he maintains that such theories cannot explain single 
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states’ behavior in detail or in all cases. Similarly, Alexander Wendt, one of the core social 
constructivists in IR, writes: “theories of international politics are distinguished from those that 
have as their object explaining the behavior of individual states, or ‘theories of foreign policy’ […] 
Like Waltz, I am interested in international politics, not foreign policy.” Other authors, such as 
Colin Elman and Hans Mouritzen, reject the previous perspective and suggest that despite some 
difficulties IR theories should still be used to devise and test theories of foreign policy.27 
At present, a large number of theories deals with the subject of foreign policy. These different 
theories are generally classified into two broad categories that, using the language associated with 
Prussian historian Leopold von Ranke, we call theories of Aussenpolitik and theories of 
Innenpolitik.28 The first category acknowledges the primacy of systemic factors (i.e. the distribution 
of relative material power29 among states) in influencing their foreign policy, and it includes diverse 
brands of Realism, such as Offensive Realism, Defensive Realism, and Neoclassical Realism.30 
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Juxtaposed against this first category we find the theories of Innenpolitik that reverse the previous 
assumption and affirm the primacy of domestic factors in foreign policy. Despite the general 
agreement on the primacy of domestic factors, these unit-level theories vary in identifying the 
specific domestic factor or set of factors that best accounts for a state’s foreign policy. Some 
domestic factors commonly used as explanans of foreign policy are: leaders’ psychology, ideology, 
culture, form of government, partisan politics, and socioeconomic structure.31 
This research is not interested in promoting a specific foreign policy theory but, rather, it takes 
advantage of the many valuable insights of FPA-style theories. Academic Valerie Hudson identifies 
the principal characteristics, or hallmarks as she calls them, of Foreign Policy Analysis. According 
to Hudson, FPA is multi-factorial, multi-level, interdisciplinary, integrative, agent-oriented, and 
actor-specific. We consistently use such characteristics as general guidelines to carry out our 
analysis on US foreign policy.32 
Accordingly, in explaining a particular foreign policy we do not rely on a single variable but, rather, 
on a number of variables (multi-factorial). Moreover, we consider variables from more than one 
level of analysis (multi-level). All three of Kenneth Waltz’s images (the individual, the state, and 
the international system) participate, in one way or another, in shaping foreign policy. Depending 
on the case under study, variables at a specific level may gain preeminence in defining the foreign 
policy outcome. However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to establish a hierarchy among such 
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variables that would be able to account for all foreign policies at all times and in all cases.33 
Furthermore, we also try to integrate teachings from a variety of disciplines including history, 
sociology, economics, psychology, anthropology, and so forth in our explanations of distinct 
foreign policies (integrative and interdisciplinary). Finally, we maintain that human agency 
deserves particular attention in our analysis (agent-oriented) and that national policymakers are not 
completely interchangeable with one another (actor-specific).34 
The last two characteristics of foreign policy, those of being agent-oriented and actor-specific, 
assume special relevance in light of the stated objective of this research: to study whether the US 
foreign policy under the new leadership of President Barack Obama represented a paradigm shift in 
the traditional US foreign policy toward the Muslim world, and particularly toward the region of the 
Greater Middle East. Human agency and actor specificity, in fact, have the potential to be essential 
drivers of change and diversity in foreign policy.  
To state that human agency is essential means that flesh and blood national leaders bearers of new 
ideas, and not abstract structures, may be major sources of change in foreign policy. As maintained 
by scholars Valerie Hudson and Christopher Vore, “human beings, acting individually or in 
collectivities, are the source of much behavior and most change in international politics.” Likewise, 
academic Charles Kegley writes, “in theorizing about the sources of foreign policy behavior, we 
should begin with individuals, because only persons think, prefer and act.” Several other authors 
interested in foreign policy change also acknowledge the important role played by human agents 
and their ideas in accounting for variability in a state’s external behavior.35 
In addition, to emphasize actor-specificity36 implies the refusal to black-box the actors under 
analysis. Actor-general approaches, that is approaches which assume that national policymakers are 
completely interchangeable, face difficulties when trying to explain what academics Benjamin Most 
and Harvey Starr call “foreign policy substitutability” and “domain specific laws”; that is, 
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respectively, why under similar material and structural conditions we can assist to variability in the 
resulting foreign policy decisions, and why, conversely, under dissimilar material and structural 
conditions we can expect similarity in the resulting foreign policy decisions. Actor-specific 
approaches can provide an answer to these questions: in the absence of material or structural 
change, diversity in foreign policy may be still possible to explain through the presence of national 
leaders with different personalities, policy preferences, and priorities.37 
The utility of these guidelines in our study notwithstanding, we are aware that the discipline of 
Foreign Policy Analysis has not been exempt from criticism. As this research is not intended to be a 
justification for the value of FPA and as the following criticisms continue to be debated in detail in 
the works of other academics, we are only going to briefly mention some of the most common.38 
Since its inception, critics of FPA have highlighted the hardness of the task of accounting for all the 
influences on a given foreign policy decision.39  
In the words of scholar Herbert McClosky,  
“the inordinate complexity of [FPA] as it has so far been outlined is unquestionably its 
greatest shortcoming, one which in the end may [editor’s note] prove its undoing […] A 
research design that requires an investigator […] to account for a decision making event 
virtually in its totality –places a backbreaking burden upon him, one that he could never 
adequately accomplish.”40 
                                         
37 Hudson and Vore, “Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow”; Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis; 
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of Substitutability in Foreign Policy,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 1 (February 2000): 3–10. 
38 The following criticisms and the debate on the relevance of Foreign Policy Analysis as a discipline are analyzed, 
among others, in the works of Chris Brown, Understanding International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1997); Jean 
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39 The origins of Foreign Policy Analysis are generally identified with the publication of three paradigmatic works 
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“Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy,” in Approaches in Comparative and International Politics, R. B. Farrell 
(ed) (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966); Richard C. Snyder, Henry W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, Decision 
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Sprout and Margaret Sprout, Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1956). 
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McClosky is probably right when he says that explaining a decision making event in its totality is a 
backbreaking task but this is not the reason why we use FPA in this research. Here, we apply FPA 
as a guide to detect and analyze the most relevant, and not all, variables that account for a specific 
foreign policy decision. Moreover, most of the time, decisions taken by human beings are the result 
of the influence of multiple variables. Does McClosky criticism imply that we should give up 
studying human decisions and, consequently, human politics altogether? 
Another commonly mentioned critique is that Foreign Policy Analysis has failed so far to produce a 
coherent grand theory of foreign policy. However, is the lack of a grand theory in FPA really a 
flaw? Scholar Robert Kelley states that generalization unavoidably leads “to a blurring of 
complexities, to a flattering of what on a closer examination is clearly quite an irregular terrain.” 
Other authors have also correctly pointed out that a profound skepticism about the ability of such 
grand theories to explain foreign policy decisions motivated the development of FPA in the first 
place and argued that FPA-style middle-range theories have better chances in accounting for very 
specific trends, events, and policies.41  
Furthermore, after the end of the Cold War, other critics have argued that changes in the 
international system made the field of Foreign Policy Analysis less relevant. In one of his works, 
academic Christopher Hill summarizes this critique as follows: “as the concepts of state sovereignty 
and independence have come under attack in recent decades, so the idea that a government might 
have a discrete set of actions (let alone strategies) for dealing with the outside world has come to 
seem anachronistic, even naïve.” Similarly, scholar Margot Light concedes that in the post-Cold 
War world “there is a steady erosion of a separate concept of foreign policy and a consequent 
undermining of FPA as a discrete field of investigation.” Such critics hold that interdependence, 
globalization, the spread of international and regional organizations, and the increasing domestic 
effects of international affairs have challenged the very nature of the state and its ability to devise a 
distinct set of policies to deal with the external world. They argue, therefore, that Foreign Policy 
Analysis should be either included in or replaced by other disciplines to understanding and 
explaining a state’s external behavior.42 
Hill himself offers an answer to this last critique:  
                                         
41 Robert Kelley, “Ideology and Political Culture from Jefferson to Nixon,” The American Historical Review 82, no. 3 
(June 1977): 553; Juliet Kaarbo, “Foreign Policy Analysis in the Twenty-First Century: Back to Comparison, Forward 
to Identity and Ideas,” International Studies Review 5, no. 2 (June 2003): 156–63; Steve Smith, “Theories of Foreign 
Policy: An Historical Overview,” Review of International Studies 12, no. 1 (1986): 13–29. 
42 Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, 1; Light, “Foreign Policy Analysis,” 100. 
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“until ‘global governance’ crystallized into something solid and coherent, with international 
institutions taking genuine responsibility for the welfare of a real world society, citizens and 
politicians alike will continue to wrestle with the dilemmas arising from the existence of 
foreignness, in varying ways and to varying degrees.”43  
In other words, although the above mentioned changes in the international system have had some 
tangible effects on the nature of the state and its foreign policy, states remain primary actors in 
world politics and continuities in the factors influencing decisions on their external behavior persist.  
All that considered, we still regard Foreign Policy Analysis as a relevant field of research that can 
provide practical guidance and useful insights to analysts interested in studying a state’s foreign 
policy. 
 
Structure and Methodology 
This research is primarily a study about change or the absence of it. In particular, our focus is on 
President Barack Obama’s pledge to reorient the foreign policy of the United States in the region of 
the Greater Middle East. In order to assess if the first-term foreign policy of President Obama 
displayed continuity or change compared to that of previous US administrations, this work is 
structured in four distinct parts. 
In Part One (Introduction), we have pointed out the primary goal of our research and explained the 
reasons why the topic is deemed critical for the advancement of the US national interest. This has 
been followed by an account of the theoretical background that provided most of the analytical tools 
applied throughout the research. Special emphasis has been given to the role of human agency and 
actor specificity as possible drivers of change in foreign policy. Part One ends with a description of 
the structure of the research and the methodology used in it. 
Part Two (US Foreign Policy) offers, across two chapters, a detailed study of the fundamental 
components of US foreign policy broadly defined: its public rhetoric and its practice. This critical 
assessment is necessary for methodological reasons: in order to properly assess the transformative 
impact of President Obama on US foreign policy toward the Greater Middle East, we need to 
analyze the main features and dynamics that have traditionally characterized such a foreign policy.   
                                         
43 Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, xviii. 
28 
 
As far as rhetoric is concerned, in Chapter One, we argue that US public rhetoric is grounded in a 
distinct and time-honored idea of national exceptionalism. Exceptionalism, in turn, provides the 
main themes that form a specific foreign policy narrative, namely the myth of US innocence. 
Innocence in foreign policy means that the United States intervenes internationally always in 
reaction to external threats or events, it is constantly committed to just causes, and it acts invariably 
with good intentions and for the noblest purposes.  
In Chapter Two, we examine US foreign policy practice. We first discuss the main actors and 
dynamics that qualify the process of foreign policymaking in the United States. Then, we analyze 
the essential concept of the national interest and identify the three principal clusters of interests 
(realist, socio-economic, and ideal) that constitute it. Finally, we offer a historical overview of the 
four core US strategic interests that have distinguished US Middle East policy since the end of 
World War II: access to Middle Eastern energy resources, containment of hostile powers, policies to 
counter terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the special relationship 
with Israel. 
Chapter Two’s historical overview of US Middle East policy provides empirical evidence of the 
tensions existing between different US national interests in the Greater Middle East. It also shows 
that, when ideal interests have clashed with socio-economic and/or realist interests, US foreign 
policy has generally experienced a profound disconnect between its public rhetoric and the actual 
policies implemented on the ground. 
Although this research strictly focuses on US relations with the Greater Middle East, it is worth 
noting that the disconnect between rhetoric and practice in US foreign policy is a phenomenon that 
goes beyond this specific geographical region. Indeed, this phenomenon can be detected in US 
relations with other areas of the world. For example in US relations with Central America, with the 
powerful case of the US foreign policy toward Cuba after the Spanish-American War in 1898 and in 
US relations with East Asia, with the telling case of US support for the regime of South Vietnam 
after the French disengaged from the country in 1954.44 
Moreover, such a disconnect between public rhetoric and practice is not limited to the realm of 
foreign policy. For instance, in US trade policy, frictions exist between the promotion of free and 
open markets abroad and protectionist measures at home (i.e. US national subsides to agriculture). 
                                         
44 See Chalmers Johnson, Blowback, Second Edition: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2004); Stephen Kinzer, Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from 
Hawaii to Iraq (New York: Times Books, 2006). 
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Or in US environmental policy, where there are tensions between general calls to defend the 
environment and the practical needs of economic growth (i.e. the United States signed but refused 
to ratify the 1997 Kyoto Protocol). 
In Part Three (The Arab Awakening), we shift the focus of our research from the general to the 
specific; from the analysis of US Middle East policy broadly defined to the study of US Middle 
East policy during the first term of Barack Obama’s presidency. In particular, Part Three applies the 
Arab Awakening, that is the wave of popular uprisings that broke out across the Greater Middle 
East in 2011, as a test to evaluate the Obama administration’s record in setting a new beginning in 
US-Muslim relations; one, according to the US president’s own statements, based on mutual 
interest and mutual respect. Across five chapters, we provide a detailed analysis of the uprisings 
that occurred in five Muslim-majority countries (Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, and Syria) and of 
the way the US administration responded to them. The selection of these specific countries 
depended on a number of criteria. First, we considered only “core” Arab Awakening countries, that 
is countries where popular protests reached an intensity and had a duration that seriously threatened 
the hold on power of the existing regimes. This is the reason why we decided not to discuss minor 
protests that took place in Algeria, Jordan, Turkey, Oman, and other Muslim countries. Second, we 
selected only countries where the United States had relevant stakes in the survival of the regime and 
where US involvement in the uprising was significant. This is why Tunisia does not show in the 
research. In fact, although unrest in the country ostensibly triggered protests and revolts in all the 
others, US stakes and involvement in the Tunisian uprising were almost negligible. Finally, the 
combined analysis of the five selected countries has a particularly effective explanatory power. It 
offers the full-range of variations in the dependent variable under analysis (aka the Obama 
administration’s response to the Awakening): support for the regime, support for the opposition, 
and shifting position over time.    
A thorough discussion of the research’s main findings is the subject of Part Four (Findings and 
Implications). These findings are used to give an answer to our main research question: “To what 
extent did President Obama’s foreign policy represent a paradigm shift in the traditional US foreign 
policy toward the Muslim world, and especially toward the region of the Greater Middle East?” Part 
Four concludes with an overview of the implications, as of the end of 2014, of the Arab Awakening 
for core US strategic and ideal interests in the Greater Middle East. 
As for methodology, this research applies what in social sciences is commonly labeled as the 
Comparative Method of analysis, that is a systematic analysis of a small number of cases in a 
comparative fashion. In particular, we carry out a comparative analysis of the Obama 
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administration’s response to popular uprisings in five Muslim-majority countries (Egypt, Bahrain, 
Libya, Yemen, and Syria). Each country-study is structured as follows:   
- identification of the most relevant US national interests in the country, 
- description of the US foreign policy toward the country before the outbreak of the Arab 
Awakening, 
- analysis of the uprising and of the Obama administration’s response, 
- assessment of continuity or change represented by the policy of the Obama administration 
compared to previous US foreign policies toward the specific country under analysis. 
In each country-study, we also consistently discuss the sometimes conflicting perspectives held by 
the US institutional actors that we consider to be most directly and frequently involved in the US 
process of foreign policymaking. These actors include: the White House, the Department of State, 
the Department of Defense, and the Congress. As for the timeframe of the research, our analysis 
focuses specifically on the events that occurred from 2011 to 2012 (the “core” years of the Arab 
Awakening). 
Given that the analysis of a small number of cases particularly suits a qualitative method of 
research, in this study we decided to rely on a qualitative approach instead of a quantitative one. 
Such an approach mainly consisted of one-to-one interviews conducted face to face or over the 
phone/internet. The interviews were discussions around certain concepts or ideas with open 
questioning. Interviewees were encouraged to explain or describe their reasons for having certain 
responses and opinions. The primary purpose of these interviews was twofold: to obtain valuable 
insights into the foreign policy debate occurring in the United States during the Arab Awakening 
and to shed light on the sometimes confused dynamics of the various 2011 popular uprisings. 
Moreover, the interviews proved particularly useful to overcome some methodological issues. One 
issue concerned the recent, and often contemporaneous, nature of the events under analysis that did 
not allow the researcher to access still classified US government documents. The sample of our 
interviews helped to address this problem since it included interviewees who either were personally 
involved in the process of US foreign policymaking or had access to people directly involved in it. 
A second issue was the ongoing conflict and high-levels of violence characterizing the countries 
under analysis that constrained the researcher’s ability to travel to those countries. Again, our 
interviews proved especially useful insofar as many of the interviewees personally traveled to the 
region or/and had extensive networks of informants there. Our sample included government 
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officials, US foreign policy analysts, and Middle East experts based both in the United States and 
overseas. Interviewees were affiliated with globally renowned think thanks and institutions such as 
the US State Department, the Atlantic Council, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the 
Middle East Institute, the Washington Institute for Near East Studies, the Brookings Institution, the 
Center for National Policy, and the Stimson Center in Washington DC; Chatham House, the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the UK Royal Air Force in London. In agreement 
with the interviewees, we decided to use the information obtained through these interviews as 
background information and to avoid direct quotations of the interviewees’ comments.  
In addition to the personal interviews that we conducted, this research relied on two other major sets 
of both primary and secondary sources. 
Regarding US foreign policy practice, sources consisted of US government files, the works of 
authoritative historians and academics, reports from human rights organizations, and articles and 
opinion pieces by foreign policy experts and journalists. Precious insights into the domestic 
dynamics of the US foreign policy debate during the Obama administration came from public 
documents released by the White House, the US Department of State, and the US Department of 
Defense, from transcripts of congressional hearings and testimonies, and from reports compiled by 
the US Congressional Research Service. In addition to the already-mentioned interviews, the 
acquisition of information still classified was made possible by the analysis of the work of experts 
and scholars that had the opportunity to have direct access to primary sources otherwise not yet 
available to the general public. With regard to the historical sections of Part Two of this research, 
useful sources of information on the practice of US Middle East policy before Obama took office 
included the FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States) that is accessible online both through 
the University of Wisconsin Digital Collection and through the website of the US Department of 
State; the Digital National Security Archive that allows the researcher to have online access to a 
large amount of digitalized primary documents; and the National Security Archive, a project run by 
George Washington University. Since our main focus was on the recent US response to the Arab 
Awakening, since the events discussed in our historical sections have been extensively analyzed by 
reputable scholars, and since we are not aware of the release of any new document that had the 
potential to substantially alter the findings of such previous analysis, we deemed unnecessary to 
carry out a thorough study of archival sources. Here, a brief word about sources on the practice of 
US foreign policy is in order. Since this research, especially Part Three, deals with very recent 
history and with events whose ultimate outcome is still uncertain, we acknowledge the remote 
32 
 
possibility that, despite our best efforts, some parts of our account of the US response to the Arab 
Awakening may look different once official records become available. 
As for US rhetoric, sources included presidential speeches and remarks, statements by high-ranking 
administration officials and congressmen, government public files, and a selection of US, European, 
and Arab news outlets (i.e. The New York Times, The Guardian, and Al Jazeera). With regard to the 
Barack Obama administrations, official speeches, statements, and remarks by US policymakers are 
all available online on government official websites: the White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/; 
the Department of State, http://www.state.gov/; the Department of Defense, 
http://www.defense.gov/; the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/; 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/; just to name a few. 
Previous administrations’ rhetoric was acquired in alternative ways. Presidential rhetoric is 
collected in the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. These collections are accessible 
for consultation at several libraries, as for example at Senate House Library in London. Another 
way to obtain evidence of past US foreign policy rhetoric is to consult old copies of US newspapers. 
The New York Times and The Washington Post conveniently cover the entire timeframe of our 
research. Digital copies of such newspapers are accessible through online databases, such as the 
ProQuest Historical Newspapers database. In addition, further evidence of past administrations’ 
rhetoric can be found through the analysis of secondary sources, such as the works of historians, 
political analysts, and journalists. 
Finally, this research looked at the US government documents leaked to the general public in 2010-
11 by Wikileaks, a whistle-blowing media organization. We were especially interested in those 
documents (the so-called Embassy Cables) describing the bilateral relations between the United 
States and Middle Eastern regimes in the years leading to the outbreak of the Arab Awakening. We 
used Wikileaks documents aware of their limits. A first problem concerned their representativeness. 
In fact, before publication, these documents had been filtered at least twice: first, by the Wikileaks 
organization and then, by the media outlets that received them. Such a process of double filtering 
may have affected the type of information that was eventually made public. Another problem was 
that the Embassy Cables mostly offered the perspective of a single department (the US Department 
of State) and not those of other government institutions such as the US Department of Defense or 
the White House. Despite these limits, the Wikileaks documents provided us with interesting 
insights into the nature of US relations with many leaders of the Arab world.   
Although primarily intended for scholars and policymakers, this research was developed in order to 
reach out to an audience as large as possible. Our great hope is to give a personal contribution to the 
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ongoing debate on such significant issues by providing fresh information and useful insights, for we 
























US Foreign Policy Rhetoric 
In this chapter we discuss the first fundamental component of the foreign policy of the United 
States; that is US foreign policy rhetoric. To begin with, we address the important relationship 
between public rhetoric and foreign policy. After that, we provide a detailed study of the origins, 
evolution, and defining characteristics specific to US foreign policy rhetoric. Particular attention is 
paid to the analysis of the idea of US exceptionalism and of its foreign policy spin off: the myth of 
US innocence.  
 
Public Rhetoric and Foreign Policy  
The term “foreign policy rhetoric” describes the ideas and values, included in public statements and 
official documents, that characterize the US foreign policy discourse. Skeptics may contend that 
public rhetoric should not be relied on as evidence to support the genuine intentions behind a 
country’s foreign policy. They argue that public rhetoric is mostly an instrument in the hands of the 
elites to deceive public opinion and hide the real reasons for a state’s international behavior.45  
Although this may be the case at times, this argument does not substantially weaken the utility and 
importance of analyzing public rhetoric in foreign policy. According to political scientist Michael 
Hunt, “public rhetoric is not simply a screen tool or ornament. It is also, perhaps even primarily, a 
form of communication, rich in symbols and mythology and loosely constrained by certain rules.” 
Hunt explains that “to be effective, public rhetoric must draw on values and concerns widely shared 
and easily understood by its audience.” In other words, public rhetoric represents the principal 
means of communication between national leaders and public opinion and, in order to be effective, 
public rhetoric has to mirror ideas and values deeply cherished by a large majority of the society, 
including the policymakers themselves. In fact, policymakers are not individuals culturally and 
ideologically alien to their societies. Assuming as much would create a situation of schizophrenic 
foreign policy, national in name but not in its fundamental tenets. On the contrary, in taking office, 
national leaders are most likely to carry their cultural and ideological background with them or, by 
using the words of XIX century philosopher Herbert Spencer, policymakers are generally “the 
products of their societies” that give them “their own early bias, their creed, morals, knowledge, 
aspirations.” More recently Henry Kissinger, a former US secretary of state, writes that “the 
                                         
45 Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and US Foreign Policy (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2009); Snyder, Myths of 
Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition. 
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convictions that leaders have formed before reaching high office are the intellectual capital they will 
consume as long as they continue in office.” Similarly, in their study on the domestic sources of US 
foreign policy, academic Eugene Wittkopf and James McCormick maintain that “the basic needs, 
values, beliefs, and self-images widely shared by Americans […] stands out as a primary societal 
source of American foreign policy.” All that considered, national core values and ideas, that find 
expression in public rhetoric, are likely to influence the way national policymakers and public 
opinion perceive and respond to international events.46 
Public rhetoric simultaneously shows both an enabling and a constraining function. On the one 
hand, a credible rhetoric enables national leaders to rally public support for a particular foreign 
policy and thus increases their ability to access the country’s power resources.47 As maintained by 
academic William Schneider, “foreign policy makers must demonstrate not only that their policies 
work, but that they […] express the values of major constituencies in American political life.” On 
the other hand, public rhetoric constrains national leaders to maintain a certain level of consistency 
between their words and their actions. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, in order to conjure 
support, a rhetoric must be credible. A rhetoric that is repeatedly proved pronouncedly inconsistent 
with the speaker’s real values and ideas will lose credibility in the long run. People will plausibly 
stop believing in such a rhetoric and will make it harder for policymakers to obtain popular support 
for their foreign policies.48  
Another notable function of public rhetoric is that it participates in the construction of a country’s 
national identity. According to academic Valerie Hudson, “[the] aspects of national identity are not 
carved in stone, nor do they spring from tablets of stone.” Rather, “discourse and interaction within 
our society are the engines of national identity.” National leaders’ public statements and 
government’s official documents, in particular, provide much-needed answers to fundamental 
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questions for human communities such as “who are we?”, “what is our role in the world?”, and 
“who are they?”49 
In addition to influencing national politics and national identities, foreign policy rhetoric has 
important external effects. It is primarily a form of communication among countries, and between 
states and other actors on the international stage. As such, foreign policy rhetoric performs its 
enabling and constraining functions also at the international level. National leaders can use public 
rhetoric to pursue a number of foreign policy objectives: to send messages to allies, to warn foes, or 
to gain international support for their policies. However, if rhetoric is not supported by a consistent 
practice it can become counterproductive and eventually raise charges of hypocrisy and double 
standards.   
Public rhetoric, therefore, is essential to understanding a country’s identity and to explaining 
significant aspects of its international behavior. This is not to say that public rhetoric is the root 
cause of foreign policy. What we are arguing here is that public rhetoric reflects important elements 
of a country’s self-image that, in turn, contribute to shape the discourse in which policymakers deal 
with foreign policy issues and in which the general public understands those issues.50  
Moving from this assumption, the next sections provide the reader with a thorough analysis of the 
predominant brand of US public rhetoric. We address three fundamental questions: What are its 
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The predominant brand of US public rhetoric draws much of its themes and strength from the idea 
of US exceptionalism.51 Many Americans hold an image of their nation as an exceptional one. In 
the XIX century, French author Alexis de Tocqueville already noted a sense of exceptionality in the 
Americans’ perception of themselves: 
“Not only are the Anglo-Americans united by these common opinions, but they are separated 
from all other nations by a feeling of pride. For the last fifty years no pains have been spared 
to convince the inhabitants of the United States that they are the only religious, enlightened, 
and free people. They perceive that, for the present, their own democratic institutions prosper, 
while those of other countries fail; hence they conceive a high opinion of their superiority and 
are not very remote from believing themselves to be a distinct species of mankind.”52 
As we show below, Americans who subscribe to the exceptionalist idea believe themselves to be a 
chosen people with a special mission to reshape the world according to their universal values. This 
belief is by no means an exclusive feature of the United States. On the contrary, images of national 
exceptionalism have been a common and recurrent theme throughout human history. For example, 
French revolutionaries in the XVIII century emphasized the universality of their values in the 
Déclaration des droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen (Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen). Moreover, scholar Russel Nye argues that “all nations […] have long agreed that they are 
chosen peoples; the idea of special destiny is as old as nationalism itself.” This argument has also 
been reiterated by professor Anatol Lieven who points out that “a great many nations throughout 
history –perhaps even the great majority- have had a sense of themselves as especially chosen by 
God, or destiny, for great and special tasks.” The United States is currently walking the same path 
walked by the past civilizational empires “of Rome and China to spread their civilizations to the 
barbarians beyond their borders; of the Spanish to Christianize the New World; of the missions 
civilisatrices of the nineteenth-century European empires; of the Soviet Union to bring the light of 
Communism to the rest of humanity.” Academic Stephen Walt concurs and writes that “when 
Americans proclaim they are exceptional and indispensable, they are simply the latest nation to sing 
a familiar old song. Among great powers, thinking you [a]re special is the norm, not the exception.” 
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Although not unique in history, the idea of national exceptionalism in the United States is grounded 
in a number of specific characteristics that taken together distinguish it from the others.53  
First of all, US exceptionalism has a strong and longstanding religious component. No serious 
attempt to analyze US public rhetoric can afford to dismiss the importance of religion in the 
country. As early as in the XVI and XVII centuries, Puritan settlers from England and Scotland 
identified North America with the “New World”, the “New Israel”, the “New Jerusalem”, or “a 
religious special place” whose inhabitants were “blessed by God.” On board of the ship Arabella, 
John Winthrop, a devout Puritan and future leader of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, delivered the 
often-recalled sermon where he stated that “we must consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill. 
The eyes of all people are upon us.” Moreover, even the founding documents of the United States 
bear the signs of this religious influence. The 1776 Declaration of Independence is filled with 
religious references: “Nature’s God”, the “Creator”, “Divine Providence”, and “Supreme Judge of 
the World.” The First Amendment in the 1791 Bill of Rights regulates the issue of freedom of 
religion. The US national motto proposed in 1861, during the American Civil War, but not ratified 
until 1956 under President Dwight Eisenhower, says “in God we trust”. In addition, evidence of the 
special status enjoyed by religion in the United States includes the success and appeal of public 
figures such as Billy Graham, an evangelical preacher who during the XX century and up to the 
beginning of the XXI has had privileged access to almost a dozen of US presidents. Furthermore, 
religion’s influence is absolutely not a relic of the past. It is still strong in contemporary US society, 
as showed by a 2011 survey poll. To the question on the importance of religion in their lives, 50 
percent of Americans answered that “religion plays a very important role”, compared to 22 percent 
in Spain, 21 percent in Germany, 17 percent in Britain, and 13 percent in France. A different 2011 
survey poll asked Christians in the United States (who represent roughly 75 percent of the entire US 
population) whether they identified themselves first with their religion or with their nationality. 
Forty-six percent put their Christian identity first, compared to 23 percent in Germany, 22 percent 
in Spain, 21 percent in Britain, and 8 percent in France. This is a percentage similar to those found 
in the societies of Turkey (49 percent) and Egypt (46 percent) with regard to Muslim identity. 
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Although not equally distributed throughout the United States, religion is undoubtedly a major 
political force in the Greater South and parts of the Midwest.54 
The second specific characteristic of US exceptionalism consists in a similarly potent and time-
honored secular component. Its origins can be traced back to the Age of Enlightenment or even 
further back to the British tradition under the Tudors. It draws extensively on the liberal philosophy 
of John Locke and on the political economy of Adam Smith. Although largely imported from 
Europe, this secular component of US exceptionalism grew in the United States within a different 
environment, free from the constraints of the secular hierarchy of the crown and the religious 
hierarchy of the church. The secular component is often referred to as the American Creed, a term 
coined in the 1940s by the Swedish Nobel Prize laureate Gunnar Myrdal. The American Creed 
grants an exceptional status to the concept of freedom. It also includes both political and economic 
aspects, the former more widely accepted than the latter. Regarding its political aspect, the Creed is 
generally praised for its support for liberal, democratic, individualistic, and egalitarian values. As 
far as egalitarian values are concerned,  in order to understand US society, it is critical to remember 
that these values refer specifically to political and cultural, not economic, egalitarianism. Regarding 
its economic aspect, instead, the Creed is often associated with the concepts of free trade, capitalist 
economy, and frontier mentality.55  
The political and economic nature of the Creed is thoroughly examined in a study by academics 
Herbert McClosky and John Zaller. In The American Ethos, they show that the national image of 
the United States is grounded both in a strong faith in democratic values, and a firm belief in 
capitalism and the free market. The major elements of the Creed are succinctly summarized by 
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scholars Daniel Deudney and Jeffrey Meiser: “individual freedom and institutionalized civil rights, 
popular sovereignty, limited government specified in a constitution, multiparty electoral democracy, 
private property and market capitalism, rule of law and independent courts, and religious liberty and 
separation of church and state.” These principles are inscribed in all the founding documents of the 
United States, including the Declaration of Independence, the Federal Constitution, the Bill of 
Rights, and single states’ Constitutions. According to foreign policy expert Walter Russell Mead, 
“many Americans, perhaps most” consider such founding documents “to be something like sacred 
scripture: revelations of eternal principles, valid for all time.” Examples of the secular component of 
US exceptionalism date back to as early as the XVIII century when author Thomas Paine worded 
the United States’ special mission to reshape the world in the following way: “we [Americans] have 
in our power to begin the world all over again.”56 
Universalism is the third characteristic of US exceptionalism. It maintains that American principles 
have universal value and are universally applicable. There are many examples of this in US public 
rhetoric. For example, in 1917, President Woodrow Wilson, while addressing the US Senate, stated 
that “these are American principles, American policies. We could stand for no others. And they are 
also the principles and policies of forward-looking men and women everywhere, of every modern 
nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail.” The 
American belief in the universality of US principles was as true in the past as it is now. In fact, 
almost a century later, in strikingly similar language, President George W. Bush made the same 
point in his administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy document, “these values of freedom 
are right and true for every person, in every society -and the duty of protecting these values against 
their enemies is the common-calling of freedom-loving people across the globe and across the 
ages.” Given that, we can confidently argue that universalism is another longstanding and essential 
component of US exceptionalism.57 
Fourth, the American self-image of being a chosen people with a special mission to reshape the 
world is peculiar for its persistence and resilience throughout US history. Historian Michael 
Kammen describes the “recurrent rhetoric” about US exceptionalism as “a cultural reality and a 
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potent force.” The validity of the idea of national exceptionalism has been sometimes doubted. 
Particularly, criticism mounted in the mid-1970s when the Watergate scandal and the failure in 
Vietnam shook Americans’ belief in their country’s exceptionality.58 However, despite the 
criticisms it has received, we believe that US exceptionalism has remained a constant of US public 
discourse. Indeed, a quick analysis of the US foreign policy rhetoric of the last two hundred and 
fifty years highlights the existence of a leitmotif that runs from the colonial period up to the present 
day.59 
Drawing on the words of Winthrop and Paine, successive presidents and top-ranking officials have 
been reiterating the same themes and the same values time and again. President John Adams in 
1797 spoke about a people blessed by God, “may that Being who is supreme over all, the Patron of 
Order, the Fountain of Justice, and the Protector in all ages of the world of virtuous liberty, continue 
His blessing upon this nation and its Government and give it all possible success and duration 
consistent with the ends of His providence." Amidst the sorrow of the Civil War, President 
Abraham Lincoln dubbed the United States “the last best hope of earth.”60  
Almost two generations later, President Woodrow Wilson stressed US exceptionality and his 
country’s leading role in the world as follows:  
“there can be no question of our ceasing to be a major power. The only question is whether 
we can refuse the moral leadership that it is offered us […] The stage is set, the destiny is 
disclosed. It has come about by no plan of our conceiving, but by the hand of God who led us 
into this way […] It was of this what we dreamed at our birth. America shall in truth show the 
way.”61  
At the outset of the Cold War, President Harry Truman, while comparing the US system with the 
Soviet one, stated that:  
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“one way of life [the American one] is based upon the will of the majority, and is 
distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of 
individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression […] 
The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter 
in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world.”62  
In a 1969 address to the nation, President Richard Nixon declared that “we have become the 
strongest, richest nation in the world. And the wheel of destiny has turned so that any hope for the 
survival of peace and freedom will be determined by whether the American people have the moral 
stamina and the courage to meet the challenge of free world leadership.” During his inaugural 
address, President Jimmy Carter sounded a similar theme, “the passion for freedom is on the rise. 
Tapping this new spirit, there can be no nobler nor more ambitious task for America to undertake on 
this day of a new beginning than to help shape a just and peaceful world that is truly humane.” After 
the demise of the USSR in 1990, President George H.W. Bush envisioned an opportunity for his 
country to reshape the world, “out of these troubled times […] -a new world order- can emerge.” At 
the beginning of the XXI century, future National Security Adviser and then Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice expressed a common and widely accepted belief when she affirmed that “the 
United States and its allies are on the right side of history.” More recently, two eminent US senators 
confirmed the persistent popularity of the theme of US exceptionalism. In 2012, at the Republican 
National Convention, Senator John McCain explained that the United States has “led with generous 
hearts, moved by an abiding love of justice, to help others eradicate disease, lift themselves from 
poverty, live under laws of their own making, and determine their own destinies [...] This is what 
makes America an exceptional nation.” Similarly, in 2013, Senator Rand Paul wrote on the columns 
of Time Magazine: “America is indeed exceptional. Our history has proved it so. While we all share 
the same Creator, we do not all share the same richness of history regarding human rights, freedom 
and democracy. There has been in the past 200 years a city on the hill that has showed brighter than 
all others.” This brief historical overview illustrates that the idea of US exceptionalism has been a 
consistent and recurrent theme in the US public discourse throughout the centuries up to current 
times.63 
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A fifth specific characteristic of US exceptionalism is that it has enjoyed a widespread political 
consensus. A consensus that is indeed bipartisan. According to some observers, political 
confrontation between Republicans and Democrats over issues of foreign policy consists of no more 
than political theater: “lost amidst the posturing is the extent to which both parties and virtually the 
entire foreign policy elite tacitly share a common vision.” Confrontation is often a matter of 
different priorities and tactics rather than disagreement on fundamental principles. The previous 
examples have already showed that the rhetoric of US exceptionalism has been widely used both by 
Republicans, such as Nixon, H.W. Bush, and W. Bush, and by Democrats, such as Wilson, Truman, 
and Carter. A couple of additional examples from history will help demonstrate the bipartisan 
nature of this consensus on the core themes and values of US foreign policy rhetoric. Democratic 
President John Kennedy revived the theme of the “city upon a hill” by stating, “today the eyes of all 
people are truly upon us -and our governments, in every branch, at every level, national, state and 
local, must be as a city upon a hill- constructed and inhabited by men aware of their great trust and 
their great responsibilities.” Similarly, Republican President Ronald Reagan stated: “I've spoken of 
the shining city all my political life, but I don't know if I ever quite communicated what I saw when 
I said it. But in my mind it was a tall, proud city built on rocks stronger than oceans, wind-swept, 
God-blessed, and teeming with people of all kinds living in harmony and peace.” During the 
George H.W. Bush Republican administration, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft said that 
the United States was “the indispensable ingredient in fashioning a stable world order […] We do 
not have the luxury of putting our leadership on hold until we get our domestic house in order. 
Unfortunately, there is no holiday from history.” In striking the same chord about US 
exceptionality, a Democrat, Madeleine Albright, secretary of state under President Bill Clinton, 
declared that “If we have to use force, it is because we are America. We are the indispensable 
nation. We stand tall. We see further into the future” and “we have our own duty to be authors of 
history.” This evidence of manifest bipartisanship adds value to the argument that the US self-
image of national exceptionalism has enjoyed extremely widespread political consensus.64 
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In addition to being bipartisan, the rhetoric on US exceptionalism also seems to blur the dichotomy 
between Realists and Idealists. Although these two schools of thought contain different paradigms 
within themselves, Realism generally assigns a critical role to the concepts of power and realpolitik 
whereas Idealism typically stresses the importance of ideas and values, other than power, in shaping 
foreign policy. Since government officials often show elements of both schools in dealing with 
different foreign policy issues, at different times, it is particularly difficult to categorize any such 
individuals in a specific school. Despite this difficulty, some national leaders are commonly 
associated to one school instead of the other. Going back to our previous historical examples, 
individuals usually considered Realists include President Nixon, President Reagan, and Secretary of 
State Rice whereas Idealists include President Wilson, President Carter, and President G.W. Bush. 
The similarity of their remarks suggests that affiliation to one school does not significantly affect 
the rhetorical use of the idea of US exceptionalism.65 
Moreover, consensus on US exceptionalism is not confined within the narrow circle of the foreign 
policy elite. It is a sentiment widely shared and cherished by the US society as a whole. Evidence of 
this consensus is everywhere we look. It can be found in the national literature. For example, 
Herman Melville, a XIX century American novelist, famous for being the author of Moby-Dick, 
writes, “we Americans are the peculiar chosen people -the Israel of our time; we bear the ark of the 
liberties of the world. God has predestined, mankind expects, great things from our race; and great 
things we feel in our souls.” Moreover, evidence is in writings on political philosophy. In one of his 
works, intellectual Herbert Croly states that “the faith of Americans in their country is religious, if 
not in its intensity, at any rate in its almost absolute and universal authority. It pervades the air we 
breathe and consciously or unconsciously, it enters largely into our personal lives as a formative 
influence.” In addition, the theme of a special US national mission to reshape the world is carved 
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into one side of the Great Seal of the United States, which reads Novus Ordo Seclorum -a new order 
of the ages. The topicality of the idea of US exceptionalism is also evident in the results of popular 
survey polls. A 2011 poll, for example, shows that 49 percent of the public in the United States 
thought that US culture, although not perfect, “is superior to others”. Confronted with the same 
question, 47 percent of respondents in Germany, 44 percent in Spain, 32 percent in Britain, and 27 
percent in France agreed that their own cultures were superior to those of other nations. Perhaps 
even more telling is the result of a poll taken in 2010. When asked if they believed that the United 
States had a “unique character that makes it the greatest country in the world” 80 percent of 
Americans answered positively. Furthermore, influential scholars and columnists make frequent use 
of the same idea, “this identification of nationality with political Creed or values makes the United 
States virtually unique”, and again, “America is no mere international citizen […] America is in a 
position to reshape norms, alter expectations and create new realities.” According to a 2012 
research, since 1980 the theme of US exceptionalism appeared in national publications 457 times 
during the first 20 years, 2,558 times during the following decade, and roughly 4,172 times since 
2010. National exceptionalism in the United States appears to be a lingering idea entrenched in the 
psyche of US society.66  
How do we explain the time-honored persistence and the widespread consensus surrounding the 
American self-image of being a chosen people with a special mission to reshape the world? 
A generally accepted explanation finds the roots of this persistence and consensus in the distinct 
history of US political culture - a history largely characterized by stability and continuity of 
institutional structures and of core political and social principles. Stability and continuity were 
mainly possible because the United States was spared the havoc of foreign invasions (due mostly to 
its relative geographical isolation) and the shocks of great social revolutions. This, in turn, 
significantly reduced the likelihood of the emergence of alternative ideas challenging US 
exceptionalism. Another element that could have reinforced the idea of national exceptionalism is 
the success of the United States as a country, not only domestically, in terms of the American 
Dream (the “dream of a land in which life should be better and richer and fuller for everyone, with 
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opportunity for each according to ability or achievement”67) but also internationally. In less than 
two hundred and fifty years, in fact, the United States has achieved impressive results. It has been 
able to evolve from thirteen small English colonies, to become an independent state within an 
international system dominated by Britain, to be one of the two superpowers during the Cold War 
bipolar system, and eventually to reach the status of world hegemon after the demise of the Soviet 
Union. In terms of great power politics, this is a stunning track record that strengthens the idea of 
national exceptionalism.68  
Furthermore, it is interesting to mention the opinion of an informed non-American who pointed out 
a facet of US society that could partly explain the popularity and resilience of the idea of national 
exceptionalism in the country. Having had a first-hand experience with his son going to school in 
California, English journalist Andrew Gumbel writes, “children are recruited from the very start of 
their school careers to believe in Team America, whose oft-repeated mantra is: we're the good guys, 
we always strive to do the right thing, we live in the greatest country in the world. No other point of 
view, no other cultural mindset, is ever seriously contemplated.” Besides, it is not only the 
education system but also the mainstream national media that commonly help to spread and 
perpetuate the image of the Americans as an exceptional people. Journalists of the mainstream 
media are also products of their own society and, as such, they tend to share and disseminate its 
core values and beliefs. As indicated by academic Doris Graber, “[US] media usually support the 
political system and rarely question its fundamental tenets. Mainstream media limit their criticism 
to what they perceive as perversions of fundamental social and political values.” Using professor 
Daniel Hallin’s terminology, US media coverage moves between the “sphere of consensus” and the 
“sphere of legitimate controversy”, but it generally ignores whatever perspective falls into the 
“sphere of illegitimate sources and views”. Although not unique to the case of the United States, 
educational institutions and mass media, along with parents and peers, play an important role in 
shaping the values and ideas of US citizens and in how these values and ideas are transmitted from 
one generation to another. 69 
Finally, the United States is a country with a relatively short history and deeply diverse in terms of 
religious affiliation and ethnicity. Given such a specific context, the idea of US exceptionalism soon 
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came to be seen as an essential element of the US national identity and a vital instrument to hold the 
nation together.70 
World history has been punctuated by images of national exceptionalism. Nevertheless, 
exceptionalism in the United States has showed some distinctive characteristics that make it a 
fundamental aspect of the country’s national identity and public discourse. US exceptionalism 
consists mainly of a longstanding religious component as well as a time-honored secular one. It is 
also characterized by the professed universality of its values, and the persistence and resilience of 
its influence. Moreover, we have seen that the idea of US exceptionalism has enjoyed widespread 
consensus not only at the level of foreign policy elites but also within the larger US society. 
 
Example Versus Action 
As described above, the national self-image of the Americans as an exceptional people has been a 
pervasive theme throughout much of US history. However, the same kind of widespread consensus 
has not always been translated to support for a single US strategy in pursuit of its special mission to 
reshape the world according to its universal values. Interestingly, exceptionalism in the United 
States has been used to justify foreign policies of both distant aloofness and active interventionism. 
Can the US special mission be carried out by setting an example? Or does it require direct action? 
Ever since the United States adopted its exceptionalist credo, the primary debate over 
implementation has centered on two competing schools of thought. Such a confrontation has also 
been reflected in the foreign policy discourse where two distinct brands of public rhetoric have 
coexisted; each one supporting a particular strategy.71 
On the one hand, the “lead by example” strategy calls for restraint in foreign policy. Proponents of 
this strategy argue that immoderate interventionism in an immoral international system would 
eventually corrupt the republican values of the domestic system. Democracy is a fragile plant that 
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needs constant care and protection. Liberty should first be perfected at home and then exported to 
others solely by the force of the example. Thomas Jefferson, one of the founding fathers of the 
United States, was a strenuous supporter of this strategy. In one of his letters, Jefferson maintains, 
“I hope that peace and amity with all nations will long be the character of our land, and that its 
prosperity under the Charter will react on the mind of Europe, and profit her by the example.”72  
In another, he writes,  
“the station which we occupy among the nations of the earth is honorable, but awful. Trusted 
with the destinies of this solitary republic of the world, the only monument of human rights, 
and the sole depository of the sacred fire of freedom and self-government, from hence it is to 
be lighted up in other regions of the earth, if other regions of the earth shall ever become 
susceptible of its benign influence.”73  
The strategy of the example was also advanced by US President John Quincy Adams in one of his 
most recalled quotes: “she [The United States] goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. 
She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator 
only of her own. She will commend the general cause by the countenance of her voice, and the 
benignant sympathy of her example.” The supporters of the “lead by example” strategy contend 
that, in order to carry out its special mission in the world, the United States should carefully avoid 
interventionism abroad and, instead, set an example at home for other nations.74 
On the other hand, the “lead by action” strategy calls for an assertive foreign policy. Democracy 
and freedom at home are inextricably bound to an active advancement of these same US values 
abroad. As early as 1795, another US founding father, Alexander Hamilton, describes the United 
States as “the embryo of a great empire.” The narrative of Manifest Destiny emblematically 
represents this strategy of action. John O’Sullivan, the American journalist who coined the term in 
the 1840s, writes that it was “the fulfillment of our manifest destiny to overspread the continent 
allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions.” O’Sullivan 
explains that “we are the nation of human progress, and who will, what can, set limits to our onward 
march? Providence is with us, and no earthly power can.” Although originally framed for the 
United States’ westward continental expansion, the narrative of Manifest Destiny was later adjusted 
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to promote US interventions throughout the world.75 The “lead by action” interpretation of the US 
special mission to reshape the world is also reinforced by a strong religious element. Indeed, since 
the early XIX century, American churches have been sending their missionaries throughout the non-
Protestant world to actively make converts, open missionary stations and schools. American 
churches have seen the spread of US religious values as a critical means to redeem the world. 
Therefore, along with a secular element, there is also a religious one that has called for an active 
advancement of US values abroad.76 
The existence of two opposite strategies has often given rise to lively debates and passionate 
confrontations on issues of foreign policy. A first confrontation took place during the George 
Washington administration and revolved around the ratification of the Jay Treaty with Britain 
(1795). Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton supported the ratification of the treaty and an 
assertive foreign policy. Thomas Jefferson, then secretary of state, was against the treaty and in 
favor of a foreign policy of aloofness. One of the main criticisms moved to the Jay Treaty was that 
overly close economic relations with London would endanger US republican values and the 
country’s recently acquired freedom. A second major confrontation concerned the 1846-48 war 
against neighboring Mexico. It saw President James Polk pushing for the annexation of the Mexican 
territories of California and New Mexico against the opposition of several members of the 
Congress, such as Democratic Senator John C. Calhoun and Whig Senator Joshua R. Giddings. The 
Spanish-American War of 1898 prompted a third heated debate. President William McKinley’s 
project to annex the Spanish territories of Hawaii, The Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico faced a 
strong resistance by a diverse group of politicians and intellectuals united under the banner of the 
Anti-Imperialist League. A fourth contest regarded the US participation in the First World War. 
Senators George W. Norris and Robert M. La Follette were two leading voices within the anti-
interventionist camp. One strong argument against intervention was that President Woodrow 
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Wilson was taking the United States into war only to serve the interests of Wall Street bankers who 
had loaned large sums of money to the Entente powers.77 The outbreak of the Second World War 
set the stage for a fifth confrontation between the supporters of the two different foreign policy 
strategies. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Century Group favored US intervention, while 
the organization America First, and its leader Charles A. Lindbergh, strongly resisted it.78  
Academic Christopher Layne holds that since the 1940s US grand strategy has been systematically 
based on “strategic internationalism”; that is on the assumption that “to be secure, the United States 
must exert the full panoply of its power – military, economic, and ideological- on the international 
system in order to shape its external environment.” Likewise, scholar Walter Russell Mead 
identifies US President Harry Truman’s 1947 enunciation of his Containment Doctrine for the Cold 
War as the event that definitively crystallized the predominant status of the “lead by action” 
strategy in US foreign policy. On that occasion President Truman strongly stressed the necessity for 
the United States to actively commit itself on a global scale to defend “the free peoples of the 
world” to maintain their freedoms against the attacks of “armed minorities” or “external pressures”. 
Words were soon followed by action and, between 1945 and 1999, the United States carried out 40 
unilateral attempts to overthrow foreign governments and it was involved in at least 30 operations 
aimed at quelling nationalist movements in foreign countries.79  
Some observers have argued that, despite evidence of US activism abroad, the US general public is 
probably less interventionist than US foreign policy elites. However, there is not unequivocal 
evidence supporting such an argument. On the contrary, according to a 2012 study by The Chicago 
Council on Global Affairs, since 1947 the number of Americans backing an “active” role of the 
United States in world affairs has ranged from 54 to 72 percent whereas the number of those 
advocating for Washington to “stay out” of world affairs has ranged from only 21 to 38 percent. 
After WWII, the strategy of the example has not disappeared but has markedly lost its power. The 
persistence of the rhetoric of the “lead by example” strategy throughout US history has largely 
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contributed to the illusion of US isolationism in world affairs, that is to the illusion of the 
Americans, as a people, reluctant to engage in international affairs.80 
US isolationism is an illusion because it mostly originates from a superficial and partial analysis of 
historical events. Economically, the United States has always favored high levels of foreign 
engagement, especially in terms of international trade. Indeed, since its independence and despite 
short-lived attempts at economic isolation, the United States has steadily increased its commercial 
relations with foreign countries. At the turn of the XX century, the country already had the largest 
economy in the world.81 US historian and then Senator Albert J. Beveridge effectively describes 
this American penchant for international trade: “American factories are making more than the 
American people can use; American soil is producing more than they can consume. Fate has written 
our policy for us; the trade of the world must and shall be ours.” In the literature on the history of 
the United States, these high levels of US economic and commercial engagement with the rest of 
the world have been commonly referred to as the Open Door policy.82 
Even if we accept the marginalization of the economic aspect of foreign policy, it is still hard to 
describe US behavior in world affairs as isolationist. If we take into consideration the historical 
confrontations between the “lead by action” and the “lead by example” strategies discussed above, 
we find that the former has generally dominated. President Theodore Roosevelt briefly sums up US 
achievements in foreign policy during the XIX century (a time usually considered as one of relative 
US isolationism) as follows: 
“Of course our whole national history has been one of expansion. Under Washington and 
Adams we expanded westward to the Mississippi; under Jefferson we expanded across the 
continent to the mouth of the Columbia; under Monroe we expanded into Florida; and then 
into Texas and California; and finally, largely through the instrumentality of Seward, into 
Alaska; while under every administration the process of expansion in the great plains and the 
Rockies has continued with growing rapidity.”83  
In about one hundred years the United States through wars, treaties, and purchases tripled the total 
area of its national territory. Such a territorial expansion did not happen in a vacuum. The United 
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States increased its territory at the expenses of the Indian nations, the French and Spanish empires, 
and Mexico. According to a study by the US Congress, in the one hundred years spanning from 
1798 through 1898, the United States used its military forces abroad at least 98 times. That is 
almost one military intervention abroad every year, a conservative measure, if we consider that the 
congressional study excludes the coeval periodic use of US troops against the Indian nations on the 
American continent. The same study by the Congress shows that during the interwar period (1918-
1941), another time of alleged US isolationism, the United States intervened militarily abroad about 
36 times. As of 2011, the United States was involved, at different levels, in military operations in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Pakistan, and Somalia; America had little less than 700 military 
installations overseas; and its military expenses accounted for almost half of the world’s total. 
These data can hardly be described as the record of a nation with a restrained foreign policy.84 
Moreover, an incomplete analysis of three specific historical events has fueled the illusion of US 
isolationism.85 These are: President George Washington’s Farewell Address (1796), the enunciation 
of the Monroe Doctrine (1823), and the US Senate’s negative vote on the Covenant of the League 
of Nations (1919).  
The general wisdom holds that in his Farewell Address, President George Washington warns his 
fellow citizens to avoid “permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world,” thus advancing 
a policy of isolation. This is a literal interpretation that does not take into consideration the 
particular historical circumstances of that time. Back then, the United States had recently gained its 
independence from Britain and it was still too weak to meddle in conflicts among the much more 
powerful European nations. Notably, in the same speech, President Washington hints at the 
possibility that the United States will adopt a different stance when the circumstances become more 
favorable. Washington says that 
“the period is not far off, when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when 
we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to 
be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making 
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acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose 
peace or war, as our interest guided by justice shall Counsel [sic].”86  
Additionally, President Washington also maintains that the United States “at no distant period” 
would emerge as “a great Nation” in world affairs. This reading of Washington’s call to avoid 
permanent alliances and entanglements illustrates that the US president was not suggesting a policy 
of simple isolationism but, rather, a more nuanced strategy of temporary nonalignment.87  
President James Monroe’s doctrine is also considered strong evidence for an aloof foreign policy. In 
fact, Monroe’s document holds that “[US] policy in regard to Europe […] remains the same, which 
is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers.” Nevertheless, a more accurate 
reading of the same document would describe the United States as still avoiding direct involvement 
in European affairs (because aware of its inferior military capabilities) but nonetheless ready to lay 
claim to its own sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere.88  
Indeed, the Monroe Doctrine clearly states that:  
“[Americans] should consider any attempt on the part [of European countries] to extend 
their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety,” and 
that “we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing [the countries of the 
Americas], or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any 
other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.”89  
In 1895, Secretary of State Richard Olney reinforces this latter interpretation of the Monroe 
Doctrine when he declares that “the United States is practically sovereign on this continent [the 
Americas] and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.” Additionally, 
at the turn of the XX century, President Theodore Roosevelt gives more credit to this alternative 
reading by articulating his own corollary to the Monroe Doctrine: “in the Western Hemisphere the 
adhesion of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however 
reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international 
police power.” All that considered, the Monroe Doctrine was not only a call for the principle of 
non-interference from European powers in the Western Hemisphere but it also, and perhaps 
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primarily, affirmed the US exclusive duty and right to intervene and direct events in that region of 
the world.90 
Finally, according to the isolationist view, the US Senate’s refusal to ratify the Covenant of the 
League of Nations represents an additional sign of the US unwillingness to get involved in world 
affairs. Probably this was in fact the position of a small minority led by Senator Robert M. La 
Follette, who had opposed the entrance into WWI in the first place. However, as pointed out by 
reputable historians, the great debate surrounding the League, far from being a call for a restrained 
foreign policy, was “something of a family feud” on “how America should sustain and extend its 
power and authority” in the world. In other words, it was essentially a debate on the different 
strategies the United States should have applied in the pursuit of an assertive foreign policy.91 
The principal reason for the Senate’s vote against the covenant, was the provision contained in 
article X:  
“The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external 
aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the 
League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression 
the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.”92 
The critics of the ratification argued that such a system of collective security would infringe on US 
sovereignty and unnecessarily reduce US freedom of action. In its reservations with regard to the 
covenant, the US Senate stated that: 
“The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any other country or to interfere in controversies between nations -whether 
members of the League or not- under the provisions of Article X, or to employ the military or 
naval forces of the United States under any article of the treaty for any purpose, unless in any 
particular case the Congress, which, under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare 
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war or authorize the employment of the military or naval forces of the United States, shall by 
act or joint resolution so provide.”93 
Therefore, it was not a penchant for isolationism but, rather, a concern about national sovereignty 
and freedom of action that mainly informed the US Senate’s decision to reject the covenant. 
In sum, the history of US foreign policy has been characterized by the rhetorical confrontation 
between two major opposite strategies: that of “lead by action” and that of “lead by example”. It is 
interesting to notice that the progressive rise of the “lead by action” strategy to a dominant position 
in US foreign policy rhetoric went hand in hand with the rise of the United States’ relative military, 
economic, and political power. The reason for this pattern may be explained by the words of 
academic Robert Gilpin. Gilpin argues that states are continually “tempted to try to increase [their] 
control over the environment […] A more wealthy and more powerful state […] will select a larger 
bundle of security and welfare goals than a less wealthy and less powerful state.” Accordingly, 
throughout US history, a rhetoric calling for an assertive foreign policy has reflected the ever-
expanding goals and ambitions of a country whose international position changed from that of being 
a colony, to that of being first a continental power, then a regional power, and finally a global 
power in little more than two centuries.94      
 
The Dark Side of the Creed 
The American Creed is unquestionably a central aspect of US public rhetoric. Despite its special 
status, however, the Creed does not have a monopoly on the US public discourse. According to 
scholars Daniel Deudney and Jeffrey Meiser, the American Creed has to coexist with “idiosyncratic 
factors of national identity rooted in ethnicity, religion and race.” These idiosyncratic factors, that 
we cloak together under the name “Dark Side of the Creed”, often represent minority views, 
although, as pointed out by professor Anatol Lieven, “they have a natural tendency to rise to the 
surface in times of crisis and conflict.” The ethnic, religious, and racial origins of the Dark Side 
occasionally put it at odds with the professed universalism of the American Creed. Writer Michael 
Lind hits the point when he says “America’s universal mission contains certain elements of 
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universal values which are in fact not universal at all but very visibly part of a purely American 
culture and way of life.”95  
Freedom, self-determination, democracy, free trade, and capitalism are deeply cherished aspects of 
the American Creed. Americans generally consider them to have universal value and to be 
universally applicable. Sometimes, however, Americans also think that not all peoples are ready or 
capable to enjoy them. Particular countries may need guidance, whereas others may make mistakes. 
If this happens, it is the United States’ duty, as the best interpreter and bearer of these values, to 
intervene and put other peoples back on track. “Self-government! Why, these people are no more fit 
for self-government than gunpowder is for hell,” US General William Shafter reportedly answered 
to a journalist when asked about the possibility of Cubans exercising self-government after the 
Spanish-American War (1898). Allegedly because Cubans were not considered ready and capable 
to rule themselves, the United States denied them the right to self-determination and, instead, put 
the country under close US tutelage. Although later the Platt Amendment (1901) ended direct US 
occupation of Cuba, it also contained provisions effectively granting the United States continued 
indirect control of the island.96  
Indeed, one main component of the Dark Side of the Creed is that of racial superiority. The concept 
of a hierarchy among races is a European legacy of the first American settlers. In its original brand, 
it was specifically a White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) superiority. Back then and for a long 
time, white people, coming from Britain and belonging to a Protestant denomination of Christianity, 
enjoyed an unchallenged privileged status in US society. This concept of racial superiority in the 
United States led to the so-called “Jeffersonian paradox”. The paradox goes as follows: how is it 
possible that the same people who, as Thomas Jefferson, wrote in the US Declaration of 
Independence that “all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness,” could accept 
and justify a socio-economic system based on slavery? The answer to this paradox is simple: 
according to the idea of racial superiority, not all men are equal.97 
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After different and successive waves of migrants, firstly from non Anglo-Saxon Europe and then 
from all over the world; after the trauma of the American Civil War; after the shocking experiences 
of the Second World War, the Holocaust, and the racist Nazi propaganda; and, finally, after the 
domestic challenge posed by the US civil rights movement, the concept of racial superiority was 
progressively recast into the more acceptable and politically correct one of cultural superiority. The 
declining power of racial thought in the United States manifested itself in the election of Barack 
Obama, an African-American, to the US presidency in 2008. Nevertheless, saying that racism is 
dwindling in the US public sphere does not necessarily mean that it has disappeared from the 
private one or with reference to non-Americans. The current US debate about Orientalism is a case 
in point. The tendency to consider Muslims alternatively as backward, evil, and/or ill-suited for 
democracy shows how stereotypes toward different ethnicities and cultures are still persistent and 
widespread in the United States.98 
Another important component of the Dark Side of the Creed is US profound wariness of 
revolutions.99 At first, this statement may sound curious given that the United States itself was born 
out of a revolution and US revolutionaries strenuously fought for their own right to self-
determination. However, throughout history, the United States has proved reluctant to accept other 
people’s revolutions, especially if such revolutions did not follow the path drawn by the American 
one. According to US diplomat George Kennan, the United States has the “inveterate tendency to 
judge others to the extent to which they contrive to be like ourselves [the Americans].” Professor 
Michael Hunt identifies the US model of a good revolution as the one described by Thomas 
Jefferson and John Adams in the early XIX century. Such a model calls for a moderate revolution, 
against an illegitimate power, led by the nation’s better classes, with the goal of protecting human 
and property rights through constitutional arrangements. The US tendency of judging the legitimacy 
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of foreign revolutions against Americans’ own experience has been a catalyst for conflict because, 
as bluntly expressed in a quotation often attributed to the Chinese revolutionary Mao Tse-Tung, 
“revolution is not a dinner party, nor an essay, nor a painting, nor a piece of embroidery; it cannot 
be advanced softly, gradually, carefully, considerately, respectfully, politely, plainly, and modestly. 
A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows another.” As a 
consequence, the United States has very often confronted revolutions largely different from its own. 
The result of these encounters, particularly in the case of social revolutions, has ranged from mere 
suspicion to open opposition, even including military interventions aimed at suppressing the 
revolutionary movement.100   
Notably, there has been times when the Dark Side had a strong impact on US foreign policy. The 
argument of racial superiority, for example, played a central part in the heated debates surrounding 
the US territorial expansion of the XIX century. On the one hand, the supporters of US 
expansionism interpreted racial superiority as a US duty to help inferior peoples to develop. On the 
other, the opponents to US expansionism warned about the risk of mixing the racial purity of the 
American people with less perfect nations. The debates on the annexation of former Mexican 
territories or of the Hawaii and The Philippines are text-book examples. Similarly, wariness of 
revolutions also influenced the international behavior of the United States. The US policy response 
to the Bolshevik revolution in Russia and to other XX century revolutionary movements in Central 
and South America bear evident signs of this influence.101 
The presence of national qualifications makes it difficult, especially for foreign observers not keen 
with this “dark” aspect of the American Creed, to fully understand specific US foreign policies. In 
particular, cultural superiority and weariness of revolutions are patently at odds with some of the 
ideals, like equality, freedom, and self-determination, that the United States publicly professes to 
champion. National qualifications to the Creed, therefore, have the negative effect of reinforcing the 
disturbing perception of a disconnect existing between US foreign policy rhetoric and US foreign 
policy practice which, in turn, generates common charges of US hypocrisy and double standards. 
The image of the United States as an exceptional country provides many of the themes that 
contribute to the construction of the myth of US national innocence in foreign policy. In the 
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following section, we first describe the myth of US innocence and then discuss how this myth has 
affected the public debate on US foreign policy.  
 
The Myth of US Innocence 
National myths are half-truth narratives that purport to explain the origins, characteristics, and 
purposes of a nation. They constitute the building blocks of a country’s national identity. National 
myths also help to simplify and make understandable to single individuals and entire societies an 
otherwise extremely complex world. Notably, such national narratives are not unique to a single 
country or culture but, rather, they have commonly manifested themselves across different regions 
at different times. According to academic Godfrey Hodgson, “all nations live by myths. Any nation 
is the sum of the consciousness of its people: the chaotic infinitude of the experience and 
perceptions of millions alive and death.” In fact, if institutionalized, spread, and perpetuated 
through public rhetoric, educational institutions, official commemorations, and the media, national 
myths can assume a privileged role in the formation of a nation’s collective memory.102   
The literature on myth-making identifies three distinct types of general narratives. The first type is 
the “self-glorifying” myth that consists of inflated or false claims about national virtues and selfless 
behavior. The second type, the “self-whitewashing” myth, contains denials or rationalizations of 
past wrongdoings. The final type, the “other-maligning” myth, denigrates others, blames them for 
the nation’s problems, or accuses them of malicious intentions.103 
For the scope of this research the myth of innocence acquires special relevance insofar as it 
represents the national narrative generally used to describe the foreign policy of the United States. 
This narrative draws most of its themes from the idea of US exceptionalism and encompasses 
aspects of all the three previously described types of myths. The national myth of innocence in 
world affairs holds that the United States intervenes always in reaction to external events or threats, 
it is constantly committed to just causes, and it acts invariably with good intentions and for the 
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noblest purposes. The reasoning behind the myth goes as follows: the universal validity and 
absolute morality of US values are self-evident; the United States is unequivocally and completely 
committed to these values and to its mission to spread them to other people; therefore, the actions of 
the United States cannot be evil and anyone who opposes them must be biased or wrong.104 
The myth of national innocence is not a new theme in human history. Its origins date back to as 
early as the V century BC, at the time of the Peloponnesian War, when Athenian hero Pericles told 
his fellow citizens that “we alone do good to our neighbors not upon a calculation of interest, but in 
the confidence of freedom and in a frank fearless spirit.” The same theme was picked up after more 
than two thousand years by US President George Washington who declared, in striking similar 
terms, that the United States would “give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a 
people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence.” At the start of the so-called American 
Century, another US president, Theodore Roosevelt, reaffirmed the innocent character of US 
foreign policy when he said in 1905 that “all that this country desires is that the other republics on 
this continent shall be happy and prosperous.” Amidst the suffering of the Second World War, US 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt joined the chorus and stated: “we are fighting today for security, 
for progress, and for peace, not only for ourselves but for all men, not only for one generation but 
for all generations. We are fighting to cleanse the world of ancient evils, ancient ills.” In the specific 
case of the United States, the belief in the myth of national innocence is further reinforced by a 
time-honored Puritan narrative imported by the first English and Scottish settlers. The colonists, 
indeed, imagined themselves as elected individuals who were born again in the New World and, 
after having undertaken a sort of cathartic experience, had been purified of all the sins of the Old 
Continent.105  
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Throughout US history, the narrative of national innocence has been sometimes challenged.106 
However, it remains to date an essential and recurrent feature of US public rhetoric and of the way 
many Americans commonly perceive their country’s foreign policy. Influential scholars and famous 
writers have often acknowledged the existence of this national myth. Historian Reinhold Niebuhr 
points out that “we [the Americans] are –according to our traditional theory- the most innocent 
nation on earth.” Professor Michael Mandelbaum, referring to post-Cold War US interventions, 
maintains that “for the United States, however, what lies behind intervention […] is neither gold, 
nor glory, nor strategic calculation. It is, rather, sympathy.” Herman Melville, a noted XIX century 
critic as well as author, describes the United States as a “political Messiah” and contends that 
“almost for the first time in the history of the earth, national selfishness is unbounded philanthropy; 
for we cannot do a good to America, but we give alms to the world.”107 
Although all the range of US actions on the international stage, be them political, social, 
commercial or economical, are generally interpreted through the prism of the myth of US 
innocence, this research has a special interest in studying the projection abroad of US military 
power. Attentive observers have emphasized the specific longstanding aspect of the myth that 
depicts the US military as a special force for good. Professor Anatol Lieven, when examining the 
US self-image of national innocence, notices “a widespread sense [in the United States] of the 
innate goodness of America’s actions on the world stage, and of the US military in particular.” 
Journalist Stephen Kinzer also describes this particular characteristic of the US soldier. Kinzer 
argues that Americans have always believed that their troops operated “on a higher moral plane 
because their cause was good.” Finally, the US self-perception of the exceptional nature of its 
armed forces is effectively described by the words of US Secretary of State Elihu Root who stated 
in 1899: “the American soldier is different from all other soldiers of all other countries since the 
world began […] he is the advance guard of liberty and justice, of law and order, and of peace and 
happiness.”108  
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This image of the US military as an idealized force for good may be also the reason behind the 
widespread belief in the United States on the utility, and even sometimes the necessity, of war to 
obtain justice. According to a 2004 survey poll, 82 percent of Americans agreed with the statement 
that “under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice.” Such a high percentage shows the 
existence of a great gap between US and, for example, European perceptions. Indeed, the US 
percentage more than doubles the European average that is set at around 40 percent, with the UK at 
69, Poland at 47, Italy at 35, France at 33, Germany at 31, and Spain at 25. On this point, academic 
John Mearsheimer contends that US leaders generally “portray war as a moral crusade or an 
ideological contest, rather than as a struggle for power” and he adds that “Americans tend to like 
this perspective, because it identifies the United States as a benevolent force in world politics and 
portrays its real and potential rivals as misguided or malevolent troublemakers.” The power and 
appeal of the myth of US innocence in world affairs is reaffirmed once more.109 
The myth of national innocence has played an important role in shaping the “general wisdom” on 
the interpretation of historical events concerning the United States. This interpretation of history 
through the prism of this myth has tended to dismiss or downplay cases when US foreign policy has 
not developed in accordance with the narrative of innocence. In other words, it has minimized cases 
that show the existence of a disconnect between the policies actually undertaken by the United 
States and the values and ideas the country publicly professes to support. The myth, in fact, has 
provided the US public with a sort of sanitized, more comfortable, and easy-to-understand 
explanation of international affairs. Let us briefly analyze the myth’s influence upon explanations of 
certain key historical events. It is interesting to notice that they all closely follow the script of the 
myth of innocence: an external threat or event forces the United States to act; once the United States 
becomes involved in the international arena, it does so, not out of narrow self-interest but, rather, 
for the good of mankind. 
According to this narrative, the United States fought its War of Independence (1775-1783) against 
the British Empire to obtain the right to self-determination. Since then, the country has made self-
determination one of the essential components of its Creed and has publicly proclaimed its 
commitment to promote it abroad. Likewise, the United States was dragged into the First World 
War (1917-1918) because of Germany’s violation of US neutral rights. The altruistic objectives of 
the ensuing US engagement in the war were to make the world safe for democracy and end all wars. 
After that, the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor forced the United States to enter the Second 
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World War (1941-1945) and embark on another crusade to defend democracy against Fascism. In a 
similar fashion, during the Cold War (approximately 1946-1991) Soviet aggressiveness pushed the 
United States to take an active role in international affairs as the champion of the free world. 
Finally, the invasion and the military occupation of Afghanistan (2001-) and Iraq (2003-2011) were 
the response to the September 11th terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. 
The goals of both military interventions were to free the world from the threat of international 
terrorism and to put those countries on the path of democracy.110     
As pointed out by academic Andrew Bacevich in 2003, “few scholars specializing in American 
diplomatic history today accept such an outline” of the history of US foreign policy. However, “in 
practice” the myth of US innocence “reigns today as the master narrative explaining (and justifying) 
the nation’s exercise of global power.” Influential revisionist historians, as Charles Beard, William 
Appleman Williams, and Noam Chomsky, criticize and cast doubts on the validity of this narrative. 
They also offer alternative interpretations of the facts that portray a less innocent and less 
benevolent United States’ foreign policy. Although the primary objective of this research is not to 
study the enduring debate among orthodox, revisionist, and post-revisionist accounts of US 
diplomatic history, mentioning at least an example of these criticisms to the myth of US innocence 
seems useful. As we saw before, with regard to the concept of self-determination, the narrative of 
the “innocent” United States holds that, once the country became independent, it started to openly 
manifest its selfless support to the right to self-determination of other nations. A critic may well 
notice that such an interpretation of the events disregards the fact that after achieving its 
independence the United States successively denied it to Native Americans, through its continental 
expansion (XVIII-XIX centuries), to the Confederate States of America, during the Civil War 
(1861-1865), and to Cuba, after the Spanish-American War (1898).111 
Despite the existence of alternative views, the influence of the myth of US innocence still endures 
in the country’s public discourse. Tellingly, the narrative of innocence is a recurrent theme in the 
public statements of recent US presidents. In the fall of 1991, at Georgetown University, soon-to-be 
president Bill Clinton provided an interpretation of the history of the Cold War that clearly 
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illustrates the persistent strong influence of the narrative of national innocence in US public 
rhetoric:  
“I was born nearly half a century ago at the dawn of the Cold War, a time of great change, 
enormous opportunity, and uncertain peril. At a time when Americans wanted nothing more 
than to come home and resume lives of peace and quiet, our country had to summon the will 
for a new kind of war -- containing an expansionist and hostile Soviet Union which vowed to 
bury us. We had to find ways to rebuild the economies of Europe and Asia, encourage a 
worldwide movement toward independence, and vindicate our nation's principles in the world 
against yet another totalitarian challenge to liberal democracy.”112 
According to Clinton’s statement, after the end of the Second World War Americans were dragged, 
against their will, into a new conflict by yet another evil enemy. Moreover, the US struggle was not 
prompted by self-interest but, rather, by the noble cause of championing the world’s freedom. 
Similarly, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, US President George W. Bush announced that “tonight 
we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom” and then he added that “all of 
this was brought upon us in a single day -- and night fell on a different world, a world where 
freedom itself is under attack [emphasis added].” Following a familiar script, President G.W. Bush 
portrayed the United States as a naïve nation unaware of the dangers of the world, firmly committed 
to defend freedom, and unwilling to intervene outside its borders unless wickedly provoked.113  
The myth of US innocence in world affairs is also kept alive by the mainstream national press. The 
interpretation of Islamic resentment toward the United States is a case in point. Journalists Charles 
Krauthammer and Thomas Friedman on the columns of the authoritative The New York Times and 
The Washington Post write that Islamic hatred toward the United States has a fundamentally 
irrational nature. They argue that it would be difficult to explain the existence of Islamic hatred 
otherwise, given that during the last decades the United States “has been largely dedicated to 
rescuing Muslims or trying to help them free from tyranny.” The same argument is made by Middle 
East expert Barry Rubin. In the authoritative journal Foreign Affairs, Rubin states that “Arab and 
Muslim hatred of the United States is not just, or even mainly, a response to actual US policies –
policies that, if anything, have been remarkably pro-Arab and pro-Muslim over the years.” These 
interpretations describe hard-feelings by Muslim communities toward the United States as generally 
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having irrational or instrumental motives. By dismissing the existence of active US responsibilities 
in originating such hard-feelings, the mainstream national press helps to perpetuate the myth of US 
innocence.114 
The world of academia in the United States is not immune to the appeal of the narrative of 
innocence either. Common expressions such as “benevolent hegemon”, “reluctant superpower”, and 
“virtuous empire”, often used to refer to the global role of the United States in the post-Cold War 
world, rest on the underlying assumption of US innocence in foreign policy. Let us consider three 
especially illustrative examples. In 1998, at the height of unipolarity, historian Robert Kagan writes 
in the influential magazine Foreign Policy, “the truth is that the benevolent hegemony exercised by 
the United States is good for a vast portion of the world’s population” and “if there is to be a sole 
superpower, the world is better off if that power is the United States.” In his article, Kagan concedes 
that “Americans are as self-interested as any other people,” but he also clarifies that US self-interest 
is a kind of “enlightened self-interest that, in practice, comes dangerously close to resembling 
generosity.” Another historian, Ernest May, highlights the “reluctant” nature of US power when he 
argues that “some nations achieve greatness […] the United States had greatness thrust upon it.” 
Finally, in one of her works, professor Joan Hoff takes issue with other scholars who describe the 
United States as a virtuous empire whose policies are fundamentally “benign and liberal”.115 
Along with politicians, journalists, and academics, also ordinary US citizens appear to share the 
belief in the innocent nature of US foreign policy. As maintained by a 2010 survey poll, 60 percent 
of Americans agreed with the statement that the United States was “generally disliked” by foreign 
peoples. However, they evidently did not link “foreign dislike” to US behavior, insofar as 76 
percent of the same respondents also believed, quite contrary to the view of most people in other 
countries, that US policymakers were paying attention to the interests of other nations in framing its 
foreign policy.116 
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How do we explain the remarkable resilience of the US myth of national innocence in foreign 
policy in spite of historical evidence of the contrary? Scholars who investigated the topic provide a 
number of interesting answers.117  
According to historian Reinhold Niebuhr, “the powers of human self-deception are seemingly 
endless.” As a consequence, Americans find it hard “to believe that anyone could think ill of 
[them],” since Americans are deeply convinced that their “society is so essentially virtuous that 
only malice could prompt criticism of any of [their] actions.” Academic John Mearsheimer makes a 
similar point when he argues that, because liberal values are so deeply rooted in US culture, 
Americans “find it easy to believe that they are acting according to cherished principles, rather than 
cold and calculated power considerations.” Moreover, scholar Robert Kagan maintains that “deeply 
rooted republicanism”, “enlightenment liberalism”, “religious conscience”, and “democratic 
worldview” make Americans reluctant to see themselves as others see them. Instead, according to 
Kagan, Americans prefer to construct “more comforting narratives” of their past or to create 
“idealized foreign policies” against which to measure their present behavior. It seems as if the 
power of and the general consensus about deep-seated and time-honored national images of 
exceptionalism and innocence have allowed Americans to repeatedly overlook the existence of 
tensions between the foreign policies their country has undertaken and the values it has publicly 
professed to stand for.118 
Stephen Gallagher, an American philosopher, identifies some common techniques through which 
the United States has been able to perpetuate its myth of national innocence.119  
A first technique is “unadulterated denial”. Unwelcome information is simply considered not true. 
In 2002, US Secretary of Defense Ronald Rumsfeld dismissed alleged charges over mistreatments 
of detainees held in custody at the Guantanamo Bay facility as “just plain false” and “just utter 
nonsense”. Secretary Rumsfeld declared that “no detainee has been mistreated in any way. No 
detainee has been harmed.” Later reports by authoritative sources as diverse as the International 
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Committee of the Red Cross and the US Federal Bureau of Investigation instead gave substance to 
the charges of mistreatment. Additionally, in a fashion reminding of the famous George Orwell’s 
Newspeak, post-9/11 practices widely considered torture (as for example water-boarding120) were 
called with the much more reassuring name “enhanced interrogation techniques”.121 
Another technique consists in denying “the reality of the victim as a victim”. This technique implies 
a process of dehumanization of the enemy who, having lost its status of human being, can be 
subjected to abuse. During the Philippine War (1899), the infamous “Balangiga massacre” and the 
systematic use of torture carried out by US troops against the Filipinos was largely possible because 
the enemy was described as “little better than a dog, noisome reptile in some instances, whose best 
disposition was the rubbish heap.” Half a century later, during WWII, a similar process of 
dehumanization offered a sort of justification for President Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066; an 
order that called for the indiscriminate internment of more than 110,000 individuals of Japanese 
descent living within the continental United States. As maintained by writer John Dower, Japanese 
were alternatively dubbed “subhuman, inhuman, lesser human, superhuman –all that was lacking in 
the perception of the Japanese enemy was a human like oneself.”122 
After that, there is the technique of “accusing the accuser”. People who question US policies are 
either malevolent, biased or dupes. Even when coming from presumably friendly countries, such as 
its European allies, criticism of the United States is generally considered irrational and mainly 
inspired by envy of US power and wealth.123 
A fourth technique is the “denial of responsibility”: wrong actions or inactions are the responsibility 
of “a few bad apples” or are required by extraordinary circumstances. Shameful incidents like the 
abuses perpetrated on the inmates of the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, the discovery of random 
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killings of Afghan civilians for sport, or the desecration of Taliban corpses in Afghanistan are 
generally explained as the responsibility of a few bad apples.124 Similarly, the US officer charged 
with ordering the so-called Haditha killings in Iraq (where 24 civilians, including women and 
children, were indiscriminately killed) eventually avoided a jail term. At the trial, the US officer 
pleaded guilty of ordering his squad “to shoot first and ask questions later”, but he justified his 
order by saying that he did so because he had perceived a serious threat and had intended to 
eliminate that threat in order to keep his Marines alive. Such incidents involving US military 
personnel are strongly condemned by US authorities. However, they are also easily forgotten and 
the myth about the exceptional goodness of the US soldier quickly restored. 125 
Finally, a last technique is to “appeal to higher loyalties”. The pursuit of higher goods permits or 
even demands for the use of questionable or blatantly wrong means. Accordingly, US President 
G.W. Bush defended the use of harsh interrogation techniques (widely considered torture) by 
arguing that such techniques were necessary to collect intelligence indispensable to protect US 
citizens against future terrorist attacks.126  
 
Final Remarks 
This chapter has dealt with the first essential component of US foreign policy under analysis: US 
foreign policy rhetoric. We have begun with an analysis of the reasons why studying a country’s 
public rhetoric is important for having a comprehensive understanding of its foreign policy. After 
that, the chapter has provided a detailed examination of the idea of US exceptionalism and the 
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significant influence that such a powerful idea has exerted over the centuries on the predominant 
brand of US public rhetoric. We have then moved to discuss the two major strategies that have been 
competing for relevance in US foreign policy: the “lead by example” and the “lead by action” 
strategies. The chapter has ended with a study of the myth of US innocence, that is the national 





















US Foreign Policy Practice 
In this chapter we address the second fundamental component of US foreign policy; that is US 
foreign policy practice. To begin with, we discuss the actors and dynamics involved in the complex 
process of US foreign policymaking. After that, we study the concept of the US national interest 
and categorize its components into three different clusters. Finally, we provide an analysis of the 
core national interests that have characterized US foreign policy toward the region of the Greater 
Middle East since World War II. 
 
The Process of US Foreign Policymaking 
In order to understand US foreign policy practice it is essential to analyze the dynamics surrounding 
the process of US foreign policymaking.127  
Even a strenuous advocate of the primacy of systemic factors, as political scientist Kenneth Waltz, 
seems to acknowledge this reality when he writes,  
“the third image [the international level] describes the framework of world politics, but 
without the first and second images [the individual and the domestic levels] there can be no 
knowledge of the forces that determine policy; the first and second image describe the forces 
in world politics, but without the third image it is impossible to assess their importance or 
predict their results.”128  
Thomas Christensen, a neoclassical realist, concedes that the fundamental aspects of IR theories 
“are simple and generalizable across cultures and political systems”, however, “the application of 
the approach to any given country requires a great deal of knowledge about the nation in question.” 
Foreign policy analyst Valerie Hudson goes so far as to say that “[t]he process of foreign 
policymaking [i]s at least as important, if not more important, than foreign policy as an output.” 
Therefore, researchers interested in studying the foreign policy of a specific country or group of 
countries should acquire a good knowledge of how these countries’ domestic political dynamics 
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work, both in theory and in practice. In this sense, understanding the particular process of foreign 
policymaking of a country becomes critical.129  
So, what are the principal actors involved in the process of US foreign policymaking? Any serious 
attempt to answer to this question cannot downplay the role of the President and the Executive 
branch over which he presides. Regarding US foreign policy, along with the president, the most 
directly involved actors within the Executive are the National Security Council, the State 
Department, the Defense Department, and the various agencies forming the intelligence 
community.130  
As far as issues of foreign policy and war are concerned, the President is endowed with significant 
powers. Some of these powers are explicitly granted by the US Constitution, namely by article two, 
section two:  
“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States […] 
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties […] 
and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint 
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls.”131 
Other presidential powers, called semi-constitutional powers, were added throughout US history as 
a consequence of the increasing number of commitments and responsibilities of the United States 
on the world stage. For example, during the Cold War, US presidents started the practice of 
conducting covert and overt military operations abroad without asking for congressional approval 
(as instead required by the US Constitution). Kennedy’s Bay of Pigs in Cuba, Johnson’s progressive 
deployment of US troops in Vietnam, and Nixon’s cover-up of the US secret bombings in Laos and 
Cambodia are cases in point. In addition to these constitutional and semi-constitutional powers, the 
role of the US president in foreign policy could vary depending on his or her personality, distinctive 
set of beliefs, particular training, and personal interest in foreign affairs. Notably, when the country 
faces situations of severe crisis, it is usually the president, as the commander in chief, who 
eventually takes responsibility for difficult decisions.132   
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Despite his or her significant powers, the President does not operate in a vacuum. He or she 
represents one actor in a wide and complex democratic political system where power is shared with 
other actors. The US Congress, and in particular the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, and the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, have crucial 
responsibilities for matters of foreign policy. According to the US Constitution, article one, the US 
Congress is vested with the power to declare war, to raise and support armies, and to provide and 
maintain a navy. Under specific circumstances the 1973 War Powers Resolution133 allows the 
President to bypass the Congress and to unilaterally commit US troops abroad. Nevertheless, the 
resolution explicitly requires the President to inform the Congress of such a decision and it 
temporally limits any military intervention started without congressional approval to no more than 
60 days (with a possible extension of other 30 days). Additionally, the US Congress also has the 
prerogative to control the appropriations process for the US federal budget (the so-called power of 
the purse) that includes control over both the defense and the foreign affairs budgets. Moreover, the 
Senate’s approval is necessary to validate some presidential decisions such as the signing of 
international treaties or the appointment of ambassadors and other public ministers. Furthermore, 
the President does not operate from scratch. Very often, he or she has to come to terms with foreign 
policies that are legacies of previous administrations and that may or may not limit the incumbent 
President’s policy options. All that considered, the fact that the United States is a democracy, and a 
federal one, puts several constraints on presidential action. It may be quite correct to say that a 
leader of an authoritarian regime has more ability to carry out drastic changes in foreign policy than 
his or her counterpart in a sound democracy, insofar as the power of the former is presumably 
limited by fewer domestic political constraints.134 
Along with providing “checks and balances” to the power of the Executive, the nature of the US 
political system (that of being an open and pluralistic democracy) gives the possibility to a large 
number of actors with different interests to get involved in the process of policymaking. An all but 
complete list of the domestic actors that have a stake in US foreign policy should contain both 
institutional actors, such as the President, the State Department, the Defense Department, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, the Congress, the Supreme Court and other governmental agencies, and also 
representatives of the US society, such as economic, military, ethnic, religious or environmental 
                                         
133 The War Power Resolution was in part a response by the US Congress to President Richard Nixon’s secret military 
campaigns in South East Asia. “War Powers Resolution,” 1973, http://www.scribd.com/doc/51612751/The-WAR-
POWERS-Resolution-of-1973-Text-and-Records-From-Congress. 
134 CQ Press, The Middle East (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc, 2007), 163; Wittkopf and McCormick, 




special-interest groups, and the media. Of course, not all actors have the same authority or the same 
resources, and are thus capable of exerting the same influence on a specific policy. However, the 
nature of the US policymaking process and of US institutions provides even relatively weaker 
actors with the opportunity of finding alternative ways to make their voice heard and of trying to 
influence the process during its different phases. For example, if a lobbyist for a human rights group 
has no direct access to the President or to one of the top officials of the Cabinet, he or she could 
always try to contact a member of the Congress. Otherwise, if the same lobbyist failed to achieve 
his or her group’s goals during the agenda setting or the decision-making phases, he or she could 
still try to influence the outcome of the policymaking process during the implementation phase by 
co-opting members of the bureaucratic and administrative staff. In other words, openness, plurality, 
constitutional checks and balances, and a system of different political majorities within the 
Legislative and the Executive branches of the Federal Government make it difficult for a single 
viewpoint to completely control every phase of this very complex process. With this in mind, we 
believe that an analytical model which considers foreign policy as the result of decisions taken by a 
unitary rational actor inevitably overlooks the critical internal dynamics that occur before these 
decisions are eventually agreed upon. A more accurate analysis should take into consideration the 
insights provided by the work of political scientist Graham Allison. Allison offers alternative 
analytical models that shed more light on the internal dynamics leading to foreign policy decisions. 
We find Allison’s Bureaucratic Politics model especially suitable to understand important aspects of 
the process of US foreign policymaking. First, the Bureaucratic Politics model describes foreign 
policy decisions as outcomes of a game of bargaining among different actors bearers of varying 
preferences, abilities, standard operating procedures, and positions of power. Second, Allison’s 
model acknowledges that the process of foreign policymaking does not necessarily privilege expert 
or rational decisions, therefore leaving the door open to the possibility of suboptimal policy 
outcomes.135 
The national process of foreign policymaking can also be susceptible to the influence of various 
international and foreign actors. Such international and foreign actors include other nation states, 
international governmental organizations (i.e. the United Nations or the International Monetary 
Fund), international non-governmental organizations (i.e. Amnesty International or Greenpeace), 
and a panoply of very different economic, political, militant, and cultural transnational forces and 
actors (i.e. multinational corporations, international terrorist groups, the Roman Catholic Church, 
international law, the global market, and globalization, to name only a few). It is important to 
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remember, however, that although international and foreign actors can play a role during the 
domestic process of policymaking, they do not have the power to take decisions for any sovereign 
state.136  
Some practical examples may help to understand the way international and foreign actors may 
influence a country’s foreign policy. The first example illustrates the case of another state’s national 
interest limiting US foreign policy options. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union, led by General 
Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, considered Eastern Europe as an exclusive area of Soviet influence. 
This Soviet policy, often dubbed Brezhnev Doctrine, eliminated in practice any real possibility of a 
US direct intervention in support of popular reformist uprisings both in Hungary in 1956 and in 
Czechoslovakia in 1968. The second example looks at issues of international commerce. The World 
Trade Organization is an international governmental organization whose main task is to supervise 
and liberalize international trade. The decisions adopted in this international forum have the effect 
of meaningfully reducing the ability of its members, including the United States, to adopt 
protectionist policies. The third example discusses the intertwined concepts of international law and 
of the international legitimacy derived from abiding by it. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 is a case 
in point. Before the onset of the war, the United States tried to secure an authorization by the United 
Nations Security Council for a military intervention. When they did not get such an authorization, 
US officials went on with their own plans anyway. However, soon after the invasion, the United 
States invested significant diplomatic capital to obtain an a posteriori international legitimation for 
the intervention from the United Nations through the approval of successive UN Security Council 
resolutions, as UNSCR 1511 (October 16, 2003) and UNSCR 1546 (June 8, 2004). These examples 
confirm academic Christopher Hill’s conclusion that the ability of a state “to exercise the 
independent choices implied by sovereignty is often in practice curtailed, while [its] power varies 
widely and is never absolute.”137 
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The relationship between the external environment and domestic actors is effectively described in 
the words of scholar Valerie Hudson:  
“If we consider the metaphor of foreign policy as a drama, then the actual humans and 
human collectivities involved in foreign policy decision making are the actors, and the core of 
foreign policy analysis provides situational motivations, understandings, and processes. But 
this drama is taking place on a stage, and the stage sets some parameters to any drama 
enacted upon it. Certain types of actions by human actors become more or less likely 
depending upon the layout of the stage and its props.”138 
In other words, very often national leaders have to adapt to or to force their own national interest 
and foreign policy upon the limits and the opportunities set by the international system, in terms of 
both the distribution of relative power capabilities and of other international and foreign actors’ 
interests and behaviors. Although international factors do not account for all aspects of a country’s 
foreign policy, they can define its general outline. As argued by Christopher Hill, national 
policymakers always have choices, although in “many circumstances the dice are heavily loaded in 
one direction or another.” Paraphrasing an example used by scholar Gideon Rose, systemic factors 
can make us go to an Italian restaurant instead of a Japanese one, however, they cannot make us eat 
pasta instead of pizza, or drink Prosecco instead of Chianti. The final choice rests on human 
decision-makers.139 
All that considered, the answer to our first question goes as follows. The US process of foreign 
policymaking includes the participation of and the bargaining among a variety of different actors 
both institutional and representative of the wider society, both domestic and external. Nevertheless, 
the President of the United States and the Executive branch play a pivotal role in taking the final 
decisions. Decisions taken at the domestic level, however, are inevitably constrained or eased by the 
limits and the opportunities set by the evolving nature of international politics. Given that the 
Executive branch is arguably the branch of the US Government most deeply and persistently 
involved in framing the foreign policy of the United States, we decided to use the White House, the 
Department of State, and the Department of Defense as our primary policymaking analytical group. 
Therefore, throughout our analysis of US foreign policy toward the Greater Middle East, we pay 
special attention to the interests, perspectives, and reactions to events in the region expressed by 
officials affiliated to these three distinct US government institutions. 
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The US National Interest   
In this section of the chapter, we address the following question: what is commonly considered the 
US national interest in foreign policy? In 1996, the Commission on America's National Interests 
declares that “national interests are the fundamental building blocks in any discussion of foreign 
policy.” Academic Gideon Rose writes that a state’s national interest in foreign policy consists of 
“the goals or preferences that guide the country’s external behavior.” These two definitions 
emphasize the connection existing between a country’s national interest and its foreign policy. 
Moreover, international relations theorist Joseph Nye Jr. maintains that, in a democracy like the 
United States, “the national interest is simply the set of shared priorities regarding relations with the 
rest of the world. It is broader than strategic interests [and] The American people clearly think that 
their interests include certain values and their promotion abroad.” Similarly, academic Samuel 
Huntington suggests that “National interests usually combine security and material concerns, on the 
one hand, and moral and ethical concerns, on the other.” Nye’s and Huntington’s definitions 
highlight the complex nature of the national interest and argue that it includes a number of different 
concerns.140 
A practical example can perhaps further clarify the concept of the national interest with regard to 
US foreign policy. Former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice once wrote that the US national 
interest should be:  
“to ensure that America's military can deter war, project power, and fight in defense of its 
interests if deterrence fails; to promote economic growth and political openness by extending 
free trade and a stable international monetary system to all committed to these principles, 
including in the Western Hemisphere, which has too often been neglected as a vital area of 
U.S. national interest; to renew strong and intimate relationships with allies who share 
American values and can thus share the burden of promoting peace, prosperity, and freedom; 
to focus U.S. energies on comprehensive relationships with the big powers, particularly 
Russia and China, that can and will mold the character of the international political system; 
to deal decisively with the threat of rogue regimes and hostile powers, which is increasingly 
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taking the forms of the potential for terrorism and the development of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD).”141 
As the above excerpt shows, the national interest of the United States can combine a large number 
of diverse concerns. Moreover, “national interests are not absolutes.” Some of them, such as the 
defense of US soil from foreign attack or the protection of US citizens at home and abroad, 
certainly enjoy almost universal support. Others, conversely, may only represent what the 
incumbent administration perceives as the current most pressing concerns. As for example, the 
Barack Obama administration’s decision in 2009 for a marked “pivot”, or reorientation, of US 
foreign policy toward the region of the Asia-Pacific. The national interest may also be determined 
by unexpected –or Black Swan- events that have the power to alter an administration’s previous 
priorities. The implications of the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States are a case in point. 
The attacks, in fact, suddenly elevated previously neglected Afghanistan to a top priority in the 
foreign policy agenda of the George W. Bush administration.142 
Drawing on Nye’s and Huntington’s definitions about the multifaceted nature of the national 
interest, we identify three main different clusters of interests within the broader national interest of 
the United States. We call them: realist, socio-economic, and ideal interests. Common realist 
interests include US foreign policies aimed at pursuing self-help, granting the country’s survival, 
increasing its security, and extending its international influence. Socio-economic interests, instead, 
provide evidence about the importance for the United States of foreign policies that prioritize 
mainly economic and commercial concerns. Finally, ideal interests generally refer to US foreign 
policies that promotes its national ideology, defined here as a coherent and organic system of 
beliefs, symbols, and values.143 
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Going back to the previous excerpt by Condoleezza Rice, we find empirical evidence of all the 
three different clusters of interests.  
Realist interests emerge when Rice points out the necessity “to ensure that America’s military can 
deter war, project power, and fight in defense of its interests if deterrence fails;” and then, when she 
suggests “to focus U.S. energies on comprehensive relationships with the big powers […] that can 
and will mold the character of the international political system.” The military, power projection, 
defense, and big powers are all buzzwords in the long tradition of realpolitik. The term realpolitik 
was coined by the German writer Ludwig von Rochau in the XIX century and it is usually 
associated with the politics of the Austrian diplomat Klemens von Metternich and the Prussian 
Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. Realpolitik generally refers to an approach in foreign policy that 
gives preeminence to pragmatism and realism over moralism and idealism. In the specific case of 
the United States, the foreign policy under Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is generally 
considered an example of US realpolitik.144  
We detect socio-economic interests in the part of Rice’s excerpt where she stresses the goal “to 
promote economic growth and political openness by extending free trade and a stable international 
monetary system to all committed to these principles.” Here, Rice is reaffirming the US 
commitment to the Open Door policy, that is to the perceived need for a “continued expansion” 
beyond the country’s limits and borders. The importance of such a need for expansion rests upon 
two time-honored assumptions: the Frontier Thesis and the Either-Or Thesis. The first assumption 
draws on the work of XIX century historian Frederick J. Turner about the importance of the frontier 
for the US society. The frontier, in fact, has a double function: as a gate of escape from existing 
responsibilities and as a means to externalize domestic problems. The second assumption holds that 
democracy and prosperity at home are inextricably dependent on continued economic expansion 
abroad. According to historian William Appleman Williams, US expansion abroad “provided the 
sine qua non of domestic prosperity and social peace.” This latter assumption seems to be 
influenced by the Marxist concern about the potential destabilizing effects on domestic society 
deriving from agricultural and/or industrial overproduction.145 
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Finally, ideal interests come to the fore when Secretary Rice emphasizes the necessity for renewing 
“strong and intimate relationships with allies who share American values and can thus share the 
burden of promoting peace, prosperity, and freedom.” Rice’s words illustrate that US ideal interests 
are those US interests more in line with the traditional themes of national exceptionalism and 
innocence so frequent in US foreign policy rhetoric.  
A survey of the US National Security Strategy documents of the past decades can also provide 
empirical evidence about the persistence and relevance throughout history of the realist, socio-
economic, and ideal components of the US national interest. The National Security Strategy (NSS) 
is a document periodically prepared by the US Government for the US Congress. Its legal bases are 
in section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986.146  
The act defines the NSS as: 
“A comprehensive description and discussion of the foreign policy worldwide commitments 
and national defense capabilities of the United States; the proposed short-term and long-term 
uses of the elements of national power required to protect and promote the interests and 
achieve the stated goals and objectives; and to provide an assessment of the capabilities of 
the United States to implement its national security strategy.”147 
In other words, the NSS is probably the best place to find valuable information about what is 
considered the official US national interest and the proposed US foreign policies aimed at pursuing 
it. Let us analyze four past NSS documents to look for evidence of the above clusters of interests. 
Two of these NSS documents were prepared by Republican administrations (NSS 1991 and NSS 
2006) while two others were written by Democratic administrations (NSS 1999 and NSS 2010).  
The NSS 1991 by the George H.W. Bush administration, points out the vital importance of the 
“survival of the United States”, and of the defense of its freedom and independence (realist 
interest); it then continues by saying that the United States seeks to “ensure access to foreign 
markets” and to ”promote an open and expanding international economic system, based on market 
principles” (socio-economic interest); finally, the NSS 1991 calls for a US effort to “strengthen and 
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enlarge the commonwealth of free nations that share a commitment to democracy and individual 
rights” (ideal interest).148 
The Bill Clinton administration, in its NSS 1999, highlights three core objectives: “to enhance 
America’s security” and ability to defend itself (realist interest); “to bolster America’s economic 
prosperity” by advancing an open international trading system (socio-economic interest); and “to 
promote democracy and human rights abroad” (ideal interest).149 
In 2006, the NSS prepared by the George W. Bush administration reaffirms the necessity “to 
provide enduring security for the American people” (realist interest); to “ignite a new era of global 
economic growth through free markets and free trade” (socio-economic interest); to “champion 
aspirations for human dignity” and to build “the infrastructure of democracy” (ideal interest).150 
Finally, the NSS 2010 by the Barack Obama administration is a document divided in three main 
sections. Their respective titles read: “Security” of the United States (realist interest); “Prosperity” 
through a strong, innovative, and growing US economy in an open international economic system 
(socio-economic interest); and “Values” and their respect at home and around the world (ideal 
interest).151 
This brief survey of four distinct National Security Strategy documents confirms that realist, socio-
economic, and ideal interests have consistently been essential parts of the national interest of the 
United States. The four NSS documents also show the “national”, and not only “partisan”, nature of 
these realist, socio-economic, and ideal concerns, insofar as both Republican and Democratic 
administrations have described them, in almost identical terms, as primary components of the 
country’s national interest.  
Since US foreign policy in the Greater Middle East has usually offered examples of conflict 
between realist and socio-economic interests, on one side, and ideal interests, on the other, we 
decided to group the first two clusters of national interests (realist and socio-economic) together and 
call them strategic interests. Such a categorization does not only facilitate our research goal of 
highlighting the existence, in the “practice” of US foreign policy, of tensions between different 
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national interests but it also improves our ability to detect instances of mismatch between US 
foreign policy practice and US foreign policy rhetoric. In fact, we maintain that mainstream US 
public rhetoric closely mirrors traditional US ideal interests. Therefore, a conflict between US ideal 
and US strategic interests is also very likely to result in a mismatch between US rhetoric and US 
practice in foreign policy.  
That said, let us go back to our original question about what it is commonly considered the US 
national interest. Broadly speaking, we can define the national interest of a state in foreign policy as 
what national policymakers and the wider society deem to be essential to protect and promote 
fundamental aspects of their way of life with regard to the state’s relations with the rest of the 
world. In the specific case of the United States, we contend that such “fundamental aspects” should 
necessarily reflect both the country’s realist and socio-economic interests (together referred to as 
strategic interests), and ideal interests. Other scholars of US foreign policy share our position. 
Robert Kelley, for instance, maintains that “we […] understand that the energies which release 
themselves in public life are emotional as well as rational, cultural and ideological as well as 
economic and pragmatic” and, therefore, “there is necessarily an intermixture of influences in 
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US Foreign Policy Practice toward the Greater Middle East since WWII 
In the previous two sections of this chapter, we have discussed the broad issues of the process of US 
foreign policymaking and of the US national interest. In this third section, we specifically turn our 
attention to the practice of US foreign policy toward the Greater Middle East. In particular, we 
provide a historical overview of the US Middle East policy since World War II, the time when the 
United States officially became a major player in the region. The main purpose of this section is to 
highlight the existence and describe the development of a number of US core national interests that 
have systematically influenced the decisions of US policymakers with regard to the Greater Middle 
East. We identify four distinct but interrelated US national interests: access to Middle Eastern 
energy resources, containment of hostile powers, policies to counter terrorism and the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction, and the special relationship with Israel. According to our previous 
categorization, such interests go under the label of strategic interests. The historical examples 
analyzed below also represent cases where US strategic interests conflicted with the US ideal 
interest of promoting the values of freedom and democracy in the region, thus compelling the 
United States to make difficult choices. As we will see, the preferred choice of US officials has 
generally been to prioritize the pursuit of strategic interests over the promotion of ideal ones.  
 
First US Interest: Middle Eastern Energy Resources 
In April 1951, the Iranian Parliament appointed Mohammad Mossadeq as the country’s prime 
minister. Mossadeq headed a popular movement, the National Front, that was determined to 
challenge two longstanding features of the Iranian political system: the autocratic rule of its 
monarchs and foreign powers’ meddling in Iran’s domestic affairs. A clear emphasis on democracy 
and self-determination proved appealing to Iranians and granted Mossadeq’s National Front 
widespread domestic support. The Iranian prime minister repeatedly showed a profound 
commitment to constitutional, democratic, and social reforms. It has been argued that during the 
years of the Mosaddeq premiership, for the first time in its long history, Iran briefly grasped the 
benefits deriving from a proto-form of democracy. Another major pillar of Mosaddeq’s political 
agenda was its attention to the principle of national sovereignty. The Iranian prime minister, in fact, 
believed that complete independence from foreign influence was an indispensable condition in 
order to build a genuine democratic form of government responsive to the people’s needs. In this 
respect, Britain’s absolute domination of the Iranian oil industry had proved to be an especially 
irritant issue for the Iranian people. Mossadeq first tried to renegotiate the terms of the British oil 
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concession153 to obtain a fairer share of the profits deriving from the sale of Iranian oil. When met 
by Britain’s uncompromising stance, the Iranians took a much more radical decision and passed the 
Law of Repossession that essentially revoked the oil concession and nationalized the country’s oil 
industry. In response to the adoption of the Law of Repossession, Britain called for the enforcement 
of an international boycott of Iranian oil aimed at crippling the Iranian economy and forcing the 
Mossadeq government to review its nationalization policies. The British also started to consider 
plans for a covert operation to overthrow the Iranian prime minister. Despite some initial hesitation 
the United States progressively came to adopt the policies of its British ally. Hence, the 
administration of President Harry Truman joined the international boycott of Iranian oil and, later, 
that of President Dwight Eisenhower became the leading force behind the planning, financing, and 
staging of Operation AJAX, the joint US/British covert action that in August 1953 led to the ouster 
of Prime Minister Mossadeq. After the August coup, the shah of Iran ruled with increasing 
repression, cracked down on all dissenters, and steadily expanded his power until the country 
completely fell under the control of his markedly authoritarian regime. Due to the critical 
involvement of the United States, Iran’s brief experiment with democracy was violently brought to 
an end.154 
In the early 1950s the United States confronted an Iranian leader whose main goal was to 
democratize his nation, who was strenuously fighting to affirm his country’s national sovereignty, 
and who enjoyed extensive popular support. This is not to say that the Mosaddeq government was 
flawless but to show that the principles promoted by the Iranian prime minister easily fit into what 
we have previously defined as time-honored US ideal interests. Given that, what considerations, 
other than shared values and ideas, influenced US foreign policymakers in their decision to actively 
oppose the Mossadeq government and replace it with the authoritarian rule of the shah? The main 
reason for the United States’ decision lay in the potential for the Iranian crisis to seriously threaten 
important US strategic interests. 
One of such interests was the containment of communism. In 1954, CIA analyst Donald N. Wilber, 
in what it is still considered the most comprehensive official account available of the events 
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surrounding the Iranian coup, wrote that the dominant reason and main justification for operation 
AJAX was the US fear of a communist takeover of Iran. However, more recent analyses point at 
Mossadeq’s anticommunism and widespread popularity to argue that US contemporary estimates of 
the Iranian communists’ capability to take control of the country were probably exaggerated. There 
is, in fact, enough evidence to contend that, despite the undisputable existence of a US concern to 
contain the spread of communism, the primary interest of the United States in the Iranian crisis 
revolved around the strategic and commercial importance of the country’s energy resources.155 
Strategically, Iran was one of the world’s major oil producers, and its relevance was only amplified 
by the fact that the country acted as a buffer between the Soviet Union and the huge oil reserves of 
the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. The dramatic experience of World War II had made US 
policymakers aware of the vital role that oil would play in modern warfare and economic growth. It 
was a self-evident truth that whoever controlled the world’s largest oil reserves would have the 
upper hand in the case of any future war. On 4 March 1953, according to a minute of a National 
Security Council meeting, US Secretary of State John F. Dulles clearly conveyed this US concern:  
“[in the case of a communist takeover in Iran] not only would the free world be deprived of 
the enormous assets represented by Iranian oil production and reserves, but the Russians 
would secure these assets and thus henceforth be free of any anxiety about their petroleum 
situation. Worse still, Mr. Dulles pointed out, if Iran succumbed to the Communists there was 
little doubt that in short order the other areas of the Middle East, with some sixty percent of 
the world’s oil reserves, would fall into communist control.”156 
Commercially, oil companies in the United States saw the Iranian crisis as an opportunity to enter 
the lucrative Iranian oil market, until then an exclusive preserve of the British. US commercial 
interests were acknowledged in a December 1952 British Foreign Office memorandum: 
“After he [US Secretary of State Dean Acheson] had again emphasized the grave danger of 
communism in Iran, and the necessity for an early settlement [of the oil dispute], he added 
that another reason for early settlement was the fact that the State Department was under 
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considerable pressure from Congressmen as a result of ‘lobbying’ on the part of various oil 
brokers interested in getting into the Iranian picture.”157 
As specifically regarding the adoption of the Law of Repossession, both US policymakers and US 
oil companies shared the view that to let the Mosaddeq government get away with its program of 
nationalization would set a dangerous precedent and threaten the entire structure of the international 
oil industry. Mosaddeq, in fact, by deeming the British oil concession both illegal and immoral, was 
questioning the very principle of the sanctity of contractual relations. If other countries would 
follow Iran’s example by forfeiting contracts as they wished, significant US investments abroad 
would be put in serious danger.158 
The events in Iran illustrate that when faced by a conflict between supporting democratic reforms 
and self-determination (US ideal interests) and protecting access to energy resources and containing 
communism (US strategic interests) the Truman and the Eisenhower administrations gave priority 
to the latter. The behavior of these two administrations support the aforementioned statement by 
former US Ambassador Indyk and others that when dealing with conflicting national interests in the 
Greater Middle East “every president since Franklin Roosevelt has struck that balance in favor of 
the [strategic] national interest, downplaying the promotion of America’s democratic values 
because of the region’s strategic importance.”159 
The Iranian crisis was not the first time that US policymakers had acknowledged the relevance of 
Middle Eastern energy resources. Historians have often identified a previous meeting between US 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Saudi King Abd al Aziz ibn Saud as a landmark in the 
relations of the United States with Middle Eastern oil. On 14 February 1945, on his way home from 
the inter-Allied conference in the Crimean city of Yalta where he had met with the Soviet leader 
Joseph Stalin and the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, President Roosevelt made an 
unusual stop in Egypt. There, the US president and the Saudi king gathered on the deck of the USS 
Quincy to discuss themes ranging from the acquisition of US basing rights in Saudi Arabia to the 
thorny issue of Jewish national aspirations in Palestine. However, the encounter essentially took 
place because the WWII years had taught President Roosevelt and his entourage the vital 
importance of oil for the US military and economic might. On the military side, the US air force, 
the US navy, and US land mechanized forces had become entirely dependent on oil by-products for 
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propulsion. On the economic side, by 1945 the demand of a fast growing US economy for refined 
petroleum products had already started to exceed domestic supply.160  
Roosevelt’s preoccupation with securing his country’s future access to Middle Eastern energy 
resources was widely shared by people in the military establishment, the Office of Strategic 
Services (the wartime predecessor of the CIA), and the State Department. In August 1945, in a draft 
memorandum to President Truman, the State Department declared that Saudi Arabia’s “oil 
resources constitute[d] a stupendous source of strategic power, and one of the greatest material 
prizes in world history.” A few years later, the US profound interest in Middle Eastern energy 
resources was reaffirmed in a classified US document holding that “oil [was] the most important 
single factor in United States relations with the area [of the Greater Middle East].”161    
There were several reasons why the government of the United States specifically chose the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as its privileged interlocutor to pursue US energy policy in the Greater 
Middle East. First, the US-Saudi energy partnership dated back to 1933 when a consortium of US 
oil companies (the Arabian American Oil Company, ARAMCO) obtained a major oil concession 
for the exclusive exploration and exploitation of Saudi oil resources. Second, Saudi Arabia was one 
of the only two states in the Greater Middle East (the other being Turkey) not under the direct or 
indirect colonial control of European powers. Therefore, there were reduced risks that engagement 
with Saudi Arabia would result into major frictions with US wartime allies, especially France and 
Britain. Third, US policymakers were well aware of the potential of the Arab kingdom’s vast oil 
reserves. By 1945 Saudi production had surpassed that of many other Arab countries and had 
become, the following year, second only to Iranian production in the region. Finally, during the last 
years of WWII, Saudi oil had already begun to significantly contribute to the US war effort.162 
The 1945 meeting between President Roosevelt and King Ibn Saud marked the official entrance of 
the United States as a major player in the energy politics of the Greater Middle East. Since then, 
granting US access to the region’s oil resources and preventing other countries to control them have 
been a constant of US foreign policy. This US strategic national interest endured throughout the 
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Cold War, survived the demise of the Soviet Union, and has continued down to the time of this 
writing. In his 2013 Address to the United Nations General Assembly, US President Barack Obama 
seized the opportunity to describe his administration’s core interests in the Middle East and North 
Africa. Such core interests included the United States’ commitment to “ensure the free flow of 
energy from the region [of the Greater Middle East] to the world.” President Obama also added that 
“Although America is steadily reducing our own dependence on imported oil, the world still 
depends on the region’s energy supply, and a severe disruption could destabilize the entire global 
economy.” In this last statement the US president referred to the fact that, since its peak in 2005, US 
imports of foreign oil have significantly declined and in 2012 the United States bought only a small 
fraction (28 percent) of its oil from the Greater Middle East. The bulk of US oil imports (53 
percent) came instead from the Western Hemisphere, mostly from Canada, Venezuela, and Mexico. 
Policies of increased domestic production and diversification of foreign suppliers notwithstanding, 
the United States still relies on imports for almost half of its petroleum, and US businesses and US 
consumers buy oil at market prices regardless of where the oil comes from. In a globalized 
economy, this means that a disruption of supplies from any major producer, especially Middle 
Eastern countries, would directly affect world prices, and it would consequently be felt by users all 
over the world, including in the United States. Enduring security and economic considerations 
continue to make Middle Eastern energy a matter of primary concern to the XXI century United 
States.163 
 
Second US Interest: Containment 
On the Christmas Eve of 1979, the Soviet Union invaded the Central Asian country of Afghanistan. 
In line with the Brezhnev Doctrine, that committed the USSR to intervene whenever a fellow 
communist government was threatened by non-communist forces, Moscow deployed Soviet troops 
into Afghanistan to help the communist-led government in Kabul in its effort to quell a widespread 
domestic insurgency. Unsurprisingly, Soviet belligerent actions provoked vehement reactions in 
Washington. US President Jimmy Carter forcefully decried what he described as an illegitimate 
communist aggression toward a smaller and independent country. Strong words of condemnation 
were coupled with economic and diplomatic sanctions. Moreover, the United States soon moved to 
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provide assistance to the anti-communist forces in Afghanistan.164 The scope and the intensity of 
the US assistance to the Afghan insurgents changed over time. From December 1979 through the 
spring of 1985 US strategy primarily focused on the concept of “harassment”. In other words, the 
limited objective behind the United States’ humanitarian and military support for the anti-
communist forces was to raise the costs of the Soviet occupation as high as possible. After mid-
1985, however, the United States under President Ronald Reagan significantly stepped up its 
involvement in Afghanistan. In fact, US foreign policymakers committed themselves to a new and 
much more ambitious goal, that is to help the Afghan insurgency to completely drive the Soviets 
out of the country “by all available means”. Throughout the crisis, US policy heavily relied on the 
cooperation of a number of partners that included the governments of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt, and China. The huge human and economic costs of the protracted conflict in Afghanistan 
eventually convinced the Soviet leadership to end Moscow’s direct military involvement in the 
country. Following difficult negotiations, the terms of the Soviet withdrawal were officially ratified 
by treaty in Geneva, Switzerland, in April 1988. The last Soviet troops left Afghanistan on 15 
February 1989. The Soviet withdrawal was followed by a lively debate in the United States about 
the role, if any, that Washington should have played in a post-Soviet Afghanistan. Two distinct 
positions were competing for relevance. One, held mostly within the US State Department, called 
for the continued involvement of the United States in Afghanistan. According to its supporters, the 
United States should have actively pursued a peaceful political settlement for the country. The other 
position, generally accepted inside the CIA, argued that the United States should have simply 
disengaged from Afghanistan and let the Afghans and their neighboring Pakistanis sort out a 
political settlement by themselves. Eventually, the CIA-backed line prevailed and Afghanistan 
steadily fell into the back-burner of US foreign policy. Accordingly, the administration of George 
H.W. Bush ended US diplomatic presence in the country by closing down the US embassy in Kabul 
in 1989 while the subsequent Bill Clinton administration shut down the USAID Afghanistan 
program in 1994, thus sanctioning the official end to all US bilateral development aid to the 
country. In the end, a decade of US support for the anti-communist insurgency exacted an 
extremely high toll on Afghanistan and failed to achieve the stated US objectives of restoring peace 
and ushering in a new government responsive to the will of the Afghans. Moreover, soon after the 
Soviet withdrawal the local insurgency fractured and metastasized into forces that engaged in an 
endless war for the control of the country. At no distant time, from the ruins of war-torn 
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Afghanistan two ominous threats arose to challenge the United States: the international terrorist 
organization Al Qaeda and its Afghan host, the Taliban regime.165 
The decision of the United States to be involved in Afghanistan throughout the 1980s served 
distinct US national interests. Interestingly, before 1979 Afghanistan had not ranked high in the list 
of Washington’s foreign policy priorities. The annual 1976 US State Department Policy Assessment 
clearly acknowledged that the country was “effectively dependent on the Soviet Union” but 
reasoned that the United States “is not, nor should it become, committed to, or responsible for the 
protection of Afghanistan in any respect.” US perceptions drastically changed in 1979 when 
external events moved the country at the forefront of the Cold War struggle between the two 
superpowers. In February of that year, the shah of Iran, a close US client and ally, was overthrown 
and replaced by an Islamic revolutionary government openly hostile to the United States. Later in 
December, the Soviet Union directly invaded Afghanistan thus gaining a foothold in a country 
dangerously near to the strategic area of the Middle East. In less than a year time, the ostensibly 
pro-US status quo in the region had been significantly shaken. All of the sudden, in the words of 
President Carter, “The implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could pose the most 
serious threat to the peace since the Second World War.”166 
First, and perhaps most importantly, the very credibility of the US commitment to its time-honored 
Cold War policy of containment of the Soviet Union was at stake. In fact, the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan proved that the Soviet Union was willing to resort to force to take over a neighboring 
country. Such a belligerent behavior outside of the traditionally recognized Soviet sphere of 
influence required a determined US response. In order to maintain its international credibility, the 
United States decided to show to the Soviet Union, and the world, “that aggression does not 
pay”.167  
In addition to representing a serious threat to the US strategic interest of containing communism, 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was interpreted in Washington as a direct menace to US oil 
interests in the Greater Middle East. The establishment of Soviet military bases in Afghanistan, in 
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fact, would have not only got the Red Army dangerously closer to the extremely valuable oil 
reserves of the Persian Gulf. But it would have also greatly increased Soviet potential to threaten 
the vital sea lanes of communication of the Indian Ocean that, among other things, supply oil to the 
industrialized West.168 
Finally, in their public statements, US officials in both the Carter and Reagan administrations 
commonly linked US support for the anti-communist forces in Afghanistan with the advancement 
there of traditional US ideal interests, including the principles of national sovereignty, independence 
from foreign influence, self-determination, freedom, and peace. 
Therefore, throughout the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan the pursuit of US strategic interests 
went hand in hand with the promotion of US ideal interests. However, the Afghan example has also 
proved that, even in the case of convergence of interests, a distinct hierarchy among different US 
national interests persisted. Tellingly, after the major strategic objective of containing communism 
was achieved with the defeat of the Red Army, US policymakers quickly lost interest in pursuing 
those often-recalled noble goals of bringing peace to Afghanistan, helping to establish a government 
truly representative of the Afghan people, and rebuilding the country’s wrecked economy. With 
regard to the Afghan crisis, strategic concerns evidently ranked much higher than ideal concerns in 
the US hierarchy of interests. 
The containment of communism became a global US strategic interest right after the end of WWII. 
The early formulations of the US policy of containment appeared in George Kennan’s 1946 Long 
Telegram and 1947 The Sources of Soviet Conduct article. Kennan, a career Foreign Service officer 
based in Moscow, recommended that “The main element of any United States policy toward the 
Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian 
expansive tendencies.” Kennan’s ideas exerted a strong influence on the production in 1950 of 
National Security Council report 68 (NSC 68). NSC 68, long considered one of the fundamental 
documents of the US Cold War policy, argued that “any substantial further extension of the area 
under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to 
confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled.” With regard to the specific region 
of the Greater Middle East, the US concern with perceived Soviet expansive tendencies 
significantly informed the Middle East policies of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations and 
the doctrines that carry their names. In March 1947, President Truman warned that the fall of 
Turkey and Greece into communists’ hands would result in “confusion and disorder” spreading 
                                         




“throughout the entire Middle East.” A decade later, in January 1957, President Eisenhower raised 
the ante of US engagement in the region by authorizing “the employment of the armed forces of the 
United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence” of any 
Middle Eastern country under the menace of international communism.169  
During the first decade of the Cold War, the containment of communism was the main rationale 
behind the US policy of building alliances and acquiring basing-rights in the Greater Middle East. 
On the one hand, US diplomatic effort led to Turkey and Greece joining NATO in 1952 and to the 
signing of an interlocking series of agreements during 1954 and 1955 (known as the Baghdad Pact 
or Central Treaty Organization) between Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Iraq, and Britain. On the other 
hand, the United States obtained the rights to establish permanent military bases in several Middle 
Eastern countries, including Saudi Arabia, Libya, Morocco, and Turkey. The containment of 
communism became also the justification for a variety of US overt and covert actions in the region, 
including military and economic assistance to anti-communist forces in Turkey and Greece (1947), 
support for the Zaim coup against the constitutionally elected President Al Quwatli in Syria (1949), 
the staging of the coup that overthrew Iran’s democratically appointed Prime Minister Mossadeq 
(1953), and the provision of funds used by pro-West President Chamoun to rig the elections and 
obtain a parliamentary majority in Lebanon (1957). The final goal of such an articulated US policy 
was to create a sort of cordon sanitaire on the southern flank of the Soviet Union that would have 
simultaneously contained Soviet expansive tendencies and protected the strategically vital region of 
the Greater Middle East.170     
The containment of communism proved to be a particularly strong and protean concept that 
informed the decisions of US policymakers throughout the duration of the Cold War. Although the 
demise of the Soviet Union is generally considered a watershed event, the collapse of communism 
in 1991 did not really alter the main US strategic interests in the Greater Middle East. In fact, 
despite the end of the communist threat, the policy of containment did not disappear but instead it 
continued in the form of a policy of “dual containment” of Iraq and Iran (the two countries that 
replaced in the US post-Cold War narrative the Soviet Union as the major threats to US national 
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interests in the region). The George H.W. Bush administration laid the foundations of the policy of 
dual containment but it was that of Bill Clinton, in its 1994 National Security Strategy document, 
that made such a policy the official US policy in the Greater Middle East. The US invasion of Iraq 
in 2003 definitively removed the threat represented by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from the 
Middle East theater thus leaving Iran as the only remaining target of the US longstanding policy of 
containment. As of today, the containment of Iran firmly remains one of the major US strategic 
interests in the Greater Middle East. In its 2010 National Security Strategy document (NSS 2010), 
the Obama administration singled out the containment of Iran, and in particular of Iranian nuclear 
aspirations, as one of the administration’s top priorities in the region. The NSS 2010 states that 
Iran’s “illicit nuclear program”, support for “terrorism”, undermining of “peace between Israelis 
and Palestinians”, and denial of its people’s “universal rights” make it a serious threat to the 
security of the United States. The NSS 2010 also warns leaders in Tehran that “if the Iranian 
Government continues to refuse to live up to its international obligations, it will face greater 
isolation.” Although the specific targets of the policy have changed over time, containment still 
endures as a critical aspect of US foreign policy in the Greater Middle East.171  
 
Third US Interest: Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction 
On 11 September 2001, four civilian airliners were hijacked by individuals associated with a radical 
Islamist group called Al Qaeda. Two planes struck the World Trade Center in New York, one plane 
hit the Pentagon in Washington DC, and a last plane crashed into an empty field in Pennsylvania. 
On that day, about 3,000 people died. The US administration of President George W. Bush 
described the 9/11 terrorist attacks as an “act of war” and responded by declaring a “global war on 
terror”. The first targets of the US response were the Al Qaeda organization and the Taliban regime 
that had been harboring the Al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan. Invoking the right to self-defense, 
explicitly recognized by article 51 of the UN Charter, and acting with widespread international 
support, the United States, on October 8, launched a military attack in Afghanistan. Initially, the 
Afghan War seemed an evident success, with the Taliban regime terminated in little more than six 
weeks. However, subsequent developments showed that early US optimism was somewhat 
misleading. In fact, during this stage of the war, Taliban forces decided not to directly confront the 
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superior military might of the United States and its allies. Instead, the Taliban regime simply melted 
away and disappeared with its armaments intact. Similarly, with the notable exception of the battle 
of Tora Bora, members of Al Qaeda generally dispersed when chased by US forces. This meant 
that, at no distant time, the United States found itself fighting a pugnacious insurgency in 
Afghanistan led by the same Taliban and Al Qaeda forces Washington thought it had initially 
defeated. Early achievements in Afghanistan contributed to the expansion of the objectives of the 
US Global War on Terror. In his January 2002 State of the Union Address, President G.W. Bush 
proclaimed that the US response to 9/11 was not just limited to non-state terrorist groups, like Al 
Qaeda, but it also included a number of rogue states that the US administration perceived as being a 
threat to the US national interest, both because of their support for terrorist organizations and their 
possession or pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Bush identified such rogue states 
with Iraq, Iran, and North Korea and grouped them under the banner of the “axis of evil”. At the 
West Point Military Academy, five months later, the US president went even further and announced 
the right of the United States to take pre-emptive military action against an enemy that might 
represent a future security threat to the country. The State of the Union and the West Point 
presidential speeches provided respectively the justification and the doctrine that led to the 2003 US 
invasion of Iraq. The Bush administration, in fact, maintained that the Iraqi regime of Saddam 
Hussein possessed WMDs, supported terrorism, and represented a serious threat to the United 
States and the world. Despite failing to obtain a UN Security Council resolution legitimizing 
military intervention, the United States started a military campaign in Iraq in March 2003. Within 
three weeks a US-led coalition occupied the Iraqi capital Baghdad and overthrew the regime of 
Saddam Hussein. Among Bush administration officials, there was a generally shared expectation 
that Iraq would rapidly become a stable pro-West country with the coalition forces welcomed as 
liberators. Such an expectation soon proved to be misplaced. The fall of Saddam Hussein was 
followed by extensive public disorder, widespread looting, and rampant criminality. The situation 
was only compounded by a number of early decisions made by the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(the US-appointed Iraqi provisional government); especially, the decision to completely dismiss the 
Iraqi military, thus throwing thousands of dissatisfied armed soldiers onto the streets. Many of these 
soldiers ended up joining an emerging insurgency that had a distinct anti-American flavor. By the 
third year of the Iraqi War, the situation in the country became even more complicated because of 
the emergence of a violent sectarian conflict between Iraq’s Sunni and Shiite communities. When 
he took office in January 2009, US president Barack Obama inherited both the conflict in 
Afghanistan and that in Iraq.172 
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The US Global War on Terror appeared to be a manifest case of convergence of distinct US 
national interests. On the one hand, the US response to 9/11 would serve clear US strategic 
interests. Indeed, the United States engaged in prolonged military campaigns to defeat the Taliban 
in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq, two openly hostile regimes. Moreover, the United 
States also committed its forces to the eradication of Al Qaeda, a radical Islamist group operating 
mostly in and from the Greater Middle East, that had been able to carry out deadly terrorist attacks 
on US soil. On the other hand, the US Global War on Terror would help to promote time-honored 
US ideal interests. In fact, the stated goal of US actions was to make the United States and the 
world safer by eliminating the threat represented by rogue states and terrorist organizations. In 
addition, after the forced removals of the Taliban and of Saddam Hussein, Afghanistan and Iraq 
would be put on a reform path to become democratic states. 
However, over time, policies adopted by the Bush administration, and continued to some extent by 
the Obama administration, generated evident tensions between US strategic and ideal interests. 
Some of these policies infringed on US civil liberties. A telling example was the Bush 
administration’s secret surveillance program through which the National Security Agency 
monitored the international phone calls and emails of “hundreds, perhaps thousands, of people 
inside the United States to search for evidence of terrorist activity without the court-approved 
warrants ordinarily required for domestic spying.” Critics of the surveillance program argued that 
US citizens might have been monitored even if they had no connection to terrorist activity. Other 
such policies were at odds with both US and international laws. The use of torture during the 
interrogations of terrorism suspects was a case in point. The Bush administration acknowledged the 
use of practices such as prolonged sleep deprivation, forced nudity and feeding, and waterboarding 
but contended that these “enhanced interrogation techniques” were short of torture and, therefore, 
consistent with US and international laws. Many observers, including civil liberties and human 
rights organizations, strongly disagreed with the Bush administration’s argument and publicly 
condemned such practices. Finally, policies adopted to wage the Global War on Terror raised 
concerns regarding due process of law. Indefinite military detention proved to be an especially 
sensitive issue. Indefinite detention allowed the US military to detain both US and foreign 
individuals suspected of terrorism for indefinite periods of time without a trial or due process. 
According to its critics, “despite the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a right to trial, [indefinite 
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detention] would let the government lock up any citizen it swears is a terrorist, without the burden 
of proving its case to an independent judge, and for the lifespan of an amorphous war that 
conceivably will never end.” All that considered, the US Global War on Terror proved to be a more 
controversial endeavor than it could otherwise have first appeared.173 
The US interest in Middle Eastern terrorism became significant in the wake of the Arab-Israeli War 
of 1967. It was, in fact, after the Arab countries’ military defeat in the war that a number of 
Palestinian movements radicalized and began to resort to terrorist tactics, including airplane 
hijackings, hostage takings, and bombings, to target US citizens and assets. One of such movements 
was the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), a spin-off of the larger Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO). The ANO held more radical views than the rival PLO with regard to the destruction of the 
state of Israel and the opposition to diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv. Since the mid-1970s, the 
United States had considered the ANO the most dangerous terrorist organization in the world. 
According to the US Council on Foreign Relations, ANO terrorist activity was responsible for the 
killing of three hundred people and the wounding of hundreds more in twenty different countries. A 
sadly notorious example of ANO terrorism was the December 1985 simultaneous attacks on US and 
Israeli airport counters in Rome, Italy, and Vienna, Austria, that killed eighteen people and injured 
111. By the mid-1980s, the United States had started programs of offensive covert operations 
against the ANO and other terrorist groups. Washington exercised pressure on those governments 
harboring ANO leaders and operatives to cut their ties with the terrorist organization. The US effort 
succeeded insofar as Iraq expelled the ANO in 1983, Syria followed in 1987, and similarly did 
Libya in 1999. The founder of the group Sabri al Banna, known by his nom de guerre Abu Nidal 
(father of the struggle), reportedly died in Iraq in 2002. As of 2013, the ANO is still listed among 
the US State Department Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations despite the fact that no major 
attack has been attributed to the ANO since its founder’s reported death.174  
As it was the case with the US Global War on Terror, US counterterrorism prior to the 9/11 attacks 
did not focus solely on non-state terrorist groups but it also targeted state sponsors of terrorism. 
                                         
173 James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, “Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers without Courts,” New York Times, December 16, 
2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Donald H. Rumsfeld, 
“Rumsfeld’s Memo on Interrogation Techniques,” US Department of Defense, April 16, 2003, 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/03.04.16.pdf; Spencer Ackerman, “Senate Wants the Military 
to Lock You Up Without Trial,” Wired.com, December 1, 2011, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/12/senate-
military-detention/. 
174 Timothy Naftali, “US Counterterrorism before Bin Laden,” International Journal 60, no. 1 (Winter 2004); Council 
on Foreign Relations, Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), accessed June 26, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/israel/abu-nidal-
organization-ano-aka-fatah-revolutionary-council-arab-revolutionary-brigades-revolutionary-organization-socialist-




Libya under the rule of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi was perceived by Washington as an especially 
dangerous threat to the United States. With its involvement in countries, such as the Sudan and 
Chad, the Qaddafi regime had repeatedly stood in the way of US interests in North Africa and the 
Middle East. Furthermore, according to US officials, Col. Qaddafi supported radical and 
revolutionary groups around the world and pursued programs to develop WMDs. In April 1986, the 
bombing of “La Belle” discotheque in West Berlin killed two American servicemen and a Turkish 
woman, and wounded more than 200 people, including scores of US soldiers. The United States 
blamed the Qaddafi regime for being behind the “La Belle” terrorist attack. In response, the US 
administration of President Ronald Reagan approved Operation El Dorado Canyon. Operation El 
Dorado Canyon was a short military campaign that consisted primarily of airstrikes against targets 
in the Libyan cities of Tripoli and Benghazi. In a fashion that anticipated the George Bush 
administration’s doctrine of pre-emption in Iraq, the Reagan’s White House justified US airstrikes 
against Libya by saying that: “The United States has chosen to exercise its right of self-defense […] 
It is our hope this action will pre-empt and discourage Libyan attacks against innocent civilians in 
the future.” Following almost two decades of tense US-Libyan relations, the abrupt decision in 2003 
of Col. Qaddafi to renounce state-sponsored terrorism and abandon its programs on WMDs paved 
the way to a process of rapprochement between the two countries that, by 2006, had resulted in the 
removal of Libya from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism and the reopening of the US 
embassy in Tripoli.175 
In describing the US core interests in the Middle East and North Africa, US President Obama stated 
that his administration  
“will dismantle terrorist networks that threaten our people. Wherever possible, we will build 
the capacity of our partners, respect the sovereignty of nations, and work to address the root 
causes of terror. But when it’s necessary to defend the United States against terrorist attack, 
we will take direct action.”176 
President Obama then added: “we will not tolerate the development or use of weapons of mass 
destruction […] We reject the development of nuclear weapons that could trigger a nuclear arms 
race in the region, and undermine the global nonproliferation regime.” Obama’s statements prove 
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that the US interest in Middle Eastern terrorism, and the related US concern about the development, 
use, and transfer of WMDs, remain a top-priority for the United States.177 
 
US Fourth Interest: Special Relationship with Israel 
In January 2006, Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip cast their vote to elect the 
members of the Palestinian legislative council. Two parties were the main contenders in the 2006 
elections: Fatah and Hamas. The first had been for a long time the leading force within the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization and then, after the Oslo Accords, of the Palestinian Authority. 
The second, an offshoot of the Gaza branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, came into existence in 
1988 during the second Palestinian Intifada (uprising). In 2006, Hamas ran a successful electoral 
campaign promising clear government and emphasizing its record of efficiency in providing basic 
services to the populace against Fatah’s perceived corruption and inability to achieve any 
significant success in its prolonged negotiations with Israel. The outcome of the elections was a 
victory for Hamas that obtained the majority of the seats in the Palestinian legislative council. As a 
consequence, Hamas would lead the new Palestinian cabinet while Fatah would retain the 
institution of the presidency. The result of the elections caught the international community off 
guard. Such an unexpected outcome proved especially troubling for the United States. In fact, the 
George W. Bush administration had initially been a strong advocate of the 2006 elections and had 
described them as an important exercise in democracy. However, US stance completely changed 
after Hamas’ victory, when the Bush administration joined Israel in refusing to recognize or even 
deal with the new government. After Hamas refused to accept the Middle East diplomatic 
“Quartet”178 demands to recognize Israel’s right to exist, renounce violence, and accept the terms of 
all previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements, the United States, Israel, and other Western countries 
imposed an international financial boycott against the new government. In addition, Israel, with the 
approval of the Bush administration, clamped down on Palestinians’ freedom of movement and laid 
a siege on the Gaza Strip (Hamas’ stronghold) limiting or halting the shipments of fuel, commercial 
goods, construction materials, food, and water. Furthermore, following the abduction of an Israeli 
soldier in June, Israel also began to perform military incursions into the Gaza Strip that resulted in 
the death of large numbers of Palestinians. The ostensible goal of the overall US policy was to 
boycott, isolate, and bring down the new Palestinian government, primarily because it was led by a 
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force, Hamas, that was profoundly hostile to Israel and that continued to resort to terrorist activities 
against Tel Aviv. From the Palestinian perspective, instead, the boycott and the blockade were 
simply forms of collective punishment through which the United States and its allies penalized 
Palestinians for having democratically expressed their political preferences. According to leaked 
confidential documents, subsequently corroborated by sources in the United States and Palestine, 
the Bush administration also approved a covert operation in 2006 aimed at the forced removal of the 
democratically-elected Hamas government. The United States secretly planned to provide, via its 
regional allies, training and weapons to Fatah forces. The plan was to provoke a Palestinian civil 
war between Fatah and Hamas that would ideally result in Hamas’ overthrow and the formation of a 
new government more acceptable to Washington. However, US actions backfired. The Hamas 
leadership, in fact, had grown increasingly concerned about the possibility of a US-sponsored coup, 
and therefore, in June 2007, decided to stage its own coup, occupy all main Fatah bases in Gaza, 
and seize complete control of the Strip. In response, Palestinian President, and Fatah leader, 
Mahmoud Abbas dismissed the Hamas government and formed an emergency cabinet that would 
rule the West Bank separately. Such a division of the Palestinian Authority into two different 
governments, one ruling over the Gaza Strip and the other ruling over the West Bank, continued 
until early 2014 when, after a number of previous failed reconciliation attempts, Hamas and Fatah 
eventually agreed to establish a new unity government.179      
The case of the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections represents a manifest example of conflicting 
US national interests. On the one hand, there was the longstanding US ideal interest of promoting 
the spread of democratic values. On the other hand, there were the similarly time-honored strategic 
interests of countering terrorism and guaranteeing the security of the state of Israel.  
Prior to the Palestinian elections, President G.W. Bush had announced his administration’s Freedom 
Agenda for the promotion of democracy around the world. The US administration maintained that 
the spread of freedom was “the great alternative to the terrorists’ ideology of hatred, because 
expanding liberty and democracy will help defeat extremism and protect the American people.” In 
line with the principles contained in the Freedom Agenda, the United States sponsored the idea of 
holding democratic elections for the Palestinian legislative council. However, US commitment to 
the spread of democratic values was seriously tested after such elections unexpectedly brought to 
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power Hamas, a Palestinian Islamist movement that was profoundly hostile to Israel and that the 
United States considered a terrorist organization.180 
Hamas, in fact, had been on the US State Department’s list of foreign terrorist organizations since 
1997. The organization’s threatening nature was only magnified in the eyes of US policymakers by 
the fact that Hamas’ attacks primarily targeted Israeli military forces, civilians, and assets both in 
Israel proper and in the Occupied Territories. According to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Hamas has been responsible for the deaths of about 400 Israelis since the early 1990s. The official 
policy of the United States toward Hamas, as laid down in the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 
2006 (Public Law 109-446), is “to avoid contact with and refrain from supporting the terrorist 
organization Hamas until it agrees to recognize Israel, renounce violence, disarm, and accept prior 
agreements.” With regard to the US policy toward Hamas, it is evident that the US interest of 
combating terrorism in the Greater Middle East coalesced with the other, equally important, US 
interest of protecting Israel.181  
Eventually, these latter two strategic interests proved to be more important for US officials than the 
ideal interest of promoting democratic practices in the Occupied Territories. Hence, the Bush 
administration quickly reverted its previous stance of support for the Palestinian elections, joined 
the international boycott of the new government, approved Israel’s blockade of the Gaza Strip, and 
allegedly planned to stage an armed coup to remove Hamas from power.  
For a long time the security of the state of Israel has been a major interest of the United States in the 
Greater Middle East. The Arab-Israeli War of 1967 is often considered a watershed in the 
relationship between Washington and Tel Aviv. It was, in fact, the 1967 War that marked the full 
alignment of the United States with Israel. Before the war, successive US administrations tried to 
adopt a somewhat neutral position between the conflicting goals of Israeli and Arab nationalisms. 
US officials, especially in the State and Defense Departments, repeatedly warned that by openly 
siding with Israel, the United States would inevitably jeopardize its relations with the Arab world, 
therefore enabling the rise of Soviet influence in the Greater Middle East and risking the loss of the 
region’s vital energy supplies. Despite such warnings, even before 1967, domestic political 
considerations made US policies often align with Israeli interests. One of these occasions occurred 
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in 1947 when US President Harry Truman actively lobbied in favor of the United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 181 for the partition of Palestine (a resolution strongly opposed by Arab 
countries) and quickly recognized the independence of the new Jewish state that originated from 
that decision. President Truman explained his pro-Israel policy with the often-recalled words: “I am 
sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of 
Zionism182; I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents.” Truman’s 
concern with US domestic elections obviously informed the president’s Israeli policy. On other 
occasions, regional dynamics in the Greater Middle East influenced US stance toward Israel. The 
events of 1958 are a telling example. That year witnessed the union of Egypt and Syria into the 
United Arab Republic, a military coup that overthrew a pro-West monarchy in Iraq, and an 
increasing opposition against the pro-West governments of Lebanon and Jordan. The US National 
Security Council recognized that the “current conditions and political trends in the Near East are 
inimical to Western interests” and noted that a “logical corollary” of opposition to radical Arab 
nationalism “would be to support Israel as the only strong pro-West power left in the Near East.” 
Regional geopolitical developments seemed to call for the establishment of a closer relationship 
between the United States and Israel.183  
In June 1967, mounting tensions in the Greater Middle East led to the outbreak of the second Arab-
Israeli war.184 In a mere six days, the Israeli military defeated the combined forces of Egypt, Syria, 
and Jordan and seized the territories of the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula (from Egypt), of the 
Golan Heights (from Syria), and of East Jerusalem and the West Bank (from Jordan). Israel’s 
outstanding military performance in the war convinced US policymakers of the potential benefits 
for the US national interest deriving from the establishment of a “special relationship” with the 
Jewish state. As a consequence, after the war, US economic and military assistance to Israel 
increased sharply. In 1968, US bilateral assistance amounted to $77 million while, in 1975, it had 
spiked to $693 million and it has increased ever since. According to the US Congressional Research 
Service, Israel is currently “the largest cumulative recipient of US foreign assistance since War 
World II.” The United States also committed itself to the double task of transforming the Israeli 
military into one of the most efficient and technologically sophisticated armed forces in the world 
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and of maintaining Israel’s qualitative military edge over its neighbors. Furthermore, over the years, 
successive US administrations have provided Israel with consistent diplomatic backing. In this 
sense, it is extremely telling that, since the 1967 War, the United States has used its veto-power at 
the United Nations Security Council to stop the adoption of more than 40 resolutions that were 
critical of the state of Israel.185 
Despite the much publicized frictions between the Obama administration and the Israeli government 
of Benjamin Netanyahu, especially over Israel’s ongoing settlement policy in the Occupied 
Territories, the “special relationship” between the two countries has continued generally unaltered 
down to the present day. Before a 2014 meeting at the White House between the US president and 
the Israeli prime minister, President Obama reaffirmed the “incredible” and “unbreakable” bond 
uniting the two nations. Obama also acknowledged the existence of “a strong bipartisan 
commitment in this country to make sure that Israel’s security is preserved in any contingency.” 
The US president finally emphasized the fact that the United States has no “closer friend or ally 
than Israel.” The message was clear: the security of Israel still ranks high in the list of US priorities 
in the Greater Middle East.186 
 
Final Remarks 
This chapter has provided a study of three important issues concerning the practice of US foreign 
policy. First, we have discussed the characteristics that qualify the political process of US foreign 
policymaking. A good knowledge of such a process is critical in order to understand US 
international behavior. As we have seen, a great variety of actors, domestic and external, bearers of 
particular interests, take part into the process of foreign policymaking at different levels and 
different times. The result of this complex negotiating process is the national interest. The national 
interest has been the object of the analysis developed in the second section of this chapter. In the 
case of the United States, we have singled out three major clusters of interests that constitute the US 
national interest broadly defined: realist, socio-economic, and ideal interests. When ideal interests 
dominate decisions on foreign policy, there is often consistency between values publicly professed 
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and actual policies undertaken. On the contrary, when realist and socio-economic interests prevail, 
we could experience a disconnect between the rhetoric and the practice of US foreign policy. 
Finally, we have showed that, since World War II, the foreign policy of the United States in the 
Greater Middle East has been systematically influenced by four primary interests: access to Middle 
Eastern energy resources, containment of hostile powers, policies to counter terrorism and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the special relationship with Israel. The last 
section of this chapter has also provided historical evidence supporting the argument that when 
confronted with conflicting national interests in the Greater Middle East, US foreign policymakers 
have traditionally taken decisions that favored strategic interests over ideal interests. In our 
following study of the US response to the Arab Awakening, we are going to assess if, when faced 
by similar conflicting national interests, the Obama administration adopted the US traditional policy 
of prioritizing strategic interests over ideal interests or if, in this respect, the response of the Obama 




































Egypt: the Last Days of the Pharaoh 
 
US-Egyptian Relations prior to 2011 
The Arab Republic of Egypt has long occupied an especially important place in the US policy 
toward the region of the Greater Middle East. The country’s large population of about 80 million 
people (with one in every four Arabs being an Egyptian), its ancient civilization (with a history of 
4,000 years of centralized rule), and its military and political clout make Egypt a trendsetter in the 
Arab world. The cooperation of successive US administrations with Egyptian leaders has therefore 
been instrumental to the projection of US influence in the wider Middle East.187 
Through its influence in Egypt the United States has pursued one of the major US strategic interests 
in the region, its special relationship with Israel. Since 1979, the peace treaty between Egypt and 
Israel has represented the backbone of the US policy to secure Israel and a staple in the overall US 
effort to find a solution to the broader Arab-Israeli conflict. After the signing of the 1979 peace 
treaty, the United States has generally viewed Egypt as a moderating force in the Middle East and it 
has provided the country with an average of $2 billion per year of bilateral assistance ($1.3 billion 
of which in the form of military aid). Egyptian leaders, on their part, have repeatedly helped the US 
government to address the complexities of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Egypt’s role after Hamas seized 
power in the Gaza Strip in 2007 is a case in point. During that crisis the Egyptian government 
backed the George W. Bush administration’s policy of isolating Hamas while favoring the Fatah 
government in the West Bank. Moreover, Egypt joined the US-sanctioned Israeli blockade of the 
Gaza Strip by mostly sealing its border with the Palestinian Territories. Finally, Egyptian envoys 
acted as essential mediators between the United States and Hamas. In fact, given that Hamas is a 
US-designated foreign terrorist organization, the government of the United States officially does not 
hold direct negotiations with it.188 
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Containment is another important US strategic interest in Egypt. After the fall of the shah of Iran in 
1979, Egypt became one of the three pillars, along with Saudi Arabia and Israel, of the US policy of 
containment in the Greater Middle East. Over the years Egypt’s strategic location at the crossroad 
of three continents and astride the Suez Canal has guaranteed critical transit rights to US aircraft 
and warships. Egypt’s military, political, and cultural influence has also proved extremely useful to 
counter the regional initiatives of powers hostile to the United States. This was true both with 
regard to the Soviet Union, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and theocratic Iran. For example, during Gulf 
War I (1990-91) Egypt first helped the United States to obtain the support of the Arab League for a 
military intervention against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and then Cairo also provided troops to the 
anti-Saddam coalition. With regard to the containment of Iran, Egypt has shared the US deep 
concerns about Teheran’s contested nuclear program and Iranian financing of militant groups such 
as Hamas and Hezbollah.189 
The US strategic interest of countering terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction has 
also significantly benefited from Egyptian cooperation. Egypt is a signatory to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty and we have already mentioned the Egyptian government’s firm support for the 
US opposition to Iran’s alleged program of developing nuclear weapons. Moreover, since 1979 the 
cooperation between the two countries in the areas of counterterrorism and intelligence 
gathering/sharing has steadily increased. Tellingly, after the 9/11 attacks against the United States, 
Egypt was among the countries that allowed the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to deport 
terrorist suspects on their soil in order to be interrogated and possibly tortured (as part of a highly 
classified CIA program of extraordinary rendition and secret detention).190 
During the first months of the Barack Obama’s tenure as president of the United States there were 
numerous diplomatic exchanges between the two countries that culminated in the US president’s 
June 2009 visit to Egypt and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s trip to Washington DC in August 
2009, Mubarak’s first visit to the United States in over five years. In a March 2009 interview with 
the Arab television network Al Arabiya, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared: “I really 
consider President and Mrs. Mubarak to be friends of my family. So I hope to see him often here in 
Egypt and in the United States.” Secretary Clinton’s remarks were probably exaggerated. According 
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to interviews we performed with foreign policy experts familiar with the facts, the longstanding 
partnership between Egypt and the United States was based on mutual utility but not on a great deal 
of mutual affection. It was a bit more than a relationship of convenience but it certainly did not 
amount to friendship. US President Obama and Egyptian President Mubarak had a roughly 
consistent vision of their interests in the Greater Middle East and expressed their willingness to 
continue their cooperation on the issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict, counterterrorism, and the 
containment of Iran. In fact, in its Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations for 
fiscal year 2010, the Obama administration recognized the importance of Egypt as a “US partner in 
the pursuit of Middle East peace and regional stability.” However, US public expressions of 
concern about Egyptian domestic political reform and human rights records prevented the 
relationship from growing warmer. In the same Congressional Budget Justification document, US 
officials noted that “Despite some progress, achieving meaningful reform [in Egypt] will continue 
to present challenges.” Lingering tensions over political reform and human rights were clearly 
exposed when Mubarak decided not to attend Obama’s speech at Cairo University on 4 June 
2009.191 
 
The Egyptian Uprising and US Response 
Activists in Egypt called for a nation-wide demonstration for 25 January 2011.192 On that day, tens 
of thousands of Egyptians took to the streets in many cities throughout the country. The opposition 
to the regime of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak included groups with very different 
backgrounds: from educated liberal or left-leaning youth, to the Egyptian labor unions, to the 
Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood. As a consequence, the nature of the anti-Mubarak opposition 
was inherently fragmented and the ensuing demonstrations were largely leaderless. Most of the 
protesters’ claims were about domestic problems: widespread corruption and unemployment, an end 
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to the three decade-old emergency laws,193 the dissolution of the parliament,194 a two-term limit to 
the presidency, a minimum wage, and the resignation of the despised minister of interior.195 
Demonstrators were also dissatisfied with the country’s foreign policy. The Mubarak regime was 
seen by its critics as a local contractor for the United States and as such incapable of taking 
independent decisions in foreign affairs. A distinct aspect of the 2011 Egyptian uprising was a 
resurgence of nationalism that called on Egypt to regain its leading role in the Middle East. 
However, anti-American sentiments, although present among Egyptians, did not drive the 
demonstrations. On the contrary, Egyptian protesters were generally demonstrating in favor of 
cherished American ideas such as freedom and democracy.196 
The Obama administration was clearly caught off guard by the first demonstrations in Egypt. From 
the US State Department, Secretary Clinton declared:  
“We support the fundamental right of expression and assembly for all people, and we urge 
that all parties exercise restraint and refrain from violence. But our assessment is that the 
Egyptian government is stable and is looking for ways to respond to the legitimate needs and 
interests of the Egyptian people.”197  
The US administration’s confidence in President Mubarak’s ability to address the unrest was soon 
reaffirmed by the White House. A few days later, amidst continuing protests, US Vice-President Joe 
Biden commented: “Mubarak has been an ally of ours in a number of things and he has been very 
responsible […] I would not refer to him as a dictator.” The US Department of Defense concurred 
and, after highlighting the healthy status of the longstanding US bilateral relationship with Egypt, 
noted that “senior Egyptian military leaders” were currently at the Pentagon for the annual US-
Egyptian defense talks. These early official statements do not reflect only a desire by the United 
States to retain a long-time ally but they also show that the Obama administration had not initially 
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grasped the magnitude of what was happening in Egypt. US officials probably thought that 
Mubarak’s rule was not in danger.198 
On January 28, after violent clashes between demonstrators and Egyptian security forces left 
hundreds injured and dozens dead, US President Obama had his first call with his Egyptian 
counterpart. The US president called upon both “the Egyptian authorities” and “those protesting in 
the streets” to refrain from violence. Obama told President Mubarak “to take concrete steps and 
actions that deliver” on the promise of democratic and economic reform. The US president then 
concluded: “the United States will continue to stand up for the rights of the Egyptian people and 
work with their government in pursuit of a future that is more just, more free, and more hopeful.” 
The Obama administration’s plan to work with the Mubarak regime received strong criticism from 
the Egyptian opposition. Mohammed ElBaradei,	 a former director general of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency and a prominent Egyptian opposition figure, made clear that “the American 
government cannot ask the Egyptian people to believe that a dictator who has been in power for 30 
years will be the one to implement democracy.” President Obama’s inclination to work with the 
current Egyptian leadership was at odds with the protesters’ increasing resolve that Mubarak had to 
go.199 
Calls for President Mubarak to resign topped the protesters’ agenda during the large demonstration, 
deemed the March of Millions, that the Egyptian opposition staged in Cairo on February 1. On that 
day, Vice-President Biden, Secretary of State Clinton, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Joint Chiefs 
of Staff Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen, National Security Adviser Tom Donilon, and 
Ambassador to Egypt Margaret Scobey, on the video conference screen, joined President Obama in 
the White House Situation Room to discuss the Egyptian crisis. The Obama team listened to 
President Mubarak publicly announcing on state television not to stand for re-election but plainly 
refusing to step down. After Mubarak’s speech Obama had a second, and last, call with the 
Egyptian president. The conversation was reportedly tense. The US president contended that 
Mubarak had not gone far enough with his speech. Mubarak replied “you don’t understand the 
Egyptian culture and what would happen if I step down now […] You are young.” The Egyptian 
president played on the US concern that an end to his leadership would pave the way to the rise to 
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power of anti-American forces. However, President Obama did not seem particularly impressed by 
Mubarak’s arguments and later that evening publicly declared: “[it] is my belief that an orderly 
transition must be meaningful, it must be peaceful, and it must begin now.”200  
By then, there was general consensus within the US administration that an “orderly transition”, that 
is a top-down process of reforms overseen by the Egyptian government, was essential to find a 
viable solution to the crisis in Egypt. Nevertheless, some officials in the US administration 
considered Obama’s formula “the transition must begin now” to be too aggressive. After President 
Obama’s remarks the US Department of State cautioned that Mubarak’s immediate resignation 
might complicate, rather than clear, Egypt’s transition to democracy. Secretary Clinton, at a security 
conference in Munich, Germany, conceded that a transition to democracy “takes some time. I mean 
there are certain things that have to be done in order to prepare” and warned about the risk that 
some forces “will try to derail or overtake the process to pursue their own specific agenda.”201 
During the frantic days of January/February 2011, diverging opinions were competing for influence 
within the Obama administration. On one side, the US State and Defense departments were very 
invested in the bilateral relationship between the United States and Egypt and wanted to salvage 
whatever they could of this relationship. President Mubarak was expendable; that was not 
necessarily the problem. What mattered the most was the broader relationship with the Egyptian 
regime. The Department of State feared that the sudden fall of President Mubarak would cast a 
shadow of uncertainty on the future of US-Egyptian cooperation on the strategic issues of the Arab-
Israeli peace process, counterterrorism, and the containment of Iran. Would a new Egyptian 
leadership honor the provisions of the 1979 peace treaty with Israel? Would a new president be as 
collaborative as Mubarak was in dealing with terrorist suspects and terrorist organizations, 
including the Hamas government in Gaza? Would he maintain President Mubarak’s hard stance 
toward the theocratic regime in Tehran? The Department of Defense, for its part, worried that a 
mismanaged power transition would jeopardize the hitherto favorable treatment enjoyed by the US 
armed forces to obtain transit rights through Egyptian airspace and waterways, especially US 
privileged access to the Suez Canal. Moreover, the Department of Defense expressed the concern of 
US arms manufacturers that an abrupt end of the Mubarak regime could result into the disruption of 
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the profitable contracts existing between such US companies and the Egyptian government. In fact, 
according to a Congressional Research Service report “approximately 30% of [the annual $1.3 
billion of US bilateral military] aid to Egypt is spent on new weapons systems, as Egypt’s defense 
modernization plan is designed to gradually replace most of Egypt’s older Soviet weaponry with 
U.S. equipment.” In order to protect such realist and socio-economic interests, officials at the State 
and Defense departments advocated for a more pragmatic policy toward the Egyptian uprising and 
seemed particularly comfortable with the idea of a slow managed transition under Egyptian Vice-
President Omar Suleiman or the military. Suleiman represented an especially acceptable candidate 
for the United States to succeed President Mubarak because he was known in the United States for 
his ardent anti-Islamism, his willingness to talk and act tough on Iran, and his previous cooperation 
with the CIA as chief of the Egyptian General Intelligence Service. A member of the Egyptian 
military was also considered an acceptable solution for a presidential succession. The United States, 
in fact, had a longstanding and cooperative relationship with the Egyptian armed forces dating back 
to the late 1970s.202 For these reasons, Suleiman and the military were seen in Washington as 
suitable candidates to secure continuity in US-Egyptian relations.203 
On the other side, the National Security Council (NSC) saw the Egyptian uprising as a colored 
revolution, like those occurred in the former Soviet Union and the Balkans in the early 2000s. 
Officials in the NSC considered the popular uprising a unique opportunity to promote the US ideal 
interests of freedom and democracy in Egypt and beyond. They were using the rhetoric about being 
on the right side of history and of not fighting the tide of change. The NSC supported the Egyptian 
uprising and advocated for a rapid transition of power. Ultimately, the more ideological position of 
the National Security Council appeared to also be the position of President Barack Obama.204 
In the meantime, a similar debate occurred in the US Congress. Some US lawmakers stressed the 
risks to US strategic interests deriving from the sudden overthrow of the Mubarak regime. Others, 
instead, pointed out the necessity to firmly stand with the Egyptian people yearning for freedom. 
Notably, US congressmen proved to be much more concerned than officials in the Obama 
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administration about the prospect of the Muslim Brotherhood coming to power in a post-Mubarak 
Egypt.205 Such a concern was bipartisan as both Democrats and Republicans repeatedly expressed 
their skepticism about “the Muslim Brotherhood’s commitment to democracy”.206 
Two events in particular were symptomatic of the existence of different opinions among officials in 
the US administration. First, the hesitation by US Press Secretary Robert Gibbs to clarify the 
meaning of President Obama’s February 1 remark that Mubarak had to step down “now”. Asked by 
journalists if “now” meant before or after the Egyptian presidential election scheduled for 
September 2011, Secretary Gibbs did not provide a straight answer. Second, the inconsistent 
statements by senior members of the administration regarding the decision to review US bilateral 
assistance to Egypt based on the Egyptian government’s response to the demonstrations. On 
January 28, Robert Gibbs said the United States was reviewing its assistance posture toward Egypt. 
Two days later, Secretary Clinton stated instead that no review was in progress. The mixed, and 
sometimes confused, signals coming from Washington drew criticisms from the Egyptian 
opposition. Protesters accused the United States of sacrificing concrete steps toward real change in 
favor of a familiar stability. Questioned about the US position toward the uprising Ibrahim Mustafa, 
a 42 year old Egyptian demonstrator, replied: “The people know [the United States] is supporting an 
illegitimate regime.”207 
The mixed nature of the statements coming from Washington also prompted some major US allies 
in the Middle East to openly convey their concerns about US policy, although for the opposite 
reason. While, in fact, the Egyptian opposition criticized the United States for its continued support 
for the Mubarak regime, the governments of countries like Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) were troubled by what they instead perceived as the Obama administration’s 
backing of Egypt’s opposition forces. Israel was especially worried about the possibility of the 
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Muslim Brotherhood seizing power in Egypt and the threat that such a scenario would represent for 
the continuation of the 1979 peace treaty. Over the years, successive Israeli governments had 
established a functioning working relationship with President Mubarak. A new Egyptian 
government controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood would threaten such a relationship. Israel, for 
example, feared that a Brotherhood-led government would be more sympathetic toward Hamas and 
therefore decide to loosen or terminate the blockade against the Gaza Strip. Saudi Arabia and to a 
lesser extent the UAE disliked the Egyptian Islamists as well. Their leaderships worried that an 
empowered Muslim Brotherhood could damage their religious legitimacy by presenting a model of 
Islamic law different from the Wahhabi tradition of an absolute monarchy. Saudi Arabia made no 
secret of its displeasure with President Obama’s handling of the Egyptian crisis. After the eventual 
ousting of Mubarak the Saudis canceled two scheduled visits to the kingdom by Secretary of 
Defense Gates and Secretary of State Clinton. The official reason for the canceling was King 
Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud’s frail health, but some read it as a direct Saudi response to the 
United States’ decision to “abandon” Egyptian president and US long-time ally Mubarak.208 
During the days preceding Mubarak’s departure, the Obama administration softened its rhetoric that 
a power transition in Egypt occurred immediately. The position of the United States coalesced into 
a plan for advocating an orderly transition under Vice-President Suleiman. The US plan, also 
supported by other international actors, required President Mubarak to transfer some powers to the 
vice-president without necessarily implying Mubarak’s formal resignation. The US administration’s 
apparent backtracking from President Obama’s “the transition must begin now” previous statement 
was probably the result of the joint pressure for adopting a more cautious policy coming both from 
within the US government (State and Defense departments) and from foreign actors (Israel, Saudi 
Arabia, UAE). Despite US efforts, the plan for an orderly transition failed to stop the protests for 
mainly two reasons. First, it failed because of the evident incapacity, or unwillingness, of the 
Egyptian regime to give meaning and credibility to its promises of political and economic reform. 
Second, the plan was unsuccessful because the Egyptian opposition had by then made extremely 
clear that Mubarak’s resignation was a conditio sine qua non for halting street demonstrations. In 
fact, the Egyptian regime’s resort to indiscriminate violence against mostly peaceful demonstrators 
(as in the case of the “Battle of the Camel” in Cairo that resulted in three dead and 600 injured) 
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along with the Egyptian president’s repeated refusal to resign from office had the effect of 
increasing the opposition’s resolve to outlast Mubarak.209       
On the evening of February 10, confronted with continuing and mounting opposition, President 
Mubarak gave a public speech to address the nation. Millions of Egyptians gathered in front of 
radios and TV sets to listen to what almost everybody expected to be a farewell address. They were 
soon to be disappointed. In a typical paternalistic tone Mubarak reaffirmed his position not to run 
again for the presidency, his intention to delegate powers to Vice-President Suleiman, his support 
for the introduction of genuine reforms but above all his commitment to “adhere to the decision of 
shouldering the responsibility in defending the constitution and the national interest of the people 
until the transfer of power.” Once again, Mubarak had refused to resign and since he was widely 
expected to do so, his stubbornness to cling to power enraged many Egyptians. According to 
sources from within the Cairo presidential palace, members of Mubarak’s inner circle, and his son 
Gamal in particular, convinced the Egyptian president that he could still ride out the turmoil.210 
Following Mubarak’s speech, President Obama released a statement that exposed the growing 
frustration of the US administration with the inability of the Egyptian regime to take the necessary 
steps to restore stability in the country: 
“The Egyptian people have been told that there was a transition of authority, but it is not yet 
clear that this transition is immediate, meaningful, or sufficient. Too many Egyptians remain 
unconvinced that the government is serious about a genuine transition to democracy, and it is 
the responsibility of the government to speak clearly to the Egyptian people and the world. 
The Egyptian government must put forward a credible, concrete, and unequivocal path 
toward genuine democracy, and they have not yet seized that opportunity.” Obama added: 
“the Egyptian people have made it clear that there is no going back to the way things were 
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[…] and they must know that they will continue to have a friend in the United States of 
America.”211 
The tone of Obama’s words was different from previous US official remarks and mirrored the US 
administration’s increased concern that continued instability in Egypt would have negative 
repercussions on US interests in the region. Despite a change in tone, US position remained 
ambiguous and not even this time did President Obama go so far as to publicly call on Mubarak to 
step down -and notably, the US president never would. 
On February 11, huge numbers of Egyptians poured into the streets to stage new demonstrations 
demanding Mubarak’s resignation. Meanwhile, the Egyptian president and his family left Cairo and 
flew to a presidential palace in the Red Sea resort location of Sharm el-Sheik. At 6 p.m. Vice-
President Suleiman made an unexpected appearance on national television to announce that 
Mubarak had relinquished the office of the presidency and had empowered the Supreme Council of 
the Armed Forces (SCAF) to administer the country’s affairs. Hosni Mubarak’s thirty-year rule of 
Egypt had suddenly come to an end.212 
After Vice-President Suleiman announced Mubarak’s resignation, President Obama welcomed the 
news from the Grand Foyer of the White House:  
“there are very few moments in our lives where we have the privilege to witness history 
taking place. This is one of those moments. This is one of those times. The people of Egypt 
have spoken, their voices have been heard, and Egypt will never be the same.” Obama then 
promised: “the United States will continue to be a friend and partner to Egypt. We stand 
ready to provide whatever assistance is necessary -and asked for- to pursue a credible 
transition to a democracy.”213  
The US administration was especially comfortable with the idea of the SCAF acting as a midwife 
during the transition to democracy. US officials had repeatedly asserted the desirability of the 
Egyptian military playing a constructive role in solving the political stalemate. Such a solution, in 
fact, seemed to guarantee the continuation of good US-Egyptian relations in a post-Mubarak Egypt.  
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The early decision by the SCAF to publicly announce its commitment to honor Egypt’s 
international obligations (an implicit reference to the 1979 peace treaty with Israel) and to transfer 
power to a democratically elected government only reinforced this US perception. The United 
States had a time-honored relationship with the Egyptian armed forces. Military-to-military contacts 
and cooperation in a number of strategic areas had been commonplace since the late 1970s. In 
addition, the Obama administration had been in close contact with the SCAF since the very 
beginning of the uprising. As noted before, on January 25, senior Egyptian military officers were at 
the Pentagon when they were reached by the news of the protests and rushed back to Egypt. During 
the two-week uprising US officials praised time and again the stabilizing role of the Egyptian armed 
forces. Illustrative of this US attitude toward the Egyptian armed forces was a comment made by 
US Secretary of Defense Gates on February 8:  
“I think that the Egyptian military has conducted itself in an exemplary fashion during this 
entire episode.  And they have acted with great restraint. And frankly, they have done 
everything that we have indicated we would hope that they would do. So I would say that they 
have made a contribution to the evolution of democracy and what we are seeing in Egypt.” 
According to some reports, Secretary Gates also had a conversation at the phone (the fifth since 
January 25) with his Egyptian counterpart, Field Marshal Tantawi, the night right before Mubarak’s 
resignation. The chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Representative Lleana Ros-
Lehtinen, publicly acknowledged that “it has been reported that the United States is working behind 
the scenes to impress upon the Egyptian military the need to protect protestors and support a 
peaceful government transition.” Given the above, the possibility that the actions of the SCAF were 
taken in coordination with Washington cannot be completely dismissed.214 
In his February 10 speech, Hosni Mubarak said he would remain the Egyptian president and 
supervise the transfer of power until the September presidential election. The day after Mubarak 
decided to step down. What could have possibly made the Egyptian President change his mind in 
less than 24 hours? 
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There is general consensus that President Mubarak’s eventual resignation was primarily the result 
of domestic pressure. In this sense, the hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions of Egyptians 
calling for irreversible change that took to the streets from late January to early February 2011 
undoubtedly played a decisive role. Equally important was the Egyptian military’s decision to take 
a somewhat neutral stance between the regime and the protesters. In more than one occasion, the 
armed forces declared that they would not “resort to use force against our great people,” that they 
acknowledged “the legitimacy of [the people’s] demands,” and that “freedom of expression through 
peaceful means” would be guaranteed to everybody. Had the armed forces decided to stand 
squarely with the Mubarak regime and to crack down on the protesters, the popular uprising alone 
may not have been able to overthrow the Egyptian president.215  
Prior to the 2011 uprising the relationship between Hosni Mubarak and the Egyptian military was 
complicated. Although Mubarak was a product of the military, having been a career officer in the 
air force, there were a number of reasons why the armed forces had come to resent his rule. First, 
there was the issue of the Mubarak regime’s program of economic reforms. Senior influential 
members of the Egyptian military despised economic liberalization from a very nationalistic point 
of view. In their opinion foreign investment and privatization were tantamount to selling Egypt’s 
soil. Along with nationalistic concerns, the armed forces also resented economic liberalization for a 
more practical reason: it allowed private actors to compete with the military’s vested interests in the 
country’s economy. Another source of discontent originated from the perception that President 
Mubarak was planning to hand over power to his son Gamal. The armed forces distrusted Gamal 
Mubarak because of his lack of a military background, his strong association with economic 
reforms, and his preferential relations with business and political, rather than military, elites. Third, 
the Egyptian military resented the Mubarak regime’s decision to establish a closer relationship with 
the Interior Ministry and security forces, whose budgets and influence, as a consequence, had 
increased significantly. Finally, the military in Egypt has consistently considered itself an 
independent organization whose loyalty primarily lies in the state and not in the institution of the 
presidency. All these reasons help to explain the position of the Egyptian armed forces during the 
uprising and why they did not firmly side with President Mubarak.216 
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Throughout the crisis, the military grew increasingly concerned with the continued deteriorating 
security situation in the country. By the day President Mubarak announced his resignation, around 
800 people had died and 6,000 more had been injured in uprising-related incidents. It was probably 
on the previous night of February 10 that the armed forces gave Mubarak the so-called “knock on 
the door” and finally convinced the president to step down. A senior Egyptian general later recalled: 
“We gave Mubarak a chance to fix the deteriorating situation, but he could not. So we had to 
intervene.”217 
Compared to the combined pressure coming from the domestic opposition and the Egyptian armed 
forces the role of the United States in Mubarak’s departure was only secondary. The Egyptian 
uprising evidenced that the leverage of the United States on Egypt’s domestic politics was indeed 
limited.	All along, the Obama administration had been reacting to ever-changing events rather than 
shaping them. Every US policy statement seemed to be too little too late compared to what was 
occurring in Egypt. Eventually, the decision to oust Mubarak was taken by the Egyptians and 
Washington simply came to terms with it. Some observers have suggested that the United States 
could have used its bilateral foreign assistance as a tool to influence the decisions of the Egyptian 
leadership. This argument neglects the fact that however significant, the importance of US bilateral 
aid was not huge in context. To begin with, in the 2000s the Egyptian economy was growing and it 
was moving from an aid-dependent economy to an investment-based economy. Thus, aid was less 
relevant during the latter Mubarak years than it used to be in the past. Furthermore, US aid had been 
about $2 billion in nominal terms since the 1980s so in real terms its actual value had probably 
decreased. Finally, in 2011, European and Persian Gulf countries, not the United States, were 
arguably the major external props of the Egyptian economy. In addition to these economic 
considerations and along with a strong political interest in not jeopardizing its strategic relationship 
with the Egyptian leadership, the Obama administration was also wary of halting US aid to Egypt 
for domestic reasons. In fact, a halt to US aid, especially military aid, would have had negative 
repercussions for the profit of those US companies (some of them very influential within the US 
Department of Defense) that did business with the Egyptian government. As a consequence, the 
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ability of the Obama administration to use US bilateral assistance as an effective lever to influence 
Egyptian domestic politics should not be overestimated.218 
 
Continuity or Change 
The Egyptian uprising presented the Obama administration with a difficult choice between 
conflicting US national interests. On the one hand, there was an overwhelmingly peaceful popular 
movement demanding social, political, and economic reforms. Support for this opposition 
movement would have contributed to the promotion of the longstanding US ideal interest of 
spreading democracy and freedom in the Greater Middle East. On the other hand, there was 
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, a loyal and valuable US ally. Siding with President Mubarak 
would have guaranteed the continuation of US-Egyptian cooperation in protecting major US 
strategic interests in the region, particularly the security of Israel, the containment of Iran, and US 
regional policies of counterterrorism and non-proliferation.  
This analysis has showed that the Egyptian uprising caught the Obama administration off guard and 
that the United States had not off-the-shelf plan to deal with such a contingency. US response to the 
uprising seemed always a step behind the events taking place in the country: for example, the US 
administration was counting on the Mubarak regime to implement meaningful reforms when 
protesters on the streets had already made abundantly clear they wanted Mubarak to go. US 
response was also characterized by mixed and sometimes confused messages coming from US 
officials: exemplary was the debate surrounding the meaning of President Obama’s remark “an 
orderly transition must begin now”. Along with the fact that the US administration was unprepared 
for the event of Egyptian President Mubarak’s sudden departure, other reasons lay behind the 
hesitant and ambivalent nature of the US response to the uprising. First, the strategic importance of 
Egypt was paramount. Therefore, US officials were extremely wary of taking any decision that 
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would irremediably jeopardize the US time-honored relationship with the Egyptian leadership. 
Second, different opinions within the US executive branch and deep concerns of some US allied 
governments led to repeated adjustments and apparent backtrackings in the US position.  
With regard to the US executive’s internal dynamics, the State and Defense departments advocated 
for a more cautious approach toward the uprising while the president seemed more keen on 
throwing his support behind the protesters. However, despite the initial existence of divergent 
opinions among officials in Washington, the Obama administration eventually adopted the 
traditional US stance of favoring the protection of US strategic interests over the promotion of US 
ideal interests in the Greater Middle East. The United States’ endorsement of political and 
economic reforms in Egypt was sincere but only to the extent that such an endorsement would not 
jeopardize the wider bilateral relationship with the Egyptian leadership. In this sense, two aspects of 
the US response to the Egyptian uprising are especially revealing. First, at the rhetorical level, 
President Obama never went so far as to publicly demand President Mubarak step down. Second, at 
the practical level, the domestic debate in the United States about reviewing US bilateral assistance 
to Egypt did not result in a decision to halt or reduce such an assistance. Contrary to the general 
wisdom that President Obama “abandoned” Mubarak, the United States decided to fully side with 
the protesters only at the very end. The Obama administration did so when it realized that the risks 
to the US national interest of standing by Mubarak were greater than those of easing him out and 
only after US officials understood that power in Egypt would be transferred to the military, an 
institution with which Washington had a time-tested cooperative relationship. All that considered, 
we can confidently argue that the Obama administration’s response to the transformative events of 











The Kingdom of Bahrain: a Troubled Ally 
 
US-Bahraini Relations prior to 2011 
At first glance, the Kingdom of Bahrain does not display the typical characteristics that would make 
it an especially relevant country for the United States. Bahrain, in fact, sits on a tiny archipelago of 
islands off the east coast of Saudi Arabia (its entire size is only three and a half times the size of 
Washington DC), has a very small population of 1.2 million people, and does not possess 
significant reserves of oil and natural gas. What makes Bahrain particularly important to the United 
States is the kingdom’s location at the heart of the strategic region of the Persian Gulf.219 
Military cooperation has undoubtedly been the cornerstone of the relationship between the United 
States and Bahrain. First military contacts began at the end of World War II and US military assets 
have been in Bahrain since 1948. Since then, the primary interlocutor of successive US 
administrations has been the Al Khalifa royal family.220 After the British withdrawal and the 
Bahraini declaration of independence in 1971 the United States took over and became the major 
foreign power with a direct presence in the country. The revolutionary events of 1979 significantly 
stepped up the strategic importance of Bahrain as a bulwark against the perceived threat represented 
by the newly established Islamic Republic of Iran. In October 1991, seven months after the last 
Iraqi troops were ousted from Kuwait, the United States and Bahrain reportedly signed a ten-year 
defense treaty. The treaty was then renewed in October 2001, and was supposed to be renewed 
again in October 2011. However, according to some reports, it seems that the George W. Bush 
administration, after the shocking events of 11 September 2001, decided to extend the defense 
treaty for an additional five years, until 2016.221 US-Bahraini military cooperation reached a higher 
level in March 2002 when US President G.W. Bush officially designed Bahrain as a major non-
NATO ally. Such a privileged designation qualified Bahrain to purchase the same kind of US 
technologically-advanced weapons that only NATO members could otherwise acquire. The access 
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of US warships to Bahrain’s naval facilities is another essential aspect of the US-Bahraini defense 
relationship. “Naval Support Activity Bahrain” is the name of a sprawling facility that covers over 
100 acres and hosts about 5,000 US personnel, mostly from the US Navy, including the 
headquarters of the US Fifth Fleet. The US Fifth Fleet has the specific responsibility to patrol the 
Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, and the east coast of Africa. Along with naval assets, 
Bahrain also hosts a number of US Air Force personnel, at the Sheikh Isa Air Base, and special 
operations teams.222 
Over the years, the presence of US military assets in Bahrain has proved critical to the pursuit of the 
US national interest in the Greater Middle East. 
To begin with, US military presence in the archipelago has guaranteed US access to Middle Eastern 
energy resources, a major US strategic interest in the region. As the largest suppliers of petroleum 
and natural gas in the entire world, the countries of the Persian Gulf (Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) are unrivaled. In 2011, the US Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) calculated Persian Gulf proved reserves of crude oil at 788 
billion barrels, roughly 58 percent of the world’s total reserves. During the same year the region 
produced an average of 25.5 million barrels of oil per day, thus accounting for about 29 percent of 
the world’s entire production. As for natural gas, in 2011 Persian Gulf proved reserves were 
estimated at 2,623 trillion cubic feet (39 percent of the world’s reserves) and the region’s 
production was of 16,126 billion cubic feet (equal to 13 percent of the world’s production). 
Furthermore, Persian Gulf oil is critical for at least other two reasons. First, the costs of oil 
exploration and production are far cheaper here than in any other region. Second, Persian Gulf 
countries possess more than 90 percent of the world’s excess production capacity, that is the 
capability to fuel additional oil rapidly into the market in case of a sudden disruption. This large 
excess production capacity gives them the possibility to decisively influence world supplies and 
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market prices. US air and naval assets in Bahrain have therefore allowed the United States to secure 
the unhindered flow of such vital energy supplies from this strategic region to the world market.223 
US-Bahraini military cooperation has also been beneficial to the US strategic interest of containing 
hostile powers in the Greater Middle East. For example, military installations in Bahrain served the 
US policy of “dual containment” of Iraq and Iran in the 1990s. Bahrain was part of the US-led 
coalition that expelled Iraq from Kuwait in 1991, Bahrain hosted US troops both during the 1991 
war and during the following embargo, and US pilots flew combat missions from Bahraini bases in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. In a similar fashion, Bahrain has supported the US policy of 
containment of Iran. In particular, the Bahraini leadership has shared US concerns about Iran’s 
nuclear program and has strongly opposed the idea of Iran developing nuclear weapons. Moreover, 
US military presence in Bahrain has been a security guarantee against potential hostile Iranian 
actions targeting Persian Gulf countries. This has been especially true in the case of Bahrain where 
the royal family has intentionally used US presence to keep its more powerful neighbor in check. 
The Al Khalifas’ suspicion of Iranian intentions224 originates from the fact that, over the past 
century, different leaders in Tehran have at times contested Bahrain’s sovereignty and publicly 
expressed claims to Bahrain’s territory.225   
Countering terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction is another important US 
strategic interest in Bahrain. The US State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism for 2010 
credited Bahrain for having worked to actively counter terrorist finance, as well as for enhanced 
border control capabilities, for efforts to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism, and for having 
successfully prosecuted a number of terrorist suspect cases. Moreover, Naval Support Activity 
Bahrain has been used to coordinate the naval operations of Combined Task Force 151 and 152 
whose main task is to interdict the movement of terrorist, arms, and weapons of mass destruction-
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related technology across the Arabian Sea. US and Bahraini naval assets have also cooperated in 
anti-piracy operations throughout the region’s waterways.226  
Before the 2011 popular uprising the relationship between the Obama administration and the Al 
Khalifas was sound. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described it as “a time-tested relationship 
based on mutual interest and mutual respect.” In similar terms, the Bahraini foreign minister stated 
that “The Kingdom of Bahrain and the United States of America share a historic, deep-rooted, and 
multifaceted relationship.” Cooperation on the strategic issues of energy security, containment of 
Iran, and counterterrorism continued unhindered. In its Congressional Budget Justification for 
Foreign Operations for fiscal year 2010, the Obama administration acknowledged that Bahraini 
military cooperation “contributes directly to the US Government’s effort to maintain security in the 
Persian Gulf.” The US administration also pursued policies to encourage democratic and economic 
reforms in the insular kingdom. As part of its attempt to promote reform the United States 
consistently invested political capital in support of Crown Prince Sheikh Salman who was 
considered by many US officials the leader of the moderate and pro-reform camp within the Al 
Khalifa royal family. The Obama administration’s commitment to reform in Bahrain was reaffirmed 
once again by US Secretary Clinton after the kingdom held its parliamentary elections in October 
2010: 
“as we know, the challenges of democratic governance do not end with elections. But I am 
impressed by the commitment that the government has to the democratic path that Bahrain is 
walking on […] America will continue working with you to promote a vigorous civil society, 
and to ensure that democracy, human rights, and civil liberties are protected by the rule of 
law, because we view Bahrain as a model partner for not only the United States, but for so 
many countries that are looking to see the way that Bahrain decides about its future.”227 
                                         
226 US Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2010, August 18, 2011, 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2010/170257.htm; Anthony H. Cordesman, US State Department and Counter- 
Terrorism Center Reporting Terrorism in the Middle East and Central Asia, August 2010 (Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, June 29, 2011), 
http://csis.org/files/publication/110629_US_State_Survey_MENA_Cent_Asia_Terrorism_2010.pdf; Kenneth Katzman, 
Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy 21/02/2012 (Congressional Research Service, February 21, 2012), 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/185930.pdf; Walter Pincus, “State Department Cables Detail U.S. Links to 
Bahrain,” The Washington Post, February 22, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/02/21/AR2011022103251.html. 
227 Hillary Clinton, “Remarks with Foreign Minister Al Khalifa After Their Meeting 03/02/2010” (US Department of 
State, February 3, 2010), http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/02/136480.htm; Simon Henderson, 
“Bahrain Boiling: Welcome to the Arab Revolt That Failed,” Foreign Policy, September 23, 2011, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/23/bahrain_boiling?page=0,2; Clinton, “Remarks with Foreign Minister 
Al Khalifa After Their Meeting 03/12/2010”; US Department of State, “Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign 
Operations FY2010, Volume II.” 
125 
 
The Bahraini Uprising and US Response 
Only two months after Secretary Clinton publicly praised the Bahraini government for being a 
model partner committed to democratic reform, popular protests broke out in the country.228 On 14 
February 2011, a few days after the ousting of President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, over 6,000 
people took to the streets and unauthorized demonstrations were held in the capital Manama and in 
other cities across the country. As it was the case in Egypt, the Bahraini uprising brought to light 
new opposition groups that made wide use of Internet-based social networks to mobilize support. 
These new groups, such as the February 14 Revolution Coalition, were leaderless networks whose 
members, mainly youth, were not affiliated with any traditional political organization and did not 
identify themselves along any particular religious, sectarian, or ideological line. At this early stage 
of the uprising, demonstrators were demanding political and economic reforms: more power for the 
elected parliament, an end to the practice of gerrymandering voting districts, respect for human 
rights, and better jobs and economic opportunities. These demands for reform were initially shared 
by both the Sunni and the Shiite communities in Bahrain. However, Bahraini Shiites, that represent 
the majority of the population in the archipelago,229 were especially vocal in their criticism of the 
minority Sunni royal family. Shiites in Bahrain, in fact, has long felt treated as second-class citizens 
deprived of their proportionate share of political power and economic wealth. Popular protests 
immediately met the resistance of Bahraini security forces that used tear gas and rubber bullets to 
disperse the peaceful crowds. During the first day of confrontations with the police one 
demonstrator was reportedly killed and tens more were injured.230 
The first reactions of the Obama administration were cautious but unambiguous. The White House 
and the State Department issued statements reaffirming that the United States supported the 
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people’s rights to protest peacefully, to freedom of expression, and to freedom of assembly. 
Moreover, the Obama administration stressed that violence and coercion should not be the way 
governments respond to peaceful demonstrations. US President Barack Obama personally urged the 
Bahraini government “to get ahead of change” and not to lag “behind the curve”.231 
Clashes between protesters and security forces continued in the following days. Although 
demonstrators worked hard to describe their mobilization as non-sectarian, it was a fact that the 
large majority of anti-government protesters were Shiites whereas the majority of people 
participating in pro-government rallies were Sunnis. On February 17, Bahraini security forces 
stormed Manama’s Pearl Roundabout where the opposition had set up a tent camp. The violent 
clearing out of Pearl Roundabout resulted in four people dead and many others injured. Rising 
tensions on the streets went hand in hand with a gradual radicalization of the slogans chanted during 
the demonstrations. Initial calls for political and economic reforms turned into more explicit 
demands for regime change with some minority groups even demanding the establishment of a 
republic. Faced by increasing opposition Bahraini King Hamad entrusted the crown prince with the 
task of starting a national dialogue with the opposition. Meanwhile, first violent confrontations 
along Shiite-Sunni sectarian lines were reported in early March.232 
The incident at Pearl Roundabout elicited the condemnation of the White House. On the same day, 
Secretary of State Clinton called the Bahraini foreign minister to express “deep concerns about the 
actions of the security forces.” Secretary Clinton also exhorted the Bahraini government to show 
restraint and engage in “a process that will result in real meaningful changes for the people.” In its 
response to the Bahraini uprising the Obama administration had to struck a difficult balance 
between the ideal interest of supporting peaceful demonstrations demanding political and economic 
reforms and the strategic interest of preserving its valuable partnership with the Al Khalifa royal 
family, a longtime US ally. As a result, US official statements constantly swung between mild 
criticisms of state repression and public reassurances about the solidity of the US-Bahraini 
relationship. In addition to the White House and the State Department, such a position toward the 
uprising was also adopted by the US military and US Defense Department. During a visit to 
Bahrain, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen decried the ongoing violence in the 
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country whilst simultaneously praising Bahraini leaders “for the very measured way they have been 
handling the popular crisis”. Chairman Mullen also reaffirmed the US “strong commitment to [the] 
military relationship with the Bahraini defense forces.” Similarly, US Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates told the Bahraini king and the crown prince that “baby steps” toward reform were not enough 
to meet their people’s political and economic grievances. However, Secretary Gates also reiterated 
the healthy condition of the US-Bahraini alliance and conveyed his conviction that the Al Khalifas 
were serious about implementing “real reform” to address the opposition’s demands.233 
The Bahraini government’s half-hearted promises of reform did not stop the opposition staging new 
demonstrations. The security situation in Bahrain was rapidly deteriorating and state security forces 
seemed unable to restore law and order. An overwhelmed Bahraini royal family, fearing for its own 
very survival, requested the help of its Gulf neighbors. The organization of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC), of which Bahrain is a member, agreed to send troops to assist the embattled Al 
Khalifas. Starting on March 14, around 2000 troops, mostly from Saudi Arabia but also from the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar, entered Bahrain under the banner of the Peninsula Shield 
Force with the double task of protecting key sites and infrastructure, and of defending Bahrain from 
any possible foreign intervention. Kuwait sent naval forces to patrol and secure Bahrain’s maritime 
borders.234 
Before King Hamad sent his official request for assistance to the GCC, Crown Prince Sheikh 
Salman had been engaged in frenzied talks with the Bahraini traditional opposition (especially with 
members of the Shiite political society Al Wefaq) to find a negotiated solution to the crisis.235 Both 
sides in the negotiations had credibility issues: the crown prince represented a regime that had 
repeatedly broken its reform promises whereas Al Wefaq and its partners were not in a position to 
guarantee that the larger Bahraini opposition would accept the terms of a possible agreement. The 
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inability of the two parties to agree on a consensual framework for national dialogue paved the way 
for the GCC military intervention and it also had significant effects on the distribution of power 
both within the government and the opposition. On the one hand, the crown prince’s failure to strike 
an agreement with the opposition weakened the reformist camp within the royal family while it 
empowered its more reactionary members. On the other hand, the traditional opposition, like Al 
Wefaq, lost credibility in the eyes of the protesters because of its policy of engagement with the 
government. They were accused of legitimizing the regime without being able to receive any 
significant reform in exchange. The fact that hardliners in both camps had gained the upper-hand 
only made the possibility of a future political compromise even more unlikely.236 
During the days preceding the deployment of the Peninsula Shield Force in and around Bahrain, the 
position of the Obama administration coalesced into a policy of support for the crown prince’s 
initiative to start a national dialogue with the opposition. The State Department “stressed the need to 
seriously engage all sectors of society in a constructive, consultative dialogue to meet the way 
forward in accordance with the aspirations of the people.” In a similar fashion, the Defense 
Department encouraged “national dialogue”. Finally, the White House, as late as March 13, was 
still exhorting “the government of Bahrain to pursue a peaceful and meaningful dialogue with the 
opposition rather than resorting to the use of force.” Moreover, US officials directly engaged in 
diplomatic actions aimed at facilitating a political solution to the Bahraini uprising. On March 11 
and March 14 respectively, Secretary of Defense Gates and Assistant Secretary of State for Near 
Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman were in Bahrain to help broker a compromise between the Al 
Khalifas and the opposition. There were also news reports of a personal call by President Obama to 
Saudi King Abdullah where the US president asked the Saudi monarch to refrain from sending 
troops to Bahrain. However, the Obama administration’s efforts to advance a political solution to 
the crisis failed and, on March 14, GCC troops began to enter Bahrain. After the news of the 
military intervention reached Washington, the White House declared that the US administration had 
been previously informed of the GCC decision.237 
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The role of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is especially important to understand the development of 
the Bahraini uprising and the US response to it. To begin with, Saudi Arabia has a significant 
political, economic, and security leverage over Bahrain to the extent that there is a widespread 
perception that critical decisions about Bahrain’s future are not taken in Manama but in Riyadh. 
Moreover, the Saudi royal family is plausibly the most important Persian Gulf ally of the United 
States. Therefore, the Obama administration inevitably had to take into account Saudi concerns and 
preferences when framing its policy response toward the crisis in Bahrain. As it occurred with 
regard to the Egyptian uprising, US and Saudi preferred policy-options in Bahrain differed 
significantly. While the United States advocated for a national dialogue, Saudi Arabia favored a 
military intervention. Saudi intransigence over the Bahraini issue was well exemplified by a Saudi 
official who reportedly described Bahrain as the “reddest of red lines”. There were two main 
reasons why Saudi Arabia was particularly worried about unrest in Bahrain. First, Saudi leaders 
feared that a Shiite takeover of the small archipelago would allow its nemesis Iran to set up camp at 
the kingdom’s doorstep. Second, Riyadh was afraid that reforms in Bahrain would have negative 
repercussions on Saudi domestic politics insofar as such reforms would encourage Shiites and 
Sunni liberals in Saudi Arabia to raise similar demands. The deployment of the Peninsula Shield 
Force was meant to send one message to the Bahraini opposition, that the Bahraini government had 
the total support of Riyadh, and another message to foreign powers, particularly the United States, 
that Saudi Arabia would not tolerate any Egypt-like change to the status quo in a neighboring 
country.238 
The day after the Peninsula Shield Force deployed in Bahrain, King Hamad issued a royal order 
pursuant to which a three-month long state of national safety was declared in the country. The royal 
order marked the beginning of a period of unprecedented repression. Emboldened by the presence 
of the GCC troops, the Bahraini government clamped down hard on the opposition. There were 
reports of mass arrests, harassment, beating, and torture against demonstrators, medical personnel, 
and people in custody. Contrary to what happened in Egypt, where the military refused to crack 
down on demonstrators, Bahraini police and armed forces stood squarely on the side of the Al 
Khalifas.239 Credible accounts estimate that 35 individuals died during the February-March unrest, 
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five of them while in detention. The unwavering support that Bahraini state security institutions 
showed for the royal family, along with the deployment of GCC troops, undoubtedly reduced the 
ability of the opposition to exert enough pressure on the Al Khalifas to compel the government to 
offer meaningful concessions.240 
On June 1, the Bahraini king announced the end of the state of national safety and invited what was 
left of the anti-government opposition to join a wide-ranging national dialogue on political and 
economic reform. In a further move to ease domestic tensions and divert international criticism, the 
king also established the Bahraini Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI). The BICI was 
composed of five senior international lawyers and its primary task was “to investigate and report on 
the events occurring in Bahrain in February/March 2011, and any subsequent consequences arising 
out of the aforementioned events, and to make such recommendations as it may deem appropriate.” 
Despite the king’s conciliatory moves, low-intensity clashes between mostly-Shiite protesters and 
state security forces continued almost daily. As for the renewed national dialogue, major opposition 
groups, like Al Wefaq, soon withdrew from the negotiations accusing the government of not being 
serious about reforms.241 
Although increasingly concerned by unrest in Bahrain (on March 16, Secretary Clinton described 
the situation as “alarming”) the Obama administration did not substantially changed its position 
toward the popular uprising. The US administration, in fact, continued to work assiduously to 
advance a political solution to the crisis. Accordingly, the Department of Defense encouraged the 
government and the opposition in Bahrain to “sit down together and talk about the long-term 
relationship between the government and the Shiite majority.” The Department of State welcomed 
the announcement of comprehensive and unconditional talks in June as a “positive step” and 
similarly described the decision to form the BICI in July as a “step in the right direction”. 
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Throughout the uprising, any US criticism of the Al Khalifas’ crackdown on the opposition was 
generally balanced by statements reaffirming the soundness and importance of the US-Bahraini 
bilateral relationship. Hence, President Obama’s 19 May remarks on the Middle East and North 
Africa: 
“Bahrain is a longstanding partner, and we are committed to its security […] Nevertheless, 
we have insisted both publicly and privately that mass arrests and brute force are at odds 
with the universal rights of Bahrain’s citizens […] and such steps will not make legitimate 
calls for reform go away. The only way forward is for the government and opposition to 
engage in a dialogue, and you can’t have a real dialogue when parts of the peaceful 
opposition are in jail. The government must create the conditions for dialogue, and the 
opposition must participate to forge a just future for all Bahrainis.” 242 
The importance of US strategic interests in Bahrain added to Saudi Arabia’s expressed opposition to 
any “revolutionary” change in the country to make the Obama administration extremely wary about 
coupling its public criticism with any action that would put tangible pressure on the Al Khalifas to 
reform. A concrete initiative to exercise such a pressure was instead pursued by the US Congress. In 
October 2011, both houses of the Congress passed a joint resolution that put on hold a planned $53 
million worth US arms sale to Bahrain. In a wording clearly reminiscent of the Leahy 
amendments,243 the October resolution stated that,  
“providing military equipment and provisions for upgrades to a government that commits 
human rights violations and that has undertaken insufficient measures to seek reform and 
accountability is at odds with United States foreign policy goals of promoting democracy, 
human rights, accountability, and stability.”244 
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The US Congress eventually took the decision that the Obama administration had long been 
reluctant to take: to hold the Bahraini government accountable for its continued repressive response 
to a mostly peaceful popular mobilization. However, the US administration was very invested in the 
bilateral relationship with Bahrain and took successive actions that significantly limited the effect of 
the congressional resolution. In early 2012, the State Department indicated that part of the arms sale 
was in fact proceeding, using a clause that allowed the administration to sell military equipment 
under $1 million without congressional approval. The State Department noted that it intended “to 
release some previously notified equipment needed for Bahrain’s external defense and support of 
Fifth Fleet operations.” US officials also emphasized that such a sale included spare parts and 
maintenance of equipment but no crowd-control items that could be used against protesters. The 
Obama administration justified the partial resumption of US arms sales by saying that the Bahraini 
government had carried out “some important initial steps” in implementing the recommendations 
made by the BICI and that US security assistance was used to “reinforce reforms in Bahrain.” 
Interviews with Bahraini officers performed in February 2012 by the think tank Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace confirmed the absence of any significant disruption in US-
Bahraini military relations. Conversely, Bahraini officers noted that the US International Military 
Education and Training, Foreign Military Financing, and Foreign Military Sales programs were 
continuing unhindered. Later in May, the Obama administration announced its decision to “release 
additional items and services for the Bahraini Defense Forces, Bahrain’s Coast Guard, and 
Bahrain’s National Guard” with the specific purpose “to help Bahrain maintain its external defense 
capabilities.” The existing halt in the sale of military items that could have been used for crowd-
control was instead maintained. After a short-lived pause US-Bahraini military cooperation seemed 
to be back to “business as usual”.245 
A senior US administration official, speaking on condition of anonymity, explained: “we have made 
this decision [to restart military assistance to Bahrain] on national security grounds. We have made 
this decision mindful of the fact that there remain a number of serious unresolved human rights 
issues in Bahrain which we expect the government of Bahrain to address.” In the eyes of the Obama 
administration, the need to maintain its strategic partnership with the Al Khalifas outweighed ideal 
considerations about promoting democratic and economic reforms in the country. Military 
cooperation between the United States and Bahrain, especially US access to Bahrain’s naval 
facilities, was critical to the pursuit of US strategic interests in the region and US military assistance 
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was an essential component of such a cooperation. As repeatedly noted by administration officials, 
a prolonged disruption of US military assistance would have not only decreased Bahrain’s external 
defense capabilities but also impaired the activities of US military assets in the archipelago and the 
interoperability between the armed forces of the two countries. As a consequence, the United States 
would have been weakened in its regional effort to secure access to Persian Gulf energy resources, 
to contain Iranian aspirations, and to conduct counterterrorism and anti-piracy operations. 
Maintaining friendly and collaborative relations with Bahraini leaders was critical to secure such 
US strategic interests. Aware of this, the Obama administration avoided a confrontational stance 
toward the rulers of Bahrain and instead adopted a policy of moderate encouragement toward 
national reconciliation and reform.246 
Along with serious concerns about protecting US strategic interests in the region, there were a 
number of additional reasons that limited the ability of the Obama administration to determine the 
outcome of the Bahraini uprising.  
To begin with, there was the specter of Iranian involvement. Throughout the uprising, both the 
Bahraini and the Saudi royal families accused Bahraini protesters of being agents of the government 
in Tehran on numerous occasions. The Obama administration was also seriously concerned about 
Iran’s ambitions toward the Gulf. However, with regard to the specific issue of the Bahraini 
uprising, US officials did not share their Gulf allies’ assessment that Tehran was the hidden hand 
behind the unrest. In September 2011, speaking before the US Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Ambassador-designate to the Kingdom of Bahrain Thomas Krajeski stressed that, 
although “concerned” about the possibility of Iran exploiting the ongoing unrest in Bahrain, the US 
administration “saw no evidence of Iranian instigation.” In fact, as noted in a 2008 US diplomatic 
cable, the United States had found no intelligence of Iranian economic or military support to the 
Bahraini opposition since at least the mid-1990s. The US assessment of Iran’s involvement in the 
Bahraini uprising was later corroborated by the findings of the BICI. In its November 2011 report, 
the Commission concluded that no hard evidence was available to “establish a discernible link 
between specific incidents that occurred in Bahrain during February and March 2011 and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran.” Diverging opinions on Iranian meddling notwithstanding, Bahraini and 
Saudi concerns meant that the United States interpreted what occurred in the tiny Gulf archipelago 
in light of the US strategic partnerships with the two royal families. Hence, the Obama 
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administration was reluctant to take concrete steps in support of the Bahraini pro-democracy 
opposition that would jeopardize its critical relationships with leaders in Manama and Riyadh.247   
US access to Bahrain naval facilities was another factor behind US hesitancy to act tough on the Al 
Khalifas. There had been a lot of talk about contingency plans to relocate US military assets in the 
case of a break in the US-Bahraini military partnership. Alternative locations were identified in the 
UAE and Qatar but there were both political and technical problems that made such a relocation 
difficult. First, US expanded military facilities may have not sat well with the sensitivity of the local 
Arab populations. Second, the selected alternative locations either inconveniently shared docking 
and other facilities with large commercial operations or did not provide large US warships with the 
ease of docking that Naval Support Activity-Bahrain does. US policymakers, including the ranking 
member of the senate armed forces committee, John McCain, publicly denied plans for the 
relocation of US military assets explaining that the United States had “too much invested” in 
Bahrain to consider the idea of moving its assets elsewhere. In fact, the United States is currently 
implementing a $580 million military construction program in Bahrain. A construction program that 
began in May 2010 and it is expected to be completed by 2015. The decision to relocate US military 
assets from Bahrain, after having invested significant amounts of taxpayers’ money there, would 
been hard to explain to a budget-wary US public opinion.248  
A third reason for US reduced leverage on Bahrain’s domestic politics was mounting anti-
Americanism. The Obama administration’s policy of half-hearted support for the uprising had in 
fact the double effect of disappointing people both in the royal family and in the opposition. On one 
side, hardliners within the Al Khalifas deeply resented US public criticism of their domestic 
response to the uprising and became suspicious of the US real commitment to the bilateral 
relationship. On the other side, demonstrators and human rights activists accused the Obama 
administration of failing to follow its rhetorical backing of democracy with actual policies in 
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support of the Bahraini uprising. Increased anti-Americanism damaged US standing in Bahrain and 
made the effort of the United States to broker a political solution to the crisis even harder.249 
 
Continuity or Change 
Conflicting national interests were at play when the United States had to frame its response to the 
2011 uprising in Bahrain. The Obama administration could have advanced the longstanding US 
ideal interest of promoting democracy and freedom in the Greater Middle East by actively backing 
the Bahraini opposition’s demands for political and economic reforms. Alternatively, the US 
administration could have sided with the Bahraini government mindful of the fact that Bahraini 
rulers’ military cooperation was essential to the pursuit of US strategic interests. Such strategic 
interests in Bahrain included US unhindered access to the region’s energy supplies, the containment 
of Iran’s nuclear program and Iranian perceived expansionist ambitions toward the Gulf, and US 
regional policies to counter terrorism and piracy. 
Throughout the uprising the Obama administration was consistent in supporting national dialogue 
and reconciliation between the Bahraini government and the opposition. Moreover, the White 
House, the State Department, and the Defense Department spoke with a single voice when they 
cautiously condemned the use of force against peaceful demonstrators, opposed the GCC military 
intervention, and voiced disappointment about the slow pace of reforms in the country. However, 
the US administration did not match its mild rhetorical criticism with any meaningful action or 
consequence. On the contrary, US officials circumvented the US Congress’s October 2011 joint 
resolution that was aimed at holding the Bahraini government accountable for documented violence 
and repeated human rights violations. Moreover, the Obama administration also refused to join 
international efforts aimed at exerting even moderate pressure on the Al Khalifas to reform. For 
example, in June 2012, the UN Human Rights Council issued a statement conveying its “concern 
over the human rights situation in Bahrain, both the violations that took place in February and 
March 2011 as well as the related ongoing ones.” While twenty-eight countries signed the UN 
document, the United States did not support the initiative. Finally, despite two years of continuous 
unrest and a death toll that, by the end of 2012, had reached a total of 85 uprising-related casualties, 
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the US administration did not impose, or even publicly threaten to impose, any sanctions against the 
Bahraini government or individual Bahraini officials.250 
The US concern about maintaining its strategic cooperation with the Al Khalifas, and their potent 
patrons in Saudi Arabia, outweighed the US ideal goal of meaningfully supporting political and 
economic reforms. The US response to the Bahraini uprising was a manifest example of strategic 
interests trumping ideal interests. In our analysis of the 2011-12 events in Bahrain we could not 
detect any evidence of the “new beginning” in the US foreign policy toward the Muslim world that 
















                                         





Yemen: It’s Counterterrorism, Stupid! 
 
US-Yemeni Relations prior to 2011 
In 2011, the Republic of Yemen was the poorest state in the Arab world and one of the most 
destitute countries on earth. It ranked 154th out of 187 on the United Nations Human Development 
Index.251 Yemen faced persistent problems	 including a weak central government, a shrinking 
economy highly dependent on declining oil resources (that roughly accounted for 25% of GDP and 
70% of government revenue), water scarcity, poverty, unemployment, armed population, and a 
deteriorating security situation. Furthermore, in the early twenty-first century the authority of the 
central government in the capital Sanaa had been repeatedly challenged: between 2004 and 2010 an 
insurgent movement, the Houthis, waged an armed rebellion in the north;252 in 2007 civil unrest 
reemerged in the south when disaffected southerners, led by the Hirak, renewed calls for 
secession;253 and finally, toward the end of the decade, Islamist extremist groups, the most active of 
which was Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), had established safe havens across the 
country. According to some estimates, almost two-thirds of Yemen’s territory was outside central 
government’s control before the Arab Awakening reached the country.254 
In Yemen, persistent instability, continued conflict, and the risk of central authority collapse 
represented serious threats to the US national interest in the region.	To begin with, Yemen shares a 
long border with Saudi Arabia. With an average production of more than 11,000 barrels per day the 
Saudi Kingdom is the world’s largest oil producer and exporter. Saudi Arabia is also a major pillar 
of the United States’ alliance system in the Greater Middle East and ostensibly the United States’ 
primary Gulf partner in the US policy of containment toward Iran. Therefore, disorder and unrest in 
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Yemen spilling over into Saudi Arabia would have the potential to threaten both the US strategic 
interest of securing safe access to Persian Gulf energy resources and the US strategic interest of 
containing Iranian influence. A recent example of such a negative spillover effect took place in 
2009 when fighting in northern Yemen extended to Saudi Arabia after reported infiltrations into 
Saudi territory by Houthi insurgents spurred Saudi troops to carry out cross-border military 
operations into Yemen.255  
In addition, Yemen flanks the Bab el-Mandeb strait. The Bab el-Mandeb is a chokepoint between 
the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, and a strategic link between the Indian Ocean and the 
Mediterranean Sea that connects the markets of Asia, Europe, and North America. In 2011, an 
estimated 3.4 million barrels of oil per day flowed through the strait. A prolonged closure of the 
Bab el-Mandeb deriving from state breakdown in Yemen would prevent oil tankers from the 
Persian Gulf, but also other types of vessels, to access the Suez Canal and would divert them around 
the southern tip of Africa, increasing both costs and transit time. Again, the US strategic interest of 
having unhindered access to the rich energy resources of the Persian Gulf would be significantly 
compromised.256 
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States, Yemen also became paramount for the US 
strategic interest of countering terrorism. As part of the US Global War on Terror, the United States 
started a program of military assistance and training to the Yemeni armed forces. The program 
included the provision of technical assistance, equipment, and training to the Yemeni Coast Guard 
to help patrol the strategic Bab el-Mandeb strait and to the Yemeni Anti-Terrorism Units to hunt 
down terrorist suspects. US officials were especially concerned about the possibility of Islamist 
extremist groups based in Yemen to organize and stage attacks against the US homeland and/or US 
facilities and personnel in the country. AQAP, the local branch of Al Qaeda, proved to be a 
particularly challenging adversary. In 2008, AQAP militants attacked the entrance of the US 
embassy in Sanaa, leading to the death of 17 people. In 2009, a Nigerian AQAP suspect tried to set 
off a bomb concealed in his underwear on a Detroit-bound flight. Finally, in 2010, AQAP 
operatives managed to ship two explosive devices destined to Chicago on commercial cargo planes. 
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Although these last two attack attempts were not successful, they nevertheless highlighted the 
tangible nature of the threat represented by extremist groups in Yemen. In early 2011, US Secretary 
of Defense Robert Gates publicly conveyed such a US concern when he stated: “We consider Al 
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which is largely located in Yemen, to be perhaps the most 
dangerous of all the franchises of Al Qaeda right now.”257 
In the wake of the failed 2009 underwear terrorist attack, the Obama administration ordered a major 
review of US policy toward Yemen. Accordingly, the US National Security Council produced a 
strategic plan that focused on three main points: combating AQAP in the short term, increasing 
development assistance in the long term, and marshaling international support for stabilization 
policies. As for US counterterrorism efforts, the Obama administration began to increasingly rely 
on drone strikes as part of a US covert program to target and kill Al Qaeda commanders in Yemen. 
In December 2010, US Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism John 
Brennan stated that occasional tensions with the Yemeni government of President Ali Abdullah 
Saleh258 were “healthy” and “the hallmark of true friendship: not telling the other what they want to 
hear but telling the other what they need to hear.” Less than a month later, US Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton made a surprise visit to Yemen. It was the first of such a visit by a US secretary of 
state since 1990. During her meeting with President Saleh, Secretary Clinton announced the United 
States’ commitment to “a broad relationship” with Yemen that included fighting against extremist 
groups but went “beyond counterterrorism.” Clinton also welcomed the Yemeni government’s 
decision to undertake “a number of reforms” in the economic, social, and political sectors and she 
pledged US assistance for “an inclusive political process that will, in turn, support a unified, 
prosperous, stable, democratic Yemen.”259 
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Brennan and Clinton’s public remarks, however, were misleading. Diplomatic cables leaked to the 
general public proved, in fact, that the relationship between the United States and President Saleh 
was much more controversial than one could otherwise infer from the previous US official 
statements. In particular, Saleh’s lack of attention, and sometimes even direct obstruction, to US 
counterterrorism operations in Yemen and US concerns about democratic shortcomings and 
widespread corruption in the country had prevented the bilateral relationship to grow warmer. In 
some of these leaked cables, US officials expressed profound skepticism about President Saleh’s 
commitment to fighting Yemen-based extremist groups. According to a May 2009 cable, the United 
States received credible intelligence saying that “The ROYG [Republic Of Yemen Government] 
offered to cease attacks on AQAP if the organization halted attacks against ROYG elements.” The 
May cable continued by suggesting that “Saleh's most pressing concern remains preserving his own 
power rather than eradicating Yemen's thriving extremist community.” Similarly, in a December 
2009 cable, the US ambassador to Yemen complained that US-trained Anti-Terrorist Units had 
“been derailed from [their] principal mission: to combat AQAP” and used to fight the Houthi 
insurgency in the north. US skepticism was clearly reciprocated. During private conversations 
President Saleh reportedly described the Americans as “hot-blooded and hasty when [they] need 
us,” but “cold-blooded and British when we need [them].” In light of the above, US Assistant to the 
President John Brennan’s description of the US-Yemeni relationship as one of “true friendship”, 
seems to be highly inaccurate. Over time, the bilateral relationship between leaders in Washington 
and Sanaa displayed significant elements of cooperation, especially on the issue of 
counterterrorism, but it never reached anything close to true friendship.260 
 
The Yemeni Uprising and US Response 
Not long after Secretary Clinton’s surprise visit to Yemen, popular protests broke out in the 
country. On January 16, hundreds of Yemeni took to the streets in Sanaa to express solidarity with 
the protesters in Tunisia who had succeeded in ousting Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. 
Slogans of support for the Tunisian uprising soon turned into expressions of domestic grievances 
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and demands for domestic reform. Yemeni demonstrators protested against the widespread 
corruption of the political system, the lack of democracy, President Saleh-sponsored constitutional 
amendments to extend his stay in power, and the general dire economic and social conditions of the 
country. Sporadic street protests continued in the following days and spread outside of the capital 
Sanaa. The youth, especially university students, and human rights activists were the initiators of 
the Yemeni uprising. They were soon to be joined in their demonstrations by members of the Joint 
Meeting Parties (JMP), an eclectic coalition of five political parties261 that represented the Yemeni 
traditional opposition in parliament to President Saleh’s dominant General People’s Congress Party 
(GPCP).262     
The Obama administration was genuinely concerned about protests in Yemen getting out of control. 
US officials were particularly worried that anti-government demonstrations would distract President 
Saleh from his counterterrorism operations against AQAP. After the outbreak of the uprising, the 
US State Department said that while it supported “the right of the Yemeni people to express 
themselves and assemble freely,” it was also closely monitoring the security situation in the 
country. On February 2, US President Obama during a reportedly cordial call with his Yemeni 
counterpart reminded Saleh that it was “imperative that Yemen take forceful action against Al 
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to protect innocent lives in Yemen as well as abroad.”263 
An initially peaceful uprising eventually took a violent turn in mid-February. On February 18, five 
people were killed in clashes between protesters and state security forces in the southern cities of 
Taiz and Aden. Five days later, pro-government supporters opened fire against demonstrators 
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camping outside Sanaa University killing two and wounding 23. The decision of the Yemeni 
government to resort to violent means to stop popular protests had the effect of unifying the 
opposition, radicalizing its demands (by then the removal of Saleh from the presidency topped the 
demonstrators’ agenda), and leading to the resignation of members of parliament and ministers from 
Saleh’s GPCP.264 
The White House responded to the first uprising-related casualties in Yemen by condemning “the 
use of violence by governments against peaceful protesters” and urging state security forces “to 
show restraint in responding to peaceful protests, and to respect the rights of their people.” Contrary 
to what happened in Egypt and Bahrain, the Obama administration coupled its public criticism with 
actual policies. In February, growing instability in the country and a serious concern that US-armed 
and US-trained counterterrorism units were used to quell mostly peaceful demonstrations convinced 
the US administration to suspend a previously-agreed security assistance package to Yemen. In 
particular, the US Defense Department halted its Section 1206 assistance to the Yemeni armed 
forces. Section 1206 includes funding for the equipment, supplies, and training of foreign national 
military forces engaged in counterterrorist operations.265  
Perhaps in response to such a decision President Saleh seized the opportunity of a public speech at 
Sanaa University to harshly criticize the United States for being behind the Yemeni uprising. 
Directly addressing the US president, Saleh stated: “Mr. Obama, you are the president of the United 
States; you are not the president of the Arab world." A spokesperson for the US State Department 
replied through a message on the social network Twitter that read: “The protests in Yemen are not 
the product of external conspiracies. President Saleh knows better. His people deserve a better 
response." Despite the fact that, less than twenty-four hours after his public remarks, President 
                                         
264 Al Jazeera, “Yemen Protesters Clash with Police,” February 14, 2011, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/video/middleeast/2011/02/2011213235027318750.html; BBC, “Yemen Protests: Five Killed 
at Anti-Government Rallies,” February 19, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12507889; 
Ahramonline.org.eg, “Yemeni Protesters Defiant After Deadly Attack,” February 23, 2011, 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/6284/World/Region/Yemeni-protesters-defiant-after-deadly-attack.aspx; 
Laura Kasinof, “Opposition in Yemen Supports Protesters,” The New York Times, February 28, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/world/middleeast/01yemen.html?ref=yemen. 
265 The US Department of Defense announced it had resumed training programs and military aid, including Section 
1206, to Yemen between spring and summer 2012. See: Jim Garamone, “U.S. Trainers, Military Cooperation Return to 
Yemen” (US Department of Defense, May 8, 2012), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=116252; Tony 
Capaccio, “Pentagon Resumes Arms Aid to Yemen for Counter-Terrorism,” Bloomberg, July 18, 2012, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-18/pentagon-resumes-arms-aid-to-yemen-for-counter-terrorism.html; 
Obama, “Statement by the President on Violence in Bahrain, Libya and Yemen 18/02/2011”; Keith Johnson, Adam 
Entous, and Margaret Coker, “U.S. Halted Record Aid Deal as Yemen Rose Up,” The Wall Street Journal, April 8, 
2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704101604576249204208045910.html; Katherine Zimmerman, 
“Recipe for Failure: American Strategy toward Yemen and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” Criticalthreats.org, 




Saleh called US Assistant to the President Brennan “to convey his regret for misunderstandings”, 
the actions of the Obama administration and the reactions of the Yemeni government confirmed the 
distinctly tense nature of the relationship existing between the two leaderships in Washington and 
Sanaa.266 
Violence escalated to unprecedented levels on March 18 when unidentified gunmen hidden on 
rooftops indiscriminately shot at demonstrators in Sanaa after Friday prayers. The ensuing violent 
confrontations between pro- and anti-government protesters led to 53 people dead and hundreds 
injured.267 The March 18 clashes represented a turning point for the Yemeni uprising. First, a 
number of top Yemeni military commanders defected and pledged to deploy their troops to protect 
the demonstrators. Among them there was Maj. Gen. Ali Mohsen, the commander of the strong 
First Armored Division and arguably the second most powerful man in Yemen. Moreover, many 
members of Saleh’s GPCP, including scores of ambassadors, resigned from their posts and from the 
party. Finally, prominent religious and tribal Yemeni leaders, including influential Sheikh Sadeq al 
Ahmar, publicly threw their weight behind the uprising and appealed to the president to step down 
peacefully.268  
President Saleh reacted to the mounting opposition by declaring a month-long state of emergency, 
effectively suspending the constitution, and by recalling loyalist troops to the capital to rescue his 
embattled regime. Political and military divisions within the regime reduced the central 
government’s already limited ability to control Yemen’s peripheral regions and provided Houthi 
rebels, southern secessionists, and Islamist extremist groups with wider freedom of action. In March 
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alone, the Houthis had seized control of the northern Saada governorate while Islamist armed 
militants had taken over Jaar, a city located in the southeastern Abyan governorate.269 
Throughout April and May 2011, Yemen witnessed an escalation of armed confrontations between 
loyalist and defected troops and between government forces and tribesmen affiliated to the Al 
Ahmar family. Such confrontations marked the transformation of a once peaceful youth-led 
uprising, demanding democratic reforms, into an armed struggle for power among competing elites. 
President Saleh, Maj. Gen. Ali Mohsen, and the Al Ahmars, indeed, represented the three major 
traditional power centers of Yemen’s politics whose vast influence dated back at least to the early 
1990s. Meanwhile, human rights activists and youth demonstrators continued to camp out in several 
Yemeni cities and to profess their adherence to non-violent forms of protest but the ongoing elites’ 
power struggle seemed to have irremediably marginalized these groups and their demands.270  
The Obama administration was deeply worried by the latest developments in Yemen. Important 
military and political defections, along with continuous mass protests, had significantly reduced 
Saleh’s base of support and severely crippled his regime. Ongoing confrontations among armed 
groups had dangerously put the country on the path to a bloody civil war. The risk of an imminent 
collapse of Yemen’s already weak state institutions suddenly seemed very real. US officials feared 
that the instability originating from state breakdown in Yemen would dangerously spread to the 
Arabian Peninsula and threaten the rule of local US allies, especially that of the Saudi royal family. 
As explained above, the cooperation of the Saudi rulers was pivotal for the United States in order to 
secure its access to the energy resources of the Persian Gulf. In addition, Saudi partnership was 
critical for the US policy of containment toward Iran since Riyadh represented the major regional 
counterweight to Teheran’s influence. The United States was also concerned that the collapse of 
Yemen’s central institutions would result in a state of lawlessness along the country’s waterways, 
mainly through the Bab el-Mandeb strait, and therefore endanger the transit of commercial goods 
and oil in particular. On top of that, the Obama administration was extremely worried by the fact 
that Yemeni government troops were ordered to halt their operations against AQAP and pulled back 
to Sanaa to protect the president. This last development directly threatened the US counterterrorism 
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effort against the Yemeni branch of Al Qaeda, ostensibly the primary US strategic interest in the 
country.271 
Similar concerns about the negative effects of continued instability for US strategic interests in 
Yemen were shared by officials within the White House, the Department of State, and the 
Department of Defense. Along with members of the executive, the situation in Yemen preoccupied 
also lawmakers in the US Congress. In several hearings on Yemen, congressmen repeatedly 
expressed their concerns about chaos spilling over to Yemen’s neighbors and about Islamic 
extremists taking advantage of the protracted disorder. Such a general consensus on the sensitivity 
of the Yemeni issue translated into the United States speaking with a single voice.272  
After the March 18 killings, President Obama “strongly condemn[ed] the violence” and “call[ed] on 
President Saleh to adhere to his public pledge to allow demonstrations to take place peacefully.” 
The US president also urged the Yemeni government, along with the opposition, “to participate in 
an open and transparent process that addresses the legitimate concerns of the Yemeni people”. 
Asked if it was time for President Saleh to step down, Secretary of Defense Gates declined to give a 
direct answer: “I don’t think it is my place to talk about internal affairs in Yemen.” However, Gates 
made clear that “instability and diversion of attention from dealing with AQAP is certainly my 
primary concern about the situation.” Similarly, the Department of State repeatedly evaded the 
question about President Saleh having lost the legitimacy to lead his country. A State spokesperson 
reaffirmed that what the United States wanted to see in Yemen was the government and the 
opposition “to demonstrate restraint and use dialogue to work for a peaceful resolution.” At this 
stage, the Obama administration denounced the ongoing violence in Yemen and advocated for 
political dialogue to find a peaceful solution to the crisis. Notably, US officials did not make any 
reference to the need for a power transition or hold President Saleh personally responsible for the 
civilian deaths.273 
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US stance toward the Yemeni uprising changed in April and May amidst mounting violence and a 
rapidly deteriorating security situation. The White House reminded President Saleh “of his 
responsibility to ensure the safety and security of Yemenis who are exercising their universal right 
to engage in political expression,” and exhorted the Yemeni president “to engage in a constructive 
political dialogue” with the opposition “so that meaningful political change can take place in the 
near term in an orderly and peaceful manner.”274 
The Department of Defense concurred:  
“Yemen is of major concern to us, has been for years because of the presence of Al Qaeda 
there and the threats that have emanated from there […] Obviously, the situation right now is 
a […] difficult one. The longer it festers, the more difficult it becomes. That is why this 
government has been urging a negotiated transition as quickly as possible.”275 
Finally, Secretary of State Clinton, in a slightly more determined tone, expressed her 
disappointment with President Saleh’s response “to the legitimate aspirations of the Yemeni 
people.” Clinton stressed that Saleh was “now the only party that refuses to match actions to words” 
and urged him “to immediately follow through on his repeated commitments to peacefully and 
orderly transfer power and ensure the legitimate will of the Yemeni people is addressed. The time 
for action is now.” The Obama administration continued to identify political dialogue between the 
government and the opposition as the best way to find a peaceful solution to the Yemeni crisis. 
However, in a marked shift from its previous position, the US administration publicly singled out 
President Saleh’s behavior as a major obstacle to peace. Although US officials refrained from 
explicitly demanding Saleh’s resignation, they increasingly began to refer to the need for 
“meaningful political change”, “a negotiated transition”, and a “transfer of power”.276  
US growing frustration with President Saleh derived from the Yemeni President’s repeated broken 
pledges to sign a transition plan proposed by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in early April.277 
According to the GCC plan, Saleh would have transferred his powers to the vice-president, then a 
national unity government led by the opposition would have been formed, followed by the drafting 
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and approval of a new constitution. In exchange for his peaceful resignation, President Saleh, and 
those who had served under him, would be granted immunity from prosecution. The Joint Meeting 
Parties agreed to the GCC plan whereas the extra-parliamentary opposition denounced it, especially 
the immunity clause that would have allowed Saleh and his inner circle not to be held responsible 
for the deaths of dozens of demonstrators. Although Saudi Arabia was without doubt the primary 
force behind the transition plan, the United States also played an important mediating role. In 
particular, US Ambassador to Yemen Gerald M. Feierstein had been constantly involved in private 
negotiations with both the government and the opposition since at least mid-March. Unlike the 
cases of Egypt and Bahrain, where visible differences emerged between Washington and Riyadh, 
US and Saudi strategies to address the Yemeni uprising converged toward common support for an 
orderly transition of power.278  
It took the US administration five months of popular protests, and at least 174 documented deaths 
of demonstrators at the hand of Yemeni security forces, to eventually back, in unequivocal terms, 
the opposition’s demand that President Saleh had to resign.279 It was Secretary Clinton, on June 1, 
that publicly conveyed this last adjustment in the US policy toward the Yemeni uprising: 
“President Saleh was given a very good offer, that we strongly backed by the Gulf countries, 
and we cannot expect this conflict to end unless President Saleh and his government move out 
of the way to permit […] the opposition and civil society to begin a transition to political and 
economic reform.”280 
Exactly two days after Clinton told Saleh to “move out of the way” a planted bomb exploded at the 
Sanaa presidential compound. The attack, that the government blamed on tribesmen loyal to the Al 
Ahmars, left the Yemeni President severely wounded. Saleh was first taken to a military hospital in 
the capital and then, the following day, transferred to Saudi Arabia to receive proper medical 
treatment. Vice-President Abd Rabbo Mansur Hadi temporarily assumed presidential powers. In 
addition, Saudi Arabia brokered a tenuous ceasefire between government troops and Al Ahmar 
tribal militias. These three latest developments raised hopes that the Yemeni crisis was getting 
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closer to a solution. Such hopes, however, were short-lived. During summer 2011, in fact, the 
Yemeni uprising grounded to a virtual standstill: political negotiations faltered, the security and 
economic conditions worsened, and violent clashes among rival factions became commonplace.281  
In an unexpected move that caught both Yemeni and international observers off guard, President 
Saleh suddenly returned to Yemen on September 23. The weeks that followed were punctuated by 
the Yemeni president’s repeated vague offers for dialogue and the opposition’s firm demand that for 
any meaningful dialogue to start Saleh had first to resign. In October, amid continued violence, the 
UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously passed Resolution 2014 that “demanded that all sides 
immediately reject violence, and called on them to commit to a peaceful transition of power based 
on proposals by the major regional organization of the Arabian Gulf.” Notably, beyond a strong 
condemnation for “human rights violations by authorities, and abuses by other actors,” UNSC 
Resolution 2014 did not contain any reference to sanctions against those responsible for such 
despicable actions.282 
During this time, the United States consistently undertook a broad diplomatic effort to put an end to 
instability in Yemen. The Obama administration used its embassy in Sanaa to hold direct talks with 
the government and the opposition, repeatedly supported the GCC plan for an orderly transition of 
power, and co-sponsored UN Security Council Resolution 2014. Along with this diplomatic effort, 
the US administration also decided to step up its counterterrorism operations in the country. In fact, 
soon after the outbreak of the uprising, Yemeni government troops had mostly abandoned their 
fight against AQAP and had been pulled back to the capital to defend the regime. As a 
consequence, Islamist extremist groups seized the opportunity to consolidate their power in the 
south-east of Yemen where they reportedly took control of the cities of Jaar and Zinjibar. In order to 
stop AQAP, and other likeminded groups, from making further advances the Obama administration 
came to the conclusion that the United States had to resume its airstrikes and drone campaign.	US 
strikes had been suspended a year before following an incident in May 2010 when a Yemeni deputy 
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governor, who was on a mission to mediate the surrender of some Islamist extremists, was 
accidentally killed by an airstrike originally intended to target Al Qaeda operatives. In the 
meantime, US officials reached out to the Yemeni opposition to make the case for continued US 
counterterrorism operations in the event of President Saleh’s removal from power. According to 
credible accounts, the opposition provided strong assurances that counterterrorism cooperation 
between the United States and Yemen would go on regardless of Saleh being president.283  
The assurances of continued US-Yemeni cooperation on counterterrorism provided by the 
opposition only reinforced the US perception, by then popular within the Obama administration, 
that Saleh’s departure would best serve the US national interest. Hence, after the wounded Yemeni 
president was transferred to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment, the Department of Defense 
commented: “Our shared interest with the Yemeni government in defeating Al Qaeda goes beyond 
one person.” Then, when Saleh abruptly returned to Yemen in September, the Department of State 
explained: "We want to see Yemen move forward on the basis of the GCC proposal, whether 
President Saleh is in or out of the country.” Finally, the White House welcomed the approval of 
Resolution 2014 by the UN Security Council: “Today the international community sent a united and 
unambiguous signal to President Saleh that he must respond to the aspirations of the Yemeni people 
by transferring power immediately.” The consistency of the messages coming from Washington 
confirmed that the Obama administration had moved past Saleh’s rule in Yemen.284 
Eventually, on November 23, after almost eleven months since the beginning of the uprising, 
President Saleh signed in Riyadh the GCC plan to hand over power. Saleh’s decision to resign 
ended months of failed negotiations and political jostling. A combination of increasing international 
pressure and mounting domestic opposition had led a reluctant Yemeni president to conclude that 
signing the GCC plan was the least bad of the options he was confronted with. After all, the GCC 
plan offered Saleh an honorable exit, granted him immunity, and did not require him to go into 
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exile. When considering the GCC offer, Saleh had perhaps in mind the different fates that had befell 
President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Colonel Muammar Qaddafi in Libya.285 
Given the significant amount of political capital that the United States had invested in finding a 
negotiated solution to the Yemeni crisis, it came as no surprise that the news of Saleh’s resignation 
was warmly welcomed in Washington. President Obama described it as an “important step forward” 
that had brought the Yemeni people “closer to realizing their aspirations for a new beginning.”286 
Here, a point in particular bears noting. Although US role in easing President Saleh out of power 
was certainly important, it was not the primary factor behind the Yemeni president’s decision to 
step down. However important, in fact, US leverage on Yemeni domestic politics had limits. The 
first limit was the vast influence of neighboring Saudi Arabia. The Saudis were Yemen’s biggest 
foreign donor and maintained a time-tested network of patronage with many Yemeni tribes, 
including the Al Ahmars. Riyadh, and not Washington, was arguably the leading force behind the 
acceptance of the GCC plan by Yemeni opposing factions. A second constraint to US leverage was 
the local nature of Yemeni politics: domestic, and not foreign, considerations were the main drivers 
of Yemeni actors’ decisions. Finally, a profound sense of disapproval, widespread among Yemenis, 
of US policies in the Middle East, including of US airstrikes in Yemen, was a third notable limit to 
US influence.287  
 
Continuity or Change 
Early into the Yemeni uprising, demonstrators started to identify corruption and authoritarianism in 
the Saleh regime as the major obstacles to democratic and economic reforms in the country. The 
Obama administration was confronted with the choice of either siding with the demonstrators and 
supporting their demand for regime change or siding with President Saleh and helping this US ally 
to survive the unrest. Yet again, the US administration faced a situation where the US ideal interest 
of seeing democracy and freedom spreading in the Greater Middle East was at odds with major US 
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regional strategic interests, namely counterterrorism, access to Persian Gulf energy resources, and 
containment of Iran. 
The response of the United States to the Yemeni uprising progressively moved from support to the 
regime to explicit calls for Saleh’s resignation. The Obama administration’s delayed and cautious 
embrace of the uprising is explained by the fact that US officials initially worried that Saleh’s 
departure would threaten US interests, especially US counterterrorism campaign against AQAP. 
Over time, however, a number of considerations changed the US calculus. To begin with, even 
before the outbreak of the protests, administration officials believed that President Saleh had never 
been as reliable an ally as the United States had hoped. In addition, US officials came to realize that 
continued unrest and significant cracks within the regime were playing directly into the hands of 
Islamic extremist groups whose influence had markedly increased in the country. Moreover, the 
Yemeni opposition had provided credible assurances that US-Yemeni security cooperation would 
continue also in a post-Saleh scenario. Finally, Saudi Arabia, a US major ally and plausibly the 
most influential foreign actor involved in the Yemeni crisis, also advocated for a transition of 
power. All of the above convinced the Obama administration that Saleh’s resignation was the best 
arrangement available to bring back some stability to Yemen and serve the broad US national 
interest, both strategic and ideal. Notably, with regard to the Yemeni uprising, this analysis could 
not detect any meaningful disagreement within the US executive (or between the executive and the 
Congress). Indeed, the White House, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense sent 
the same messages and maintained a common position throughout the crisis. 
Although the United States eventually backed a transition of power in Yemen, US officials were 
extremely careful in not antagonizing Saleh and his supporters in the process. They did so by 
granting Saleh and his inner circle immunity from prosecution and by allowing him to keep the 
honorary title of president. Moreover, neither the GCC plan nor UNSC Resolution 2014 imposed 
any consequence on high-ranking members of the Saleh regime for their crackdown on 
demonstrators that, according to the Yemeni Ministry of Human Rights, had resulted, by the end of 
2011, in 2,000 deaths. In addition, the Obama administration did not push hard for a complete 
overhaul of the regime either. US officials feared that the removal en masse of Saleh’s family 
members and loyalists, many of whom occupied extremely sensitive positions within Yemeni Anti-
Terrorism Units, would irremediably harm US ongoing fight against AQAP. Finally, US rhetoric 
also showed the hesitation of the US administration to hold Saleh and the regime directly 
accountable for the violence. In stark contrast with US presidential statements addressing the 
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Egyptian, Libyan, and Syrian uprisings, US President Obama never publicly said that the Yemeni 
president “had lost legitimacy”.288 
To conclude, since the early 2000s, US foreign policy in Yemen had primarily focused on the fight 
against Islamic extremism, with democracy promotion being an afterthought. Although the Yemeni 
uprising represented an unexpected distraction, the overall Yemeni policy of the United States did 
not show any significant change as a result of it. In fact, the Obama administration cautiously threw 
its support behind the uprising only when US officials realized that Saleh’s hold on power had 
clearly become untenable and was actually threatening US strategic interests in the country. In other 
words, the Obama administration fully backed democracy promotion in Yemen only when this US 
ideal interest aligned with other US strategic interests, especially that of continuing the US 
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Libya: a Convergence of Interests 
 
US-Libyan Relations prior to 2011 
The state of Libya is a North African country that sits between Tunisia, on the west, and Egypt, on 
the east. Roughly 90 percent of Libya’s six million inhabitants are Sunni Muslim. The country 
enjoys the benefits of having the largest proven oil reserves in Africa and among the ten largest 
globally. As a consequence, Libya’s economy depends primarily on the energy sector that generates 
about 95% of export earnings, 80% of GDP, and 99% of government income. Before the outbreak 
of the 2011 uprising, oil wealth coupled with a small population gave Libya one of the highest 
GDPs per capita on the continent. However, despite these numbers, government policies under the 
autocratic and corrupted rule of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi had left many Libyans poor.289 
In September 1969, a group of young military officers, who called themselves the Free Officers, 
seized power through a coup that overthrew King Idris, Libya’s first and only monarch. It did not 
take long before Col. Muammar Qaddafi, who was among the main organizers of the military coup, 
gained prominence and became the sole leader of the new regime: the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
(State of the Masses). Since then, Qaddafi’s policies put Libya at odds with the international 
community, especially with the United States. Libyan support for international radical causes (i.e. 
the Palestinian Abu Nidal Organization and the Irish Republican Army), sponsorship of 
revolutionary movements across Africa (i.e. the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone and the 
National Patriotic Front in Liberia), terrorist attacks that resulted in the death of US citizens (i.e. the 
1986 “La Belle” discotheque attack in Berlin and the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over 
Lockerbie), and the pursuit of programs to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proved to 
be points of strong contention between leaders in Washington and Tripoli. In particular, US 
President Ronald Reagan defined the Libyan colonel “the mad dog of the Middle East” and 
responded to “La Belle” attack in Berlin by ordering a series of strikes against Libyan territory 
under the banner of Operation El Dorado Canyon. Over the years, the government of the United 
                                         
289 US Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Brief: Libya,” accessed October 18, 2014, 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=LY; Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook”; Dirk J. 
Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); John Wright, A History of 
Libya (London: Hurst, 2012). 
154 
 
States also offered support to anti-Qaddafi opposition groups and reportedly engaged in limited 
covert efforts at regime change.290 
This US-Libyan distinctly tense relationship began to change after 2003, when Col. Qaddafi 
decided to renounce state-sponsored terrorism, to accept responsibility and to compensate the 
victims of previous attacks, and to stop Libya’s programs on WMDs. Such remarkable decisions led 
to a gradual rehabilitation of the Qaddafi regime on the international stage. By the end of 2006, the 
US administration of President George W. Bush had lifted its unilateral sanctions on Libya, had 
removed the country from its list of states sponsoring terrorism, and had reopened the US embassy 
in Tripoli.291 In 2008, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was the highest-ranking US official 
to visit Libya and meet with Col. Qaddafi in a half-century. Following the meeting, Secretary Rice 
said: “The relationship has been moving in a good direction for a number of years now and I think 
tonight does mark a new phase.”292 
After the 2003 rapprochement, policies to counter terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs became 
the major US strategic interest in Libya. In a 2008 diplomatic cable, US officials stated that Libya 
was “a strong partner in the war against terrorism” and that counterterrorism cooperation was “a 
key pillar of the U.S.-Libya bilateral relationship.” Similarly, the US Department of State’s 2008 
Country Reports on Terrorism praised the Qaddafi regime for cooperating “with the United States 
and the international community to combat terrorism and terrorist financing.” Further evidence of 
close US-Libyan cooperation came to the surface in September 2011, when hundreds of secret 
documents were discovered in the Libyan capital of Tripoli, that provided details on US renditions 
of terrorism suspects to Libyan authorities between 2002 and 2004. Along with a clear desire to win 
the favor of policymakers in Washington, Col. Qaddafi had another good reason for sharing the US 
strategic interest of combating extremist groups in North Africa. Local extremist groups, like Al 
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group had, in fact, repeatedly 
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expressed their hostility toward Qaddafi and their willingness to fight in order to topple his 
regime.293 
The administration of President G.W. Bush considered the rapprochement with Qaddafi’s Libya a 
major foreign policy success. After taking office, the Barack Obama administration continued 
through political engagement and diplomatic enticements to build on that success. In its 
Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations for fiscal year 2010, the US 
administration laid out US policy priorities in Libya. According to this document, the United States 
would assist the Libyan government in improving its border control capabilities, especially with 
regard to the interdiction of WMD-related technologies. US assistance would also fund 
counterterrorism programs like the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Initiative. Finally, 
US military assistance and training were expected to induce the Qaddafi regime to play a more 
responsible role in Africa. In particular, US officials hoped that Libya’s security forces would 
police the regions of the Sahara and the Sahel, thus freeing up US military resources for other 
purposes. In June 2010, US Ambassador to Libya Gene Cretz publicly praised the regime of Col. 
Qaddafi for being “a model for global nuclear nonproliferation efforts” and “a strong ally in 
countering terrorism.”294 
Recent cooperation in countering terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs notwithstanding, US 
officials still had lingering reservations about the reliability of Muammar Qaddafi. In confidential 
cables leaked to the public, US diplomats described the Libyan leader as “mercurial” and 
“eccentric”. In one of such cables, US Ambassador Cretz depicted Libya as “a kleptocracy in which 
the regime –either the Qaddafi family itself or its close political allies- has a direct stake in anything 
worth buying, selling, or owing.” Moreover, even after the 2003 foreign policy shift, Col. Qaddafi 
maintained his public confrontational stance toward Israel, a major US ally in the region. Qaddafi 
opposed engagement and reconciliation with Israel in the face of the continued Israeli occupation of 
Palestinian territory and Israeli settlement activity. In addition, more than three decades of US-
Libyan frictions had resulted in the absence of strong political, military, or commercial ties between 
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the two countries. Even with regard to energy resources, Libya was not particularly relevant to the 
United States insofar as, in 2011, US oil imports from the North African country were minimal.295 
Due to a long history of confrontation and persistent US concerns, it can be argued that, right before 
the outbreak of the Libyan uprising, the United States had no major national interest at stake either 
in Libya per se or in the rule of Col. Qaddafi. US counterterrorism and nonproliferation policies in 
Libya were indeed important but not as critical as those carried out by US forces elsewhere in the 
Greater Middle East, as for example in Yemen.296 
 
The Libyan Uprising and US Response 
Inspired by popular movements in neighboring countries, opponents to the Qaddafi regime in Libya 
rose up in mid-February 2011. Between February 15 and 16, thousands of Libyans took to the 
streets in a number of cities across the country, including the eastern town of Benghazi, Libya’s 
second largest. These protests were mostly spontaneous outbursts of popular anger. In fact, at the 
time of the 2011 uprising, and as a direct consequence of Qaddafi’s 42 years of iron-first rule and 
systematic policy of quelling dissent, there was no significant organized opposition within the 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Echoing their counterparts throughout the Middle East, Libyan 
demonstrators chanted slogans against the “corrupt rulers of the country” and for “an end of the 
regime”. They shared the widespread popular perception that the economic and social opportunities 
that had opened up since Libya’s international rehabilitation in 2003 had remained in the hands of a 
deeply corrupted and self-serving elite, namely the Qaddafi family and his cronies. Contrary to what 
happened in Egypt, Bahrain, and Yemen, peaceful protests in Libya quickly turned violent. News 
reports described Libyan demonstrators, armed with rocks and gasoline bombs, clashing with riot 
police and attacking state security forces’ buildings. The Libyan government responded in kind and, 
on February 17, state security forces used live ammunition to disperse demonstrators, killing at least 
24. The Obama administration’s first reaction to the unrest in Libya was to condemn “the use of 
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violence” and to urge the Libyan government “to show restraint in responding to peaceful protests, 
and to respect the rights of [its] people.”297  
During the following days, the uprising spread to the Libyan capital and Qaddafi’s stronghold of 
Tripoli. Moreover, government troops sent to Benghazi with the task of crashing the opposition 
sided instead with the latter and helped demonstrators to seize the local military barracks. 
Benghazi’s military defections were the prelude to the quick dissolution of the Libyan armed forces. 
The main explanation to the rapid breakdown of the Libyan military in the face of the 2011 mass 
protests lies in the feeble and fragmented nature of such an institution where tribal affiliation 
mattered more than loyalty to the state. This was also a consequence of Col. Qaddafi’s deliberate 
policy of keeping the armed forces weak and divided in order to prevent the emergence from their 
ranks of any potential would-be challenger.298 Throughout his rule, Qaddafi had maintained his grip 
on power by relying on his special security forces. Libyan special security forces were militarily 
superior to the regular army and were led and staffed by the colonel’s family, loyalists, and tribe. As 
such, their fate was inextricably tied to that of Qaddafi and his regime, and they were therefore 
ready to defend him to the last.299 
Confronted by mounting opposition, the Qaddafi regime employed its full force against the 
protesters.	In Tripoli, in particular, the regime reportedly sent security forces, civilian loyalists, and 
foreign mercenaries, supported by aircraft and helicopters, to clamp down on the opposition. In a 
televised address to the nation, the Libyan leader promised to fight “until the last drop of [his] 
blood”. The violence unleashed by Qaddafi opened the first cracks within the regime: government’s 
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ministers, military officers, and diplomats resigned from their posts or sided altogether with the 
protesters.	Meanwhile, a de facto division of Libya was taking shape on the ground: in the west, 
Qaddafi’s forces were tightening their grip on Tripoli, while a fledging Libyan opposition, 
supported by defected troops, seemed to have established control over a number of cities in the 
eastern region of Cyrenaica, especially near the border with Egypt.300 
As violence escalated, US President Obama stated that his administration’s “highest priority” was to 
guarantee the safety of US citizens in Libya. The underlying reason behind this specific US concern 
was the Obama administration’s fear that had the United States been too critical too soon of the 
Libyan government, the “eccentric” and “mercurial” Qaddafi could have retaliated against US 
citizens. Unsurprisingly then, when most Americans were safely out of the country, US officials 
became more outspoken in their criticism of the Libyan regime. Hence, on February 25, the White 
House announced its “decision to move forward with unilateral sanctions, […] coordinated 
sanctions with our European allies, and multilateral efforts to hold the Libyan government 
accountable through the United Nations.” The White House also declared that the United States had 
“suspended the very limited military cooperation it had with Libya” and had halted “the sale of 
spare military parts” to Libyan armed forces.	 As part of the US unilateral sanctions, President 
Obama signed Executive Order 13566 that froze about $30 billion in assets belonging to the 
Qaddafi family and other Libyan entities.301 
At the international level, the Obama administration co-sponsored UN Security Council Resolution 
1970. Resolution 1970 was unanimously approved by the UN Security Council on February 26. It 
condemned the “violence and use of force against civilians,” referred Libya to the International 
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Criminal Court,302 called for an arms embargo on the country, froze state assets, and imposed a 
travel ban on Qaddafi and his inner circle. On the same day, President Obama had a phone call with 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel. While the two leaders were discussing the crisis in Libya, the 
US president expressed his strongest public rebuke yet toward Col. Qaddafi: “when a leader’s only 
means of staying in power is to use mass violence against his own people, he has lost the legitimacy 
to rule and needs to do what is right for his country by leaving now.” In a marked departure from 
the cautious US stance toward the uprisings in Egypt, Bahrain, and Yemen, in the case of Libya, the 
Obama administration showed no particular hesitation in sanctioning the Libyan regime, saying that 
Qaddafi had lost legitimacy, or urging the Libyan leader to step down.303  
In the meantime, the US State and Defense departments worked assiduously to give the US 
president the largest range of policy options possible, including the use of military force. US 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met with US allies in Geneva, Switzerland, to confer about the 
Libyan crisis. After the meeting, Secretary Clinton told reporters that “no option is off the table […] 
that of course include[s] a no fly zone.” From its part, the Department of Defense announced it was 
repositioning US naval and air forces around Libya in order to provide the United States with the 
flexibility necessary to use them “if needed”.304 
It is relevant to observe, at this point, that when it came to condemning Col. Qaddafi for his violent 
crackdown on demonstrators, imposing unilateral sanctions, and supporting international efforts 
against the Libyan regime, the Obama administration displayed a strong unity of purpose. The same 
consensus among US officials was not achieved, however, on the issue of the use of military force. 
Indeed, on the sensitive issue of employing US armed forces to address the Libyan crisis, the 
Obama administration appeared divided into two camps. On the one hand, Secretary of State 
Clinton, Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice, and Special Assistant to the President for 
Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights Samantha Power were strong advocates of the use of 
military force, especially of the need to impose a no-fly zone over Libya. They argued that a 
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military intervention was necessary in order to stop the violence. On the other hand, Secretary of 
Defense Gates, National Security Adviser Thomas Donilon, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Michael Mullen expressed more caution about the possibility of employing US armed forces. 
They did not discount the seriousness of the violence in Libya but they contended that a no-fly zone 
would be difficult to implement, would likely divert assets from other ongoing US military 
operations in the region (namely Afghanistan and Iraq), and could be seen as foreign meddling in 
Libya’s domestic affairs, thereby delegitimizing the cause of the Libyan protesters.305  
By the end of February, credible accounts put the number of uprising-related deaths in Libya to 
1,000. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees maintained that since the beginning of 
the unrest almost 100,000 individuals had fled Libya into Tunisia and Egypt (this number almost 
doubled in early March). Militarily, anti-Qaddafi forces started a thrust in March toward west and 
seized control of several coastal cities, including some important oil-export terminals. Politically, a 
previously disorganized opposition coalesced into the Transitional National Council (TNC) whose 
main tasks were to act as the united political face of the uprising and provide a single address for 
the uprising’s international supporters. By March 6, however, Qaddafi’s forces had regrouped and 
began to strike back, successfully advancing into opposition-held territory in the east. Qaddafi 
loyalists’ effective counteroffensive prompted the TNC to call on the international community “to 
protect the Libyan people from any further genocide and crimes against humanity.” On March 17, 
Col. Qaddafi announced that an attack against the opposition’s de facto capital Benghazi was in fact 
imminent. The Libyan leader put the protesters on notice: “We will come house by house, room by 
room. It’s over. The issue has been decided […] We will find you in your closets. We will have no 
mercy and no pity.”306  
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Qaddafi’s unambiguous threat of carrying out a massacre raised the urgency for the international 
community to act. The US Department of State mobilized. On the sidelines of a G8 summit in Paris, 
Secretary Clinton met with a leader of the beleaguered Libyan TNC; the first such a contact 
between a senior US official and a formal representative of the Libyan opposition.	 Although 
conducted entirely behind closed doors and not followed by any public statement, the meeting was a 
further sign of the Obama administration’s support for the Libyan uprising. In Paris, Secretary 
Clinton also met with the foreign minister of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). There have been 
speculations about the significance of the latter meeting. In fact, on the same day, March 14, the 
UAE had joined other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in military operations allegedly 
aimed at defusing tensions in the Kingdom of Bahrain. Some observers argued that the United 
States acquiesced to the GCC action in Bahrain in exchange for the UAE’s commitment to take an 
active role in any prospective military intervention in Libya. For the Obama administration the 
support and the participation of Arab countries was an essential prerequisite for any US 
involvement in Libya. As for the GCC countries, their leaders perhaps viewed backing a pro-
uprising military intervention in Libya as an opportunity to divert public attention from the 
contemporaneous violent crackdown on popular dissent they were endorsing in Bahrain. At the time 
of this writing, it has not been possible to verify the accuracy of these speculations, however, 
because of the timing of the GCC intervention in Bahrain and of the US-UAE meeting in Paris, it is 
not completely far-fetched to think that developments in Libya and Bahrain were somehow 
connected.307    
On the day Qaddafi threatened to attack Benghazi, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 
1973. The resolution demanded “the immediate establishment of a cease-fire” and authorized UN 
member states "to take all necessary measures […] to protect civilians and civilian populated areas 
under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign 
occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.” UNSC Resolution 1973 effectively 
opened the door to an international military intervention and to the establishment of a no-fly zone 
over Libya.308 Asked to comment on the adoption of the UNSC resolution, US Ambassador to the 
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United Nations Rice emphasized that the Obama administration was “very pleased” with the 
outcome of the vote. In the wake of the UN vote, President Obama declared that “The United 
States, the United Kingdom, France, and Arab states agree that a ceasefire must be implemented 
immediately. That means all attacks against civilians must stop.” Obama made clear that “These 
terms are not subject to negotiation. If Qaddafi does not comply with the resolution, the 
international community will impose consequences, and the resolution will be enforced through 
military action.”309 
The Libyan regime responded to the mounting international pressure by announcing a ceasefire. 
Despite the regime’s public statements, news outlets continued to report credible accounts of 
government forces’ attacks against opposition-held cities.	 When it appeared clear that the 
announcement of a ceasefire was yet another ruse by Col. Qaddafi to deceive the international 
community and gain more time to continue his crackdown on the opposition, a coalition of 
countries resolved to take military action against him. With the stated goal of enforcing UNSC 
Resolution 1973, on 19 March 2011, US and British warships and submarines launched more than 
one hundred Tomahawk cruise missiles on Libyan soil, while US, French, and British fighter jets 
fired against Qaddafi’s defense systems, airfields, and ground forces.310 
A few days into the military operations, US President Obama described his administration’s 
decision to commit US armed forces in Libya as “in America’s national interest.” The Libyan 
uprising, in fact, was a perfect case of convergence among different US national interests. The US 
administration explained its support for the anti-Qaddafi opposition primarily in terms of US ideal 
interests: stopping “actions that undermine global peace and security”, preventing Qaddafi to 
“commit atrocities”, avoiding a “humanitarian crisis”, and defending “the democratic values” the 
United States stands for. These noble objectives went hand in hand with a number of US strategic 
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interests. First, US military participation together with many US allies, especially European allies, 
would serve the US strategic purpose of fostering transatlantic relations and preserving the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a credible and functioning alliance in the twenty-first 
century. Second, the military intervention would prevent violence to spread to Libya’s neighbors, 
especially Egypt, therefore reducing the likelihood of destabilizing spillover effects across the 
region at a very delicate time. Finally, US military backing of the Libyan uprising would have the 
potential to be an effective exercise in public relations insofar as it could be used by the United 
States to fend off criticisms about the US administration’s quasi-silent response to 
contemporaneous events in Bahrain.311 
The absence of any meaningful conflict between ideal interests and strategic interests undoubtedly 
facilitated the Obama administration’s decision to back the anti-Qaddafi opposition. The eventual 
US decision to participate in military operations in Libya was also made easier by other factors. To 
begin with, US administration officials that had previously expressed skepticism about the wisdom 
of getting militarily involved in the Libyan crisis came to see the option of a military intervention 
under a more positive light. For example, Defense Secretary Gates, an early skeptic, stated in front 
of the US House Armed Services Committee that, by early March, “it became apparent that the time 
and conditions were right for international military action.” Secretary Gates’s shift of position 
mostly depended on two additional factors that significantly informed the political calculus in 
Washington: the willingness of European countries to commit “real military resources” in Libya 
and the open endorsement by Arab countries of military action. These developments would reduce 
both the burden of the military operations for the US armed forces and diminish the perception that 
the military intervention in Libya would be yet another example of Western neo-colonialism in the 
Greater Middle East. Broad international support in favor of the Libyan opposition made the 
international isolation that characterized the Qaddafi regime only more evident. The latter was 
another facilitating factor leading to the US military involvement in the North African country. 
Since the beginning of the uprising, in fact, international and regional organizations had strongly 
condemned the violence unleashed by the Libyan government against protesters. Along with the 
resolutions issued by the United Nations, words of condemnation came from the African Union, the 
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Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Arab League.312 The Arab League also decided for 
the suspension of Libya’s membership and quickly endorsed at the UN Security Council the TNC 
plea for imposing a no-fly zone. All of this added to the fact, already explained above, that the 
Obama administration was not particularly invested in its relationship with Col. Qaddafi and, 
therefore, did not perceive the Libyan ruler as indispensable to protect any vital US strategic 
interest.313 
On March 31, NATO officially took control of the international military effort in Libya under the 
code name of Operation Unified Protector (OUP). After command of the operations passed to 
NATO, US aircraft stopped to perform ground strikes. The United States still provided unique and 
indispensable capabilities to the international military effort but the role of the US armed forces 
shifted from kinetic actions to a role of support for logistics, intelligence-gathering, reconnaissance, 
refueling, and surveillance. Many observers noted that foreign intervention in Libya saved not only 
the lives of civilians in besieged Benghazi but also the totality of the anti-Qaddafi forces from 
annihilation. However important, foreign intervention did not provide the Libyan opposition with 
the necessary edge to gain the upper hand in the conflict. The main effect, therefore, was “to freeze” 
the fighting on the ground; a precondition for the military stalemate that followed.314  
As the crisis in Libya dragged on, the broad consensus that had surrounded the March 19 military 
intervention began to weaken. On the domestic front, the Obama administration increasingly 
became the target of criticism from the US Congress. Lawmakers on Capitol Hill questioned 
President Obama’s authority to commit US troops without formal congressional approval (as 
required by the War Powers Resolution of 1973) and pressured the US administration to provide 
more information on the missions, costs, and objectives of US participation in OUP. The 
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administration replied that the president’s decision to send troops had not violated US law. 
Administration officials noted that military action had been authorized only after consultation with 
the bipartisan leadership of the US Congress and argued that such a consultation was enough for 
authorizing what they described as a limited military campaign. President Obama and his team 
saved no energy to stress that US participation in OUP was “limited” and that the United States was 
not “leading” the military operations.315 In this effort to assuage a concerned US Congress, the 
Obama administration consistently described its “official” Libya policy as grounded on two tenets. 
First, administration officials insisted that the United States would not deploy troops on the ground, 
thus limiting the risk of US casualties. Second, the US administration announced it would provide 
anti-Qaddafi forces only with non-lethal aid, that included vehicles, body armors, uniforms, and 
tents, but no weapons, therefore decreasing the likelihood that US arms would end in the hands of 
extremist groups. We know now that the Obama administration’s “unofficial” policy in Libya was 
somehow different. For example, CIA operatives were indeed “on the ground” since the early 
phases of the fighting to gather intelligence for military strikes and to contact and vet anti-Qaddafi 
forces. In addition, President Obama reportedly signed a presidential finding authorizing US covert 
support for the Libyan opposition, including the possibility to ship arms to the rebels.316 Moreover, 
the United States approved arms transfers from other countries, such as Qatar and to various extents 
the UAE, Sudan, and Egypt. Despite these discrepancies between the official and unofficial 
accounts of US policy in Libya, the heated confrontation between the Obama administration and the 
US Congress progressively lost its centrality in the US political debate. In fact, over time, military 
developments in Libya made the prospect of a US prolonged involvement, requiring sustained 
deployment of US forces and costly investments, increasingly unlikely.317 
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On the international front, the initial large support built around UNSC Resolution 1973 quickly 
faded away. Russia and China, two veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council, soon began 
to accuse NATO of overstepping the UN mandate to protect civilians and of pursuing, instead, a 
secret agenda for regime change. The Atlantic Alliance firmly rejected Russian and Chinese 
charges. Although Western officials repeatedly denied outright the existence of a military plan for 
regime change in Libya, some observers suggested that the United States, Britain, and France were 
essentially “uninterested in real negotiations” with the Libyan government and that the unstated 
goal of OUP was indeed to put an end to Qaddafi’s rule in the country. Notably, in conversations 
with US and UK senior officials familiar with the events we were told that during the Libyan crisis 
there were no meaningful attempts by the West to engage Col. Qaddafi diplomatically. NATO, on 
the contrary, repeatedly backed the TNC’s position that, as a precondition for any negotiation, 
Qaddafi had to go.318   
Domestic and international debates on NATO military operations in Libya lost much of their 
relevance when NATO-backed Libyan opposition forces eventually achieved military victory. By 
mid-August, anti-Qaddafi troops began to make significant advances and, on August 23, they 
occupied the capital Tripoli. Exploiting the momentum produced by the conquest of Tripoli, the 
opposition moved toward the last two remaining bastions of Qaddafi’s support: the cities of Bani 
Walid and Sirte (Qaddafi’s birthplace). After a fierce confrontation, Bani Walid fell on October 17, 
followed by Sirte on October 20. On that eventful day, in Sirte, opposition fighters found, chased, 
and killed Col. Qaddafi. The exact dynamics of the killing are not clear, with people arguing that 
Qaddafi was killed in a cross-fire and others saying that he was instead executed. Whatever the 
case, pictures and videos of the colonel’s corpse posted on the internet were an unmistakable sign of 
the end of an era for all Libyans. Qaddafi’s death also resulted in the conclusion of NATO military 
campaign and the debates surrounding it.319 
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The White House described the termination of the autocratic rule of Muammar Qaddafi as a foreign 
policy success that vindicated the Obama administration’s decision to intervene militarily in support 
of the Libyan uprising. Vice-President Joe Biden enthusiastically said that “NATO got it right” and 
noted that during Operation Unified Protector the United States “spent $2 billion total and did not 
lose a single life.” Likewise, President Obama praised US contribution to the multilateral military 
effort and hailed the news of Qaddafi’s death as “a momentous day in the history of Libya.”320  
 
Continuity or Change 
When Libyans rose up against the corrupted and undemocratic rule of Col. Qaddafi, the Obama 
administration faced a foreign policy crisis where US ideal and strategic interests converged. In 
Libya both these clusters of the US national interest pointed to a US response in support of the 
popular uprising. Backing the Libyan uprising would serve the US ideal interests of spreading 
economic, social, and democratic reforms in the Greater Middle East, protecting civilians from the 
brutality of an oppressive regime, and avoiding a severe humanitarian crisis. At the same time, US 
endorsement of the anti-Qaddafi opposition would contribute to the protection of a number of US 
strategic interests: fostering transatlantic relations, justifying the role of NATO in the twenty-first 
century, preventing violence from spreading and destabilizing Libya’s neighbors, and offering a 
public relations opportunity to rebut criticisms regarding the US quasi-silence over government 
repression of popular demonstrations in Bahrain. This convergence of interests was made possible 
mostly because of the uneasy nature of the relationship between Washington and the Libyan 
government. Indeed, contrary to the cases of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, the Al Khalifas in Bahrain, 
and Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen, the Obama administration had no vital national interest in 
keeping Col. Qaddafi in power. Qaddafi’s cooperation on the strategic issues of counterterrorism 
and nonproliferation was indeed important but certainly not critical for the larger US 
counterterrorism and nonproliferation effort in the Greater Middle East. 
Given the absence of any detectable tension between US ideal and strategic interests in Libya, US 
foreign policy rhetoric showed a particularly high level of consistency with the actual US policies 
implemented on the ground. Hence, US public statements of support for the demands of the Libyan 
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protesters were followed by concrete actions, such as the early imposition of unilateral sanctions 
and a sustained diplomatic effort aimed at increasing international pressure on the Qaddafi regime. 
In addressing the Libyan crisis, the White House, the State Department, and the Defense 
Department generally spoke with a single voice. Some divergent opinions within the Obama 
administration momentarily arose when US officials discussed the possibility to commit US troops 
to a multilateral military campaign in Libya. Nevertheless, by early March 2011, such divergences 
had seemingly been resolved and, eventually, the administration solidly endorsed the military 
option. Libyan opposition forces’ military victory over Qaddafi forces and the very death of the 
Libyan autocrat seemed to vindicate the Obama administration’s policies. However, eight months of 
intense armed conflict had exacted a high toll on Libya’s economy and had severely tarnished the 
country’s social fabric therefore anticipating difficult times ahead. Moreover, disagreement among 
UN Security Council members concerning the interpretation of Resolution 1973 and the scope of 
OUP would have significant repercussions on the future ability of the UNSC to act in Syria. 
All that considered, in 2011 Libya the United States faced a crisis where US ideal interests 
converged with US strategic interests. Moreover, US officials justified the military intervention in 
support of the Libyan uprising on broadly humanitarian grounds. Interestingly, convergence of 
interests and professed humanitarian concerns had also been significant factors influencing a 
number of past US decisions on military intervention: Somalia in 1993, Kosovo in 1999, and, to a 
certain extent, even Afghanistan in the 1980s. Given such similarities, we can ascertain that the 
Obama administration’s response to the 2011 Libyan uprising showed clear elements of continuity 











Syria: the Risks of Change 
 
US-Syrian Relations prior to 2011 
Two characteristics of the Syrian Arab Republic are especially important to understand the complex 
dynamics of the 2011 popular uprising. The first is Syria’s strategic location in the heart of the 
Greater Middle East. Syria shares borders with Turkey in the north, Iraq in the east, Jordan in the 
south, and Israel and Lebanon in the west. The second is Syria’s heterogeneous society. Religiously, 
the majority of Syrians are Sunni Muslims (over 70 percent), but there are also followers of three 
smaller Muslim sects, such as Alawites (over 10 percent), Druzes, and Ismailis, as well as several 
Christian denominations. Ethnically, roughly 90 percent of Syrians are Arabs, with Kurds 
representing the largest ethno-linguistic minority (from 7 to 10 percent).321 
After obtaining independence from France in 1946, Syria experienced decades of chronic political 
instability punctuated by frequent military coups. In 1970, the rise to power of a strongman, Hafez 
al Assad, eventually brought stability to Syria. However, stability in the country came at the price of 
the establishment of a full-fledged police state and the violent repression of any meaningful form of 
organized domestic opposition. Hafez’s iron-fist rule lasted until his death in 2000, when power was 
passed to one of his sons, Bashar. Soon after taking office, young and Western-educated Bashar al 
Assad promised a program of economic and political reforms and, for a time, the Syrian regime 
seemed sincerely willing to tolerate some level of free expression. The so-called Damascus Spring 
did not last long. Bashar al Assad’s promotion of market-oriented economic reforms was not 
followed by any actual, significant reform of the Syrian political system. Even economic measures, 
such as privatizations of state-owned assets, did not lead to a sound market economy but, rather, to 
crony capitalism that, in turn, disproportionately benefited those individuals and entities closely 
linked to the regime. In addition, President Assad’s limited initial opening to dissent proved 
ephemeral as it was quickly replaced by a new era of violent repression against opposition.322 
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Even before the 2011 uprising, Syria was a highly problematic country for the United States. In 
fact, Syrian policies directly ran against three core US strategic interests in the Greater Middle East: 
countering terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), ensuring the 
security of Israel, and containing regional hostile powers. 
The United States classified Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1979. The Assad regime long 
supported a number of US State Department-designated foreign terrorist organizations, including 
Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Palestinian groups Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General 
Command. By the end of 2010, these groups had offices in Damascus and were free to operate 
within Syria's borders.323 US-Syrian positions were also profoundly at odds on the issue of 
nonproliferation of WMDs. According to US sources, the Syrian regime started a chemical weapons 
program decades ago, perhaps as early as in the 1970s. In addition, the United States repeatedly 
accused Syria of pursuing a secret program to develop nuclear weapons in the remote desert facility 
of Dair Alzour.324  
Moreover, Syria represented both a direct and indirect threat to the security of Israel. Directly, the 
Syrian military engaged in several armed conflicts against Israel, and, as a consequence of 
numerous failed peace negotiations, the two countries in 2011 were technically still in a state of 
war.325 Indirectly, the Syrian regime threatened the security of Israel by providing political and 
material support to openly anti-Israel organizations, such as Hezbollah and Hamas. US policies 
were aimed at avoiding the resumption of a direct Syrian-Israeli armed confrontation and at limiting 
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Syria’s ability to wage low-intensity warfare against Israel through its Lebanese and Palestinian 
proxies.326 
Finally, the Assad regime had developed a close association with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The 
countries of Syria and Iran not only had cultural and religious affinities, but their leaderships also 
shared a common hostility against the United States, Israel, and pro-West Arab regimes. The 
Syrian-Iranian alliance represented a serious obstacle for the US regional policy of containment. In 
fact, Syria’s strategic location and the Assad regime’s connection to Hamas and Hezbollah 
effectively provided Iran with the means to extend its influence from the Persian Gulf, through the 
Levant, and to the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea.327 
Over time, in response to antagonistic Syrian policies, the United States imposed several unilateral 
sanctions that prohibited US foreign assistance to Syria and significantly restricted bilateral trade. 
During the presidency of George W. Bush, US-Syrian relations deteriorated further. The two 
governments repeatedly clashed over a number of issues including the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, the 
ensuing Syrian backing of Iraqi insurgent groups, and the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese 
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. The latter episode led the United States to the decision to indefinitely 
recall its ambassador to Damascus.328  
This was the particularly tense bilateral relationship that US President Barack Obama inherited 
when he took office in 2009. On the one hand, the new US administration maintained the unilateral 
sanctions against Syria and, as showed in its Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign 
Operations for fiscal year 2010, continued to consider the Assad regime a serious threat both to the 
United States and to Syria’s neighbors. On the other hand, the Obama administration embarked in 
an attempt to engage with the Syrian leadership “to find areas of mutual interest, reduce regional 
tensions, and promote Middle East peace.” As part of this engagement attempt, delegations of 
senior US officials and lawmakers (including Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell 
and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee John Kerry) often traveled to Syria for 
high-level meetings. Moreover, in January 2011, President Obama restored the position of US 
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ambassador to Syria by appointing Robert Ford to the post. Nevertheless, during 2009-10, the US 
policy of engagement did not lead to any significant advancement in the Arab-Israeli peace process, 
did not convince Syria to stop sponsoring US-designated terrorist organizations, and did not weaken 
Syria’s alliance with Iran. As a result, the Obama administration grew increasingly frustrated with 
the regime of President Assad. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton publicly conveyed US 
frustration in a November 2010 interview. When asked where the policy of engaging Syria was 
heading, Secretary Clinton replied: “Syria’s behavior has not met our hopes and expectations over 
the past 20 months –and Syria’s actions have not met its international obligations. Syria can still 
choose another path and we hope that it does.” On the eve of the 2011 uprising, the Obama 
administration’s policy of engagement with Syria had lost much of its initial momentum.329 
 
The Syrian Uprising and US Response 
The Syrian uprising began in mid-March 2011. On March 18, the first major demonstrations took 
place in a number of cities across the country. Although, these early protests were sparked by 
specific local grievances (as for example, the arrest in the city of Daraa of a dozen teenagers 
accused of scrawling anti-Assad regime graffiti), demonstrators soon turned their attention to wider 
national issues: more freedom and democracy, better living conditions, and an end to the 
government’s corruption and unaccountability. Like in other Middle Eastern countries experiencing 
turmoil in 2011, the uprising in Syria started as a spontaneous popular movement characterized by a 
very loose structure and the absence of a well-defined leadership. At this early stage, a particularly 
relevant organizational role was played by internet-savvy youth and human rights groups.330  
The Syrian regime offered a significantly different account of the uprising. State-controlled news 
outlets cast the protests alternatively as the work of Islamist extremists, armed gangs, or foreign 
agents. Such a narrative was used by the regime as a justification for its violent response to what, in 
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fact, were mostly peaceful demonstrations. By the end of the first day of protests, at least six people 
had been killed, hundreds injured, and many others arrested. However, if the use of violence was 
meant to stop demonstrators from taking to the streets, it failed. On the contrary, the brutality of the 
regime’s response had the opposite effect of fueling wider popular rage. Protests continued 
unabated and demonstrators raised their demands, with calls for the overthrow of the regime 
becoming increasingly frequent.331  
US officials at the State and Defense departments immediately condemned the use of lethal force by 
Syrian authorities. The State Department, in particular, called on the Syrian regime to exercise 
restraint and refrain from violence against peaceful demonstrators. Words of strong condemnation 
came also from the White House. Amidst continuing unrest, US President Obama defined the use of 
force by the Assad regime as “outrageous”. The US president noted that his administration had 
repeatedly encouraged President Assad “to implement meaningful reforms” but that the Syrian 
president had instead “chosen the path of repression.”332 
Faced with mounting opposition, President Assad began to offer some concessions, mostly 
symbolic gestures aimed at defusing the crisis. Nevertheless, these concessions went hand in hand 
with the uninterrupted use of lethal force and mass arrests by state security forces. In April, the 
Syrian regime also increased its reliance on the military to maintain control over the country. The 
Syrian armed forces proved to be especially loyal to the Assad regime. The Syrian president was a 
member of the Alawite minority, like most of the career soldiers and military officers. Moreover, 
the military’s most elite unit, the Republican Guard, was an all-Alawite force. In addition, the 
military’s top-ranks were permeated by President Assad’s family members. Given such a 
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composition of the armed forces, Syrian military officers were unlikely to turn on the president 
since they saw their fates as inextricably linked to the survival of the regime.333 
Meanwhile, the many diverse groups challenging the Assad regime tried to organize themselves 
into a more structured opposition. Domestically, the Syrian opposition formed small local 
committees in towns and cities across the country. In order to increase coordination among 
themselves, such committees united under the banner of the Local Coordinating Committees of 
Syria (LCC). Externally, Syrian expatriates, Islamists, liberals, representatives of the LCC, youth 
and human rights activists, tribal leaders, and Kurdish factions had been meeting outside of Syria at 
least since May in an attempt to coalesce around a unified leadership. After several inconclusive 
meetings, and after overcoming the many differences among its heterogeneous membership, on 3 
October 2011, the opposition eventually announced the official formation of the Syrian National 
Council (SNC).  Despite the SNC’s purported broad-based nature, some Syrian minority groups, 
such as Alawites, Shiites, Druzes, and Christians were poorly represented. Furthermore, at the end 
of July, a number of Syrian officers defected and announced the creation of the Free Syrian Army 
(FSA), thereby providing the anti-Assad opposition with its own military wing. The FSA, however, 
never evolved into a unified military force with an effective command-and-control structure. 
Instead, the FSA mostly remained an umbrella organization for an array of anti-regime armed 
groups operating in a largely autonomous fashion.334  
The above description has to be considered a simplification of an otherwise much more complex 
and continuously evolving situation. Although the LCC, the SNC, and the FSA gained some 
preeminence within the Syrian opposition, other political and military groups were also challenging 
the Assad regime. Given the large number of distinct actors involved and the absence of clear 
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hierarchical relations among them, no single entity acquired the legitimacy necessary to speak as 
the sole and consensus representative of the Syrian opposition. Such a fragmentation and lack of 
coordination would prove especially damaging to the opposition’s efforts to win both domestic and 
international support.335 
The Obama administration coupled its rhetorical support for the Syrian uprising with a strategy of 
progressive targeted sanctions against the Assad regime. In April, President Obama renewed the 
Syria National Emergency Act, essentially prolonging the effect of sanctions that had been in place 
since 2004. After that, the White House	extended the scope of the Syria National Emergency Act by 
issuing Executive Order 13572, which levied sanctions on people and entities close to President 
Assad. Finally, in May, President Obama issued Executive Order 13573 imposing additional 
sanctions on senior members of the regime, including the Syrian president. Notably, it was the first 
time, since the beginning of the uprising, that the US administration had imposed a set of sanctions 
that directly penalized President Assad.336 
During May/June 2011, US officials also sharpened their rhetorical criticism of the Syrian regime. 
President Obama firmly denounced the Assad regime’s decision of resorting to repression to remain 
in power. Obama stated that President Assad had still a choice: to “lead the transition” to a freer and 
more democratic Syria or to “get out of the way”. US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates defined 
the violence unleashed by the Syrian regime as a “slaughter of innocent lives”. Secretary Gates 
added that “whether Assad still has the legitimacy to govern in his own country after this kind of a 
slaughter I think is a question that everybody needs to consider.” In even stronger terms, Secretary 
of State Clinton warned, “The legitimacy that is necessary for anyone to expect change to occur 
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under this current government is, if not gone, nearly run out.” The public rhetoric adopted by the 
administration officials suggested that US patience with President Assad was wearing thin.337 
Despite a harsher rhetoric, new sanctions specifically targeting the Syrian president, and continued 
violence that had resulted into more than 900 uprising-related deaths, the Obama administration 
stopped short of calling on President Assad to resign. They further did not explicitly declare that the 
Syrian president had lost legitimacy to lead his country. The US administration’s hesitation in 
holding President Assad personally responsible for the “brutal crackdown” on the opposition 
received criticism from the US Congress. In fact, at least since early May, several US lawmakers 
had been saying that the Syrian president had “lost legitimacy” and had been asking Assad “to step 
down”.338 
On July 7, in a show of solidarity with the residents, US Ambassador to Syria Ford visited the city 
of Hama, one of the focal points of the Syrian uprising. Following Ambassador Ford’s visit, pro-
Assad supporters attacked and vandalized the US embassy and the ambassador’s own residence in 
Damascus. The Obama administration immediately condemned the attack. In a marked shift from 
previous US administration’s comments, Secretary of State Clinton said:  
“If anyone, including President Assad, thinks that the United States is secretly hoping that the 
regime will emerge from this turmoil to continue its brutality and repression, they are wrong 
[…] President Assad is not indispensable and we have absolutely nothing invested in him 
remaining in power."339  
Pressed to explain further, Secretary Clinton added: “from our perspective, he [Assad] has lost 
legitimacy.” Likewise, although in a less assertive tone (perhaps indicating the existence of 
divergent opinions within the administration), President Obama echoed Clinton’s message: 
“[Assad] has missed opportunity after opportunity to present a genuine reform agenda […] You are 
seeing President Assad lose legitimacy in the eyes of his people.” In describing such an important 
                                         
337 Obama, “Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa”; Robert Gates, “Remarks by Secretary 
Gates at the Security and Defense Agenda, Brussels, Belgium 10/06/2011” (US Department of Defense, June 10, 2011), 
http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4839; Arshad Mohammed and Andrew Quinn, 
“Clinton Suggests Assad Legitimacy ‘Nearly Run Out,’” Reuters, June 2, 2011, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/02/us-syria-clinton-idUSTRE7514K320110602. 
338 On the position of the US Congress see for example: US House Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, 
“Shifting Sands: Political Transitions in the Middle East, Part 2” (US Congress, May 5, 2011), 
http://archives.republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/66173.pdf; US Congress, “S. Res. 180 - Expressing Support for 
Peaceful Demonstrations and Universal Freedoms in Syria and Condemning the Human Rights Violations by the Assad 
Regime,” May 11, 2011. 
339 Hillary Clinton, “Remarks With European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 




shift in the administration’s policy toward the Syrian uprising, US officials stated that it was not a 
direct consequence of the embassy attack. They insisted, instead, that a change of policy had been 
weeks in the making.340  
Eventually, it took another month of the Syrian regime’s empty promises of compromise, 
accompanied by continued repressive measures against the opposition, for the Obama 
administration to unequivocally demand President Assad’s resignation. President Obama explained 
the decision as follows: 
“The future of Syria must be determined by its people, but President Bashar al Assad is 
standing in their way. His calls for dialogue and reform have rung hollow while he is 
imprisoning, torturing, and slaughtering his own people. We have consistently said that 
President Assad must lead a democratic transition or get out of the way.  He has not led.  For 
the sake of the Syrian people, the time has come for President Assad to step aside.”341 
In order to further disrupt the Assad regime’s “ability to finance a campaign of violence against the 
Syrian people”, President Obama signed Executive Order 13582. This last Executive Order froze all 
assets of the government of Syria under US jurisdiction, prohibited US subjects from engaging in 
any transaction involving the government of Syria, banned US imports of Syrian petroleum or 
petroleum products, prohibited US subjects from having any dealings in or related to Syria’s 
petroleum or petroleum products, and prohibited US subjects from operating or investing in 
Syria.342 
The US president also pointed out: 
“The United States cannot and will not impose this transition upon Syria. It is up to the 
Syrian people to choose their own leaders, and we have heard their strong desire that there 
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not be foreign intervention in their movement […] We will support this outcome by pressuring 
President Assad to get out of the way of this transition.”343 
Detected in Obama’s words is the US president’s early reluctance to get the United States involved 
in another Libya-style intervention. 
The Assad regime represented a bridgehead for the Islamic Republic of Iran to spread its influence 
across the Grater Middle East. Syria also sheltered and sponsored militant organizations, such as 
Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian Hamas, openly hostile to the United States and its local ally 
Israel. Moreover, Damascus possessed chemical weapons and allegedly pursued programs for the 
production of nuclear ones. Finally, since March 2011, President Assad had overseen a brutal 
crackdown on mostly peaceful demonstrators whose demands were about freedom, democracy, and 
better living conditions. All of this seemed to create a clear convergence between US strategic 
interests and US ideal interests. In fact, the removal of President Assad would presumably increase 
Iran’s isolation in the Greater Middle East, weaken US-designated terrorist organizations like 
Hezbollah and Hamas, and serve US non-proliferation policy while, at the same time, promote 
values and principles dear to the United States. Therefore, it is not immediately obvious why it took 
four long months for the Obama administration to say that President Assad had lost legitimacy and 
an extra month to finally call on the Syrian president to step aside.344  
At this point, a deeper analysis of the US national interests at stake in Syria is necessary to 
understand the Obama administration’s hesitant policy toward the uprising. 
A first reason behind the US belated demand for Assad’s resignation was that a significant number 
of administration officials and US lawmakers had the perception that the Syrian president was a 
potential reformer. They believed that, if given enough time and some political space, young 
Western-educated Assad, who came to power with a reformist agenda in 2000, would in fact 
implement the social, political, and economic reforms demanded by the Syrian protesters. 
Moreover, the Obama administration had not completely given up on the possibility that the US 
policy of engagement with the Assad regime could succeed in drawing Syria away from Iran’s orbit 
and convince President Assad to play a constructive role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. 
However, as time passed, punctuated by Assad’s broken promises of reform and continued regime-
sanctioned violent repression, more people in Washington became disillusioned with the idea that 
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the Syrian president was a reformer and that he could be a force for peace in the region. With regard 
to this, we can identify three broad positions within the US executive. First, the White House 
seemed reluctant to openly pursue a policy of seeking Assad’s removal. This was perhaps because 
President Obama had personally invested political capital in his administration’s early attempt to 
engage with the Syrian leadership. Second, the US State Department took a more activist approach. 
Secretary Clinton and Ambassador Ford, in particular, became strong advocates for a more assertive 
US policy in Syria. Third, the US Defense Department adopted a somewhat neutral stance and 
usually deferred to the other two institutions’ decisions. Pentagon officials, in fact, were fully 
absorbed in dealing with the contemporaneous US participation in military operations in Libya.345     
Along with different perceptions about the personality of President Assad, US hesitation in calling 
for the Syrian president’s resignation depended also on geo-political and strategic considerations. 
To begin with, the Assad regime had long succeeded in keeping religiously and ethnically divided 
Syria from plunging into chaos and sectarian conflict. US officials were genuinely worried that a 
security vacuum would emerge from a sudden and “disorderly” power transition in the country. The 
United States was especially concerned about the possibility that Islamists or Iran would fill such a 
vacuum. Chaos and sectarian conflict originating from the fall of the Assad regime could also 
dangerously spread to Syria’s neighbors thus destabilizing an already volatile yet strategically 
important region. Secondly, the Obama administration saw the end of the Assad regime in light of 
Israel’s security. The rule of President Assad, in fact, had guaranteed a certain level of stability on 
the Syrian-Israeli border for years. Despite Syria’s open support for anti-Israel militant 
organizations, the Syrian president had developed a live-and-let-live relationship with Israel. Israeli 
officials were familiar with their Syrian counterparts, whereas they feared what might replace 
them.346 US and Israeli fears seemed to be validated on 5 June 2011 when pro-Palestinian 
demonstrators, commemorating the anniversary of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, tried to breach the 
border into the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, triggering an armed response by the Israeli defense 
forces. Analysts argued that demonstrators could not have reached the border without at least the 
Syrian government’s acquiescence, and someone also speculated that President Assad had 
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deliberately allowed the incident to happen in order to show the regional security implications of 
the fall of his regime. Thirdly, some observers argued that the Obama administration’s hesitation in 
committing the United States to a policy of openly seeking Assad’s resignation was part of the 
broader US strategy to address the uprising. According to this view, the Obama administration 
worried that too forceful a US pro-uprising stance too early might have been interpreted by Syrians 
as foreign meddling in their domestic affairs and, therefore, led to a nationalist rejection of the 
protests.347 
All that considered, the Obama administration’s task of framing a policy response to the Syrian 
uprising was much more complex than a limited analysis of the US national interest might have 
otherwise revealed. A clear convergence between ideal and strategic US interests could not be taken 
for granted. Important US strategic interests, in fact, conflicted with a policy aimed at the overthrow 
of the Syrian president. Individual perceptions of Assad’s personality, divergent assessments of the 
Syrian regime’s stabilizing role in the region, and a cautious US strategy accounted for the US 
hesitation in fully supporting the Syrian opposition. Only when developments in Syria showed that 
President Assad was unable to contain the unrest, and that the regime’s violent repression was 
directly contributing to increased regional instability, the Obama administration came to the 
conclusion that US interests would be best served by joining the Syrian opposition’s call for Assad 
to step aside.   
After President Obama publicly called on his Syrian counterpart to resign in August, the US 
administration consistently relied on diplomacy as its preferred tool to achieve regime change. US 
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman explained that the Obama 
administration did not “seek further militarization” in Syria, but it was instead working with US  
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international partners “to further isolate and pressure the regime through diplomatic and financial 
means.” Similarly, President Obama conveyed his administration’s commitment “to create the kind 
of international pressure and environment that encourages the current Syrian regime to step aside so 
that a more democratic process of transition can take place inside of Syria.” US Secretary of 
Defense Leon Panetta348 also reaffirmed the US administration’s preference for diplomacy: 
“Although we will not rule out any future course of action, currently the administration is focusing 
on diplomatic and political approaches rather than a military intervention.”349 
Accordingly, the United States put its weight behind the Arab League’s and the United Nations’ 
successive initiatives to find a diplomatic solution to the Syrian crisis. Moreover, the Obama 
administration sponsored the formation of the Friends of Syria Group. Such a group represented an 
additional forum where countries sympathetic to the Syrian uprising coordinated their collective 
actions in support of the anti-Assad opposition. However, US efforts to bring meaningful 
diplomatic pressure to bear on the Syrian regime clashed with the reality of an international 
community deeply divided on the issue of Syria. Throughout the crisis, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
stood firmly with President Assad. At the United Nations, Russia and China repeatedly blocked any 
UN Security Council resolution condemning the Syrian regime with their veto power. Russia and 
China did not want a repetition of a Libya-style intervention, where, according to these two 
countries, a UN mandate intended to protect civilians had instead become a license to pursue regime 
change. The Arab League was also divided. Sunni Gulf states perceived the Assad regime as a 
proxy of Shiite Iran and, therefore, were more inclined to support the Syrian opposition. Other Arab 
governments, like those of Iraq and Lebanon (incidentally both Syria’s neighbors) were more 
reluctant to side against the Assad regime fearing destabilizing repercussions for their countries. 
This lack of international consensus on Syria significantly weakened the ability of the United States 
to diplomatically isolate the Assad regime.350  
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Meanwhile, the humanitarian situation in Syria was rapidly worsening. By the end of summer 2012, 
between 17,000 and 23,000 people had died in uprising-related incidents. Approximately 234,000 
refugees had registered for UN support. Tens of thousands of refugees more were thought to have 
left Syria without registering. Roughly 2.5 million people needed assistance inside the country. 
More than 1.2 million others were internally displaced. The security picture did not look bright 
either. In mid-July, due to the remarkable escalation of violence documented in Syria, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross officially classified the crisis as a full-fledged civil war. 
By then, what began as a peaceful and national protest movement had turned into a sectarian armed 
conflict mostly pitting the Sunni majority of the populace against President Assad’s Alawite sect. 
As evidence of the brutality of the conflict, the UN Human Rights Council reported that both 
regime loyalists and opposition fighters were responsible for atrocities and abuses committed 
against both combatants and civilians. Finally, sectarian tensions threatened to spill over into 
Syria’s neighbors, thus rising the specter of a regional conflict.351 
The deteriorating humanitarian and security situations, coupled with the patent failure of diplomacy 
to bring about regime change, prompted senior officials within the Obama administration to 
advocate for a more assertive US policy toward Syria. In summer 2012, State Secretary Clinton and 
CIA Director David Petraeus prepared a plan for arming the Syrian opposition. The Clinton-
Petraeus proposal called for carefully vetting the anti-Assad opposition and training selected groups 
of fighters, who would be supplied with weapons. The idea was to create allies in Syria with whom 
the United States could work, both during the crisis and after President Assad’s eventual removal. 
This position was also supported by Defense Secretary Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Martin Dempsey.352 Despite the seniority of the officials sponsoring the plan, the White 
House decided to reject their proposal. Since the beginning of the uprising, President Obama had 
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consistently expressed his belief that the United States could best protect its national interests by 
staying out of the Syrian conflict as much as possible. Evidently, by the end of summer 2012, the 
US president had not changed his mind. Therefore, beyond the diplomatic effort, US policy in Syria 
continued to be limited to the provision of non-lethal support (i.e. communication gear), 
humanitarian relief (i.e. medical supplies), and political assistance for the formation of a more 
united and legitimate opposition.353 
The White House explained its self-imposed no-arming policy as follows: “We do not believe that 
militarization, further militarization of the situation in Syria at this point is the right course of 
action. We believe that it would lead to greater chaos, greater carnage.” While US officials were 
genuinely concerned about the possibility that an additional influx of weapons into Syria would 
only worsen the crisis, there was also another paramount reason behind the Obama administration’s 
refusal to provide lethal aid to the anti-Assad opposition. US officials feared that US weapons could 
fall into the hands of extremist groups with anti-American agendas, possibly even to Al Qaeda 
linked groups. In fact, by mid-2012, escalating violence and the failure of the moderate opposition 
to extract any significant concession from the Assad regime had radicalized the Syrian uprising and 
increased the popular appeal of extremist factions. An October 2012 report, issued by the think tank 
International Crisis Group, confirmed that “the presence of a powerful Salafi354 strand among 
Syria’s rebels ha[d] become irrefutable.” Islamist militant groups such as Jabhat al Nusra , Ahrar al 
Sham, and the Islamic Vanguard had become primary actors in the armed struggle against regime’s 
loyalist forces.355 
In addition, there were a number of domestic and external factors that limited the ability of the 
Obama administration to shape events in Syria. A policy of larger US involvement, especially a 
military involvement like the one in Libya, clashed with domestic constraints. The economic crisis 
and a shrinking federal budget did not allow for new costly military adventures abroad. The United 
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States experienced a widespread domestic fatigue with respect to military interventions and nation 
building operations in yet another Muslim country. As well, political considerations in a 
presidential election year saw the risky decision of committing US armed forces in a war as 
potential for losing votes. Moreover, the Obama administration also faced external constraints. 
Decades of tense US-Syrian relations had led to the absence of any significant commercial, 
political, or military ties between the two countries, thereby depriving the United States of essential 
tools to exercise meaningful pressure on the Syrian government.356 Furthermore, even after almost 
two years of unrest, the Assad regime continued to enjoy substantial support among different Syrian 
constituencies. Despite some defections, the Alawite-controlled military mostly remained loyal to 
the regime. Similarly, the Sunni business and mercantile classes, that became influent under the rule 
of the Assad family, had a stake in the survival of the Syrian president. Syria’s religious and ethnic 
minority groups also generally sided with the regime out of fear of instability and retribution at the 
hands of the Sunni majority. Conversely, the anti-Assad opposition repeatedly failed to resolve its 
internal differences and to present itself to the Syrian people and the international community as a 
unified and credible organization that would be able to govern in a post-Assad Syria. A final 
constraint to US action was represented by the lack of international agreement on the best way to 
resolve the Syrian crisis. The absence of a clear UN mandate made the possibility of any US direct 
intervention more difficult.357 
The interplay of these considerations resulted in the Obama administration’s hesitant policy of 
qualified support toward the Syrian uprising. At times, US officials even seemed ambivalent about 
the desirability of the opposition’s victory. In fact, US actions belied the administration’s unstated 
hope that systematic US and international pressures would eventually convince the Syrian regime 
(with or without President Assad at its helm) to engage in serious negotiations and end the crisis. 
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Continuity or Change 
At first glance, the Syrian uprising appeared to provide a case of convergence among different US 
national interests. The ideal interest of supporting demonstrators demanding more freedom, 
democracy, and better living conditions seemed compatible with the strategic interests of containing 
Iranian influence, securing Israel, and advancing US counterterrorism and nonproliferation policies. 
However, our analysis has showed that such a convergence of US interests was not obvious. In fact, 
US backing of the Syrian opposition’s call for Assad’s resignation generated concerns within the 
Obama administration about the negative repercussions that an abrupt end to the Assad regime 
would have for these same core US strategic interests in the region. 
After the outbreak of the uprising, the US administration was quick to offer rhetorical support for 
the Syrian opposition and to exert economic and diplomatic pressure on the Syrian regime. US 
officials proved more hesitant, instead, when it came to backing the Syrian opposition’s demand for 
Assad’s resignation and to considering plans to expand US participation in the crisis to include 
military assistance to the armed opposition. Within the US executive branch, administration 
officials held divergent opinions on such sensitive issues. On the one hand, the White House, and 
especially President Obama, played a “moderating role” and advocated for a limited and qualified 
US involvement. On the other hand, the State Department, and to a certain extent also the Defense 
Department, pushed for a more assertive US policy. In the end, the White House’s moderate 
position emerged as the administration’s official position. 
In framing its response to the Syrian uprising, the Obama administration was caught between the 
understanding that Assad rule had become untenable and serious concerns about the uncertainty of 
what would replace the Syrian regime. Eventually, the administration took the decision to join the 
Syrian opposition’s call for Assad to step aside, but it did so only after US officials concluded that 
President Assad would be unable to stop the crisis and that continued conflict in Syria was 
jeopardizing the stability of the wider region. Even after the decision to demand Assad’s 
resignation, the policy of the Obama administration continued to show half-hearted support for the 
uprising, primarily out of concern about the growing influence of Islamist extremist groups within 
the ranks of the Syrian armed opposition.   
Overall, we can argue that the Obama administration’s response to the Syrian uprising represented 
continuity with the traditional US foreign policy in the Greater Middle East. The United States 
backed the Syrian uprising only when administration officials determined that US strategic interests 
had finally aligned with US ideal interests. Moreover, in line with US foreign policy responses to 
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previous crises in the region, the Obama administration showed a preference for maintaining a 










































Findings and Implications 
 
Research Findings 
Since World War II, the United States has arguably been the most influential foreign actor in the 
Greater Middle East. The demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 removed the last biggest constraint to 
the United States’ hold on the region. This dominant position in one of the most strategically 
important areas of the world gave US policymakers a noticeable edge over their global competitors 
in order to advance the US national interest. Therefore, it is not surprising that successive US 
administrations’ primary concern in the Greater Middle East has been to maintain their country’s 
influential status. In particular, the United States has always been seriously concerned with any 
crisis that could substantially alter the existing distribution of power. Over time, US officials came 
to see the status quo in the region as highly beneficial to the US national interest and any threat to 
the status quo as correspondingly dangerous. Hence, US involvement in covert actions aimed at 
reinstating the shah to power in Iran in 1953, US assistance to the insurgency fighting Soviet 
occupation troops in Afghanistan during the 1980s, and US military intervention in 1991 to repel 
Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. 
The interests of the United States in the Greater Middle East are multiple and sometimes 
conflicting. As a consequence, US presidents have repeatedly found themselves in the difficult 
position of striking a delicate balance between the pursuit of core strategic national interests (such 
as access to Middle Eastern energy resources, containment of hostile powers, policies to counter 
terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the special relationship with 
Israel) and the promotion of cherished ideal national interests (such as the desire to see a freer and 
more democratic Greater Middle East). Abundant historical evidence exists to support the argument 
that US presidents have by and large favored the former set of interests to the detriment of the latter. 
This has resulted in the traditional US preference for backing autocratic, but friendly, regimes rather 
than wholeheartedly embracing calls for democratic reform.  
Officials in Washington have commonly believed that support for friendly autocratic regimes 
represented the safest way to maintain US dominant status and protect US strategic interests, at least 
in the short term. The alternative of embracing democratic reform in the Greater Middle East has 
been perceived as having two major downsides. First, the fruits of a policy of democracy promotion 
could be reaped only in the long term; a political prospect that is not particularly appealing to a four 
189 
 
year-term administration. Second, the outcome of a democratic transition will always be uncertain. 
Who will replace undemocratic but pliant autocrats that have been in power for decades? Will new 
democratically-elected leaders be as accommodating to US interests as their autocratic 
predecessors? Especially given the fact that those new leaders will reasonably be more responsive 
to domestic constituencies openly suspicious of US intentions and policies? Will new 
democratically-elected leaders actually be committed to continue on the path of democratic reform? 
There is no doubt that those and similar questions have weighed heavily in the reasoning of the 
officials responsible for framing US foreign policy. 
The above is not to say that the United States has not been an advocate of democratic reform in the 
Greater Middle East. On the contrary, US administrations have publicly supported democratic 
reforms for decades both by exerting direct pressure on the regimes and by fostering the 
development of local civil society. The United States, however, has engaged in democracy 
promotion in Middle Eastern countries only to the extent that US engagement would not jeopardize 
the broader bilateral relationships.  
The 2011-12 Arab Awakening was an unexpected event that cast serious doubts on the validity of 
the rationale behind this traditional US foreign policy toward the Greater Middle East. The outbreak 
of the Awakening showed that autocratic leaders could hardly be considered the best guarantors of 
stability. Some Middle Eastern leaders were overthrown, others were severely challenged, and all of 
them were confronted by some level of popular unrest. Long-repressed popular grievances 
eventually erupted in formidable uprisings that critically shook the foundations of the region’s order 
and added elements of instability and uncertainty that had the potential to threaten core US national 
interests. 
When protesters across the Greater Middle East took to the streets in 2011 demanding democratic 
reforms and more accountability for their autocratic leaders, President Barack Obama faced one of 
those situations where a US president has to find a difficult compromise between different US 
national interests. How, then, did President Obama respond to the transformative events of the Arab 
Awakening? 
On the one end of the spectrum, there are the opinions of skeptical Arab activists that blamed the 
Obama administration for not going beyond rhetorical support for the pro-democracy protests. On 
the opposite end, there are irritated Arab regimes that vehemently accused the United States of 
abandoning longtime allies and recklessly siding with protesters. Opposing interpretations of the US 
response to the uprising in Egypt were a case in point. Egyptian demonstrators charged the Obama 
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administration with being too hesitant to embrace the popular protest that eventually overthrew 
President Hosni Mubarak, whereas Arab leaders, especially in Saudi Arabia, blamed the United 
States for not defending a longtime ally until the end. Likewise, with regard to the Bahraini 
uprising, hardliners within the Al Khalifa royal family were profoundly upset by US public 
criticism of their crackdown on demonstrators, whereas human rights activists condemned what 
they perceived as a quasi-silent US response to the Bahraini government’s repressive policies. 
Finally, President Obama offered his own interpretation of the events during a 2012 speech at the 
United Nations General Assembly. According to Obama, the United States was “inspired by the 
Tunisian protests” that toppled President Ben Ali, “insisted on change” in Egypt, “supported a 
transition of leadership” in Yemen, intervened in Libya “to stop the slaughter of innocents”, and 
asked for an end to the regime of President Bashar al Assad “so that the suffering of the Syrian 
people can stop”. Notably, President Obama’s remarks conveniently omitted any reference to the 
US response to the uprising in Bahrain.358 
None of these black-and-white interpretations (fully backing the regimes or fully siding with the 
uprisings) provides an accurate description of the Obama administration’s response to the Arab 
Awakening. The purpose of this research was indeed to offer a more nuanced understanding of the 
US administration’s Middle East policy and, especially, to give an answer to our main research 
question: 
“To what extent did President Obama’s foreign policy represent a paradigm shift in the traditional 
US foreign policy toward the Muslim world, and especially toward the region of the Greater Middle 
East?” 
In order to do that, in our Introduction, we highlighted the relevance of the research question and its 
implications for the protection and promotion of the US national interest. We also described the 
theoretical background that has provided the analytical tools applied throughout the research. 
Chapter One was a detailed analysis of the longstanding features of US foreign policy rhetoric, 
where we stressed the privileged status enjoyed by the idea of US exceptionalism and the myth of 
US innocence. Chapter Two examined US foreign policy practice. In it, we first discussed the main 
actors and dynamics involved in the process of US foreign policymaking. Additionally, we studied 
the concept of the US national interest and its different constituents. Finally, we identified four core 
US strategic interests that have distinguished US Middle East policy since the end of World War II. 
Chapter Three through Chapter Seven addressed the Obama administration’s response to the 2011-
                                         




12 Arab Awakening. In these chapters, we analyzed five distinct popular uprisings (in Egypt, 
Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, and Syria) and the US administration’s response to them.  
Our work resulted in a number of research findings that we are now going to use to determine 
whether, under the presidency of Barack Obama, continuity or change was the distinctive feature of 
US foreign policy toward the Greater Middle East. We identified four main research findings. 
1) President Barack Obama embraced the traditional themes of US foreign policy rhetoric 
This research maintains that the predominant brand of US public rhetoric describes the Americans 
as a chosen people with a special mission to reshape the world according to their universal values. 
This idea of US exceptionalism contains many different themes that we discussed in Chapter One. 
We contend that President Obama’s own rhetoric systematically resorted to these same traditional 
themes. 
In at least two occasions, President Obama explicitly subscribed to the idea of US 
exceptionalism.359 Firstly, during a 2009 news conference in Strasbourg, France:  
“I believe in American Exceptionalism […] if you think of our current situation, the United 
States remains the largest economy in the world. We have unmatched military capability. And 
I think that we have a core set of values that are enshrined in our Constitution, in our body of 
law, in our democratic practices, in our belief in free speech and equality that, though 
imperfect, are exceptional.”360 
Secondly, at the end of his first term as US president: “What makes us exceptional -what makes us 
American- is our allegiance to an idea articulated in a declaration made more than two centuries 
ago.”361 According to President Obama, the United States was “the greatest nation on Earth” and “a 
place where all things are possible”.362  
The traditional themes of US global leadership, uniqueness, and indispensability were also frequent 
in the president’s remarks:  
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“[…] the leadership that has made America not just a place on a map, but the light to the world.”363 
“For generations, the United States of America has played a unique role as an anchor of global 
security and as an advocate for human freedom.”364 
“[…] America remains the one indispensable nation in world affairs, and as long as I'm President, I 
intend to keep it that way.”365 
Moreover, President Obama’s rhetoric drew on the time-honored themes of John Winthrop’s “city 
upon a hill” and Thomas Paine’s US “power to begin the world all over again”. Winthrop and 
Paine’s legacies were evident in Obama’s 2009 address before a joint session of the US Congress: 
“As we stand at this crossroads of history, the eyes of all people in all nations are once again 
upon us [Winthrop], watching to see what we do with this moment, waiting for us to lead. 
Those of us gathered here tonight have been called to govern in extraordinary times. It is a 
tremendous burden, but also a great privilege, one that has been entrusted to few generations 
of Americans. For in our hands lies the ability to shape our world [Paine] for good or for 
ill.”366 
Following in his predecessors’ footsteps, the 44th president of the United States reiterated time and 
again the universal character of the values promoted by his country, as in occasion of his 2012 
remarks to the United Nations General Assembly: “[…] we believe that freedom and self-
determination are not unique to one culture. These are not simply American values or Western 
values -they are universal values.”367 
The idea of US exceptionalism includes two potent components, one religious and one secular. 
President Obama’s statements were punctuated by religious references. For example, in his 2009 
Inaugural Speech Obama stated:  
“We remain a young nation, but in the words of Scripture, the time has come to set aside 
childish things. The time has come to reaffirm our enduring spirit; to choose our better 
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history; to carry forward that precious gift, that noble idea, passed on from generation to 
generation: the God-given promise that all are equal, all are free, and all deserve a chance to 
pursue their full measure of happiness.”368 
In addition, under Barack Obama, each and every State of the Union Address, like many other 
presidential speeches, ended with the familiar formula “God bless America”.  
In a similar fashion, President Obama’s rhetoric was filled with secular references to the American 
Creed. With regard to the political aspects of the Creed, the US president repeatedly expressed his 
strong faith in the democratic nature of the United States: “The patriots of 1776 [independence from 
Britain] did not fight to replace the tyranny of a king with the privileges of a few or the rule of a 
mob. They gave to us a republic, a government of and by and for the people, entrusting each 
generation to keep safe our founding creed.” As for the economic aspects of the Creed, Obama 
frequently extolled the positive effects deriving from a free market: “Nor is the question before us 
whether the market is a force for good or ill. Its power to generate wealth and expand freedom is 
unmatched.”369 
In Chapter One we also demonstrated that the traditional public rhetoric of the United States is 
characterized by a particular foreign policy narrative. This narrative, called the myth of US 
innocence, provides the prism through which most Americans have generally perceived and 
understood their country’s foreign policy. The myth of US innocence in world affairs holds that the 
United States intervenes always in reaction to external events or threats, it is constantly committed 
to just causes, and it acts invariably with good intentions and for the noblest purposes. In the past, 
many US presidents subscribed to this myth and President Obama made no exception. In his speech 
after being awarded the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize, Obama worded the role of the United States in the 
world in the following way: 
“The United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six 
decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms.  The service and sacrifice 
of our men and women in uniform has promoted peace and prosperity from Germany to 
Korea, and enabled democracy to take hold in places like the Balkans. We have borne this 
burden not because we seek to impose our will. We have done so out of enlightened self-
interest -because we seek a better future for our children and grandchildren, and we believe 
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that their lives will be better if others’ children and grandchildren can live in freedom and 
prosperity.”370 
Chapter Three through Chapter Seven illustrated that, in their public statements, US officials made 
extensive use of themes drew directly on the myth of US innocence in foreign policy. In this sense, 
President Obama’s narrative of his administration’s response to the 2011-12 Arab Awakening was 
especially telling: 
“We were inspired by the Tunisian protests that toppled a dictator, because we recognized 
our own beliefs in the aspiration of men and women who took to the streets. We insisted on 
change in Egypt, because our support for democracy ultimately put us on the side of the 
people. We supported a transition of leadership in Yemen, because the interests of the people 
were no longer being served by a corrupt status quo. We intervened in Libya alongside a 
broad coalition, and with the mandate of the United Nations Security Council, because we 
had the ability to stop the slaughter of innocents, and because we believed that the aspirations 
of the people were more powerful than a tyrant. And as we meet here, we again declare that 
the regime of Bashar al Assad must come to an end so that the suffering of the Syrian people 
can stop and a new dawn can begin.”371 
Likewise, President Obama’s description of the US decision to contribute assets to the 2011 
international military intervention in Libya followed closely the script of the myth of US innocence: 
“Some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in other countries. The United States of 
America is different. And as President, I refused to wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves 
before taking action.”372 
Another traditional theme of the myth of US innocence assigns a special status to the role of the US 
military and portrays US soldiers as an exceptional force for good. Accordingly, President Obama 
praised time and again the US armed forces for being the “guardians of our liberty” who “risked 
their lives and sacrificed their limbs for strangers half a world away.” Additionally, for Obama, US 
soldiers are not only selfless individuals but they are heroes “tempered by the flames of battle” 
whose skills and courage are “unmatched”.373 
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This representative sample of the wider record of President Obama’s rhetoric has clearly showed 
that the US president subscribed to the main themes of the idea of US exceptionalism (global 
leadership, uniqueness, indispensability, universality of US values, references to religion and to the 
American Creed). Moreover, President Obama’s description of US involvement in world affairs has 
distinctly proved the enduring influence of the foreign policy narrative of the myth of US 
innocence. All that considered, we can confidently argue that Obama’s rhetoric displayed a 
considerable level of continuity with the mainstream tradition of US foreign policy rhetoric. 
2) The core US national interests in the region of the Greater Middle East remained unaltered 
In Chapter Two, we analyzed the concept of the US national interest and we distinguished its 
various components into two categories: strategic interests and ideal interests.  
As for the former, we identified four traditional US strategic interests in the region: access to 
Middle Eastern energy resources, containment of hostile powers, policies to counter terrorism and 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the special relationship with Israel. There is 
abundant evidence supporting the argument that these same interests remained top priorities also 
under the presidency of Barack Obama. In the 2010 US National Security Strategy document, for 
example, the Obama administration clearly presented US main strategic interests in the Greater 
Middle East. They included: cooperation “with our close friend, Israel, and an unshakable 
commitment to its security”; the containment of Iran and Iranian policies of “pursuit of nuclear 
weapons, support for terrorism, and threats against its neighbors”; US policies of nonproliferation 
and counterterrorism; and US unhindered access to the region’s energy resources.374 
Further evidence was provided by our study of the events of the 2011-12 Arab Awakening. Chapter 
Three through Chapter Seven indicated that US core strategic interests in the Greater Middle East 
remained unaltered also with regard to the specific Arab countries under analysis. Access to Middle 
Eastern energy resources was a primary US concern during the popular uprisings in Bahrain and 
Yemen. US officials were deeply worried that the outbreak of unrest in Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, and 
Syria would jeopardize the US interest of containing hostile powers (namely Iran). Prolonged 
instability in Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, and Syria seriously threatened US regional policies of 
counterterrorism and nonproliferation. Finally, the security of Israel weighed heavily in the internal 
debate that framed the Obama administration’s response to popular protests in Egypt and Syria. 
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While President Obama’s commitment to traditional US strategic interests in the Greater Middle 
East is well documented, foreign policy commentators hold different opinions about the US 
president’s commitment to the promotion of regional US ideal interests, especially to the issue of 
democracy promotion.375  
Some observers argued that democracy promotion was not a US top priority interest when President 
Obama took office in 2009. According to this view, there is ample evidence indicating that the 
newly elected president was stepping back from one of the core US national interests. Such 
evidence includes President Obama’s early statements about his willingness to engage 
diplomatically with nondemocratic governments in countries like Iran, Syria, Russia, and China. 
Democracy advocates interpreted this policy of engagement as a retreat from the longstanding US 
policy of promoting the spread of democratic values. A second piece of evidence was the US 
reaction to popular protests in Iran. In June 2009, in fact, the Iranian government cracked down on 
the pro-democracy Green Movement that was protesting against alleged irregularities during that 
year presidential election. The quasi-silent public response of the Obama administration elicited 
strong criticism. Third, supporters of the view that President Obama was backpedaling on 
democracy promotion noted that, in the president’s 2009 Cairo Speech, democracy ranked only 
fourth in a list of seven top issues in US-Muslim relations.376 
We believe that the above analysis is a misreading of the US president’s early actions. It is true that, 
upon taking office, President Obama toned down US rhetoric about democracy promotion. 
However, that did not necessarily mean the US president was indifferent to the issue. Instead, 
President Obama’s softer rhetoric partly depended on the fact that the concept of democracy 
promotion had been tainted in the minds of most people (particularly Muslims) by its identification 
with the 2003 War in Iraq, the War on Terror, and Western interventionism in the Greater Middle 
East more in general. Therefore, downplaying the role of democracy promotion in the US public 
discourse was coherent with President Obama's stated goal of improving US-Muslim relations 
while distancing himself from the policies of President George W. Bush. 
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Our interviews with former US officials and foreign policy experts provided us with the insights 
and information necessary to offer a different interpretation of President Obama’s policy of 
engagement with undemocratic governments, mild criticism of the Iranian regime’s crackdown on 
the Green Movement, and the place occupied by democracy promotion in the presidential Cairo 
Speech. According to our sources, President Obama’s policy of diplomatic engagement with 
undemocratic governments was not a retreat from US traditional support for democracy. On the 
contrary, diplomatic engagement was a response by the new president to the evident failure of past 
administrations’ “cold-shoulder” policies to produce any significant advance for democracy in those 
countries. Similarly, US quasi-silent reaction to the forceful repression of the Green Movement in 
Iran probably depended more on the “timing” (that is the when the protest occurred) rather than the 
“substance” (that is the why people were protesting). Iranian demonstrators took to the streets 
precisely when President Obama had started to engage with the leaders in Teheran on the thorny 
issue of Iran’s nuclear program and at the height of Obama’s distancing himself from the G.W. 
Bush interventionist legacy in the Greater Middle East. Had the Green Movement occurred a year 
later into President Obama’s tenure, the response of the United States might have been quite 
different. Finally, with regard to President Obama’s alleged neglect of democracy promotion during 
his 2009 Cairo Speech, it is important to remember that such a speech was not intended as a 
political agenda. It was not a political program describing specific US future policies toward the 
Muslim world. The Cairo Speech was first and foremost an exercise of public diplomacy. It was a 
message of friendship toward the Muslim world centered on the idea of setting a new beginning in 
US-Muslim relations. Therefore, one should not overstate the fact that democracy promotion ranked 
fourth instead of first in the list of President Obama’s top priorities. Especially because the three 
issues preceding democracy promotion were fighting violent extremism, the Arab-Israeli peace 
process, and nuclear proliferation –other three core US national interests in the Greater Middle 
East.377   
Different interpretations of President Obama’s early actions notwithstanding, US public support for 
democracy promotion became increasingly apparent in the months immediately following the Cairo 
Speech. In his September 2009 address at the United Nations General Assembly, for example, 
President Obama conveyed his administration’s firm commitment to democracy:  
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“Democracy cannot be imposed on any nation from the outside. Each society must search for 
its own path, and no path is perfect […] There are basic principles that are universal; there 
are certain truths which are self-evident -- and the United States of America will never waver 
in our efforts to stand up for the right of people everywhere to determine their own 
destiny.”378 
In summer 2010, the United States was actively monitoring the political situation in the region of 
the Greater Middle East. In August, President Obama reportedly circulated among senior members 
of his administration a memorandum called “Political Reform in the Middle East and North Africa”. 
The presidential memorandum assessed that, without significant reforms toward more democratic 
forms of government, the region was ripe for political turmoil.379 
However, as extensively illustrated in Chapter Three through Chapter Seven, it was the outbreak of 
the Arab Awakening that brought the issue of democracy promotion unquestionably to the forefront 
of the US foreign policy debate. In fact, accurately or not, the Arab Awakening was generally 
perceived as a popular struggle aimed at transforming autocratic and repressive regimes into freer 
and more democratic forms of government.   
In March 2011, while explaining US military intervention in support of the Libyan opposition, 
President Obama	noted that “the United States of America was founded on the belief that people 
should govern themselves. And now we cannot hesitate to stand squarely on the side of those who 
are reaching for their rights, knowing that their success will bring about a world that is more 
peaceful, more stable, and more just.”380 President Obama also expressed his belief that ideal 
interests were top priorities for the United States as much as core strategic interests:  
“The United States supports a set of universal rights. And these rights include free speech, the 
freedom of peaceful assembly, the freedom of religion, equality for men and women under the 
rule of law, and the right to choose your own leaders […] Our support for these principles is 
not a secondary interest. Today I want to make it clear that it is a top priority that must be 
translated into concrete actions, and supported by all of the diplomatic, economic and 
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strategic tools at our disposal […] it will be the policy of the United States to promote reform 
across the region, and to support transitions to democracy.”381 
In his April 2011 remarks on the Syrian uprising, the US president reaffirmed in clear terms his 
country’s unwavering support for the spread of democratic values: “The United States will continue 
to stand up for democracy and the universal rights that all human beings deserve, in Syria and 
around the world.”382  
Finally, in May 2011, President Obama publicly declared that he had been committed to democracy 
promotion in the Greater Middle East all along, at least since the 2009 Cairo Speech. In the US 
president’s own words: “that’s why, two years ago in Cairo, I began to broaden our engagement 
based upon mutual interests and mutual respect. I believed then –and I believe now– that we have a 
stake not just in the stability of nations, but in the self-determination of individuals.”383 
Since 2009, we witnessed a crescendo in President Obama’s public support for democracy. Despite 
an arguable slow start, US support steadily increased and probably reached its climax around spring 
2011, when popular uprisings in the Greater Middle East thrust the issue of democracy promotion 
firmly back into the limelight. President Obama’s continued commitment to the promotion of US 
ideal interests in the region went hand in hand with the US president’s well-documented 
commitment to the protection of traditional US strategic interests. Given that, we can state with 
certainty that, under the presidency of Barack Obama, US core national interests in the Greater 
Middle East remained unaltered. 
3) The Obama administration’s response to the Arab Awakening was more consistent than it has 
been generally acknowledged to be 
In his response to the Arab Awakening, President Obama did not follow a single panoptic approach 
but, instead, his administration devised ad hoc policies to address the specific circumstances of each 
individual uprising. As a result, the United States was perceived as embracing popular uprisings in 
some countries while not in others. Critics charged President Obama of inconsistency in his policy 
response toward the Awakening. This sense of inconsistency was only reinforced by the lack of a 
clear Obama doctrine for the Greater Middle East. Observers, in fact, noted that President Obama 
did not formulate an all-encompassing strategy for the region or, at least, anything closely 
resembling, for example, the previous Eisenhower or G.W. Bush doctrines. During the 2008 
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presidential campaign, candidate Barack Obama announced that his foreign policy was “not going 
to be as doctrinaire as the Bush doctrine, because the world is complicated.” In March 2011, 
President Obama reaffirmed his position while discussing the ongoing uprisings in the Greater 
Middle East: “when you start applying blanket policies on the complexities of the current world 
situation, you’re going to get yourself into trouble.” While recognizing the absence of a clear 
Obama doctrine for the region, we take issue with the charge of inconsistency. We suggest, in fact, 
that the Obama administration’s response to the Arab Awakening was more consistent than it has 
generally been acknowledged.384 
First, Chapter Three through Chapter Seven established that, when confronted by a situation of 
conflicting US national interests, President Obama consistently prioritized strategic interests over 
ideal interests. This was especially evident with regard to the US response to the Bahraini uprising. 
In Bahrain, the US strategic concern of maintaining military cooperation with the Bahraini royal 
family, and its patrons in Saudi Arabia, outweighed the US ideal interest of siding with protesters 
demanding political and economic reforms. Hence, President Obama’s mild criticism of, and no 
concrete actions against, the Al Khalifas’ crackdown on mostly peaceful demonstrators. Similarly, 
the United States backed political change in Egypt, Yemen, and Syria only when US officials came 
to the conclusion that the US ideal interest of supporting the uprisings had eventually aligned with 
US strategic interests. Consistently, and in line with the traditional US foreign policy toward the 
Greater Middle East, President Obama ranked strategic interests higher than ideal interests in 
framing his administration’s response to the Arab Awakening.  
Second, President Obama was consistent in pursuing his administration’s preferred policy options. 
When popular uprisings did not reach a critical mass, the Obama administration systematically 
leaned toward sustaining the status quo and encouraged the incumbent regimes to address the 
legitimate demands of the people. This is how the United States responded to popular protests in 
Bahrain and also in other Arab kingdoms like Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Jordan. When popular 
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uprisings did reach a critical mass and continued instability threatened the US national interest, the 
Obama administration consistently advocated for an orderly transition of power. This was the case 
of the uprisings in Egypt and Yemen that led to the resignation of Egyptian President Hosni 
Mubarak and Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Finally, only when the first two policy options 
failed, the Obama administration had to devise ad hoc policies which depended on local and 
international developments that US officials could not completely control. The US response to the 
crises in Libya and Syria were cases in point. 
Third, President Obama consistently conveyed his preference for diplomatic solutions to the 
complex crises facing the countries affected by the Arab Awakening. Early in his presidency, 
Obama declared: 
“I […] believe that events in Iraq have reminded America of the need to use diplomacy and 
build international consensus to resolve our problems whenever possible. Indeed, we can 
recall the words of Thomas Jefferson, who said: ‘I hope that our wisdom will grow with our 
power, and teach us that the less we use our power the greater it will be’.”385 
Accordingly, the Obama administration systematically relied on diplomatic tools when addressing 
the uprisings in Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria. An express preference for diplomacy went 
together with a distinct reluctance to resort to US military power. The US response to the Syrian 
uprising was especially revealing. On that occasion, in fact, President Obama reportedly vetoed a 
plan sponsored by high ranking officials in his administration that would have committed the 
United States to assist militarily groups within the anti-Assad opposition. Libya was the only case 
during the Arab Awakening when President Obama decided to resort to US military power. 
Nevertheless, the US president did so only after having secured a broad international support for the 
military intervention (including that of the United Nations, the Arab League, and NATO) and only 
after having received assurances that other countries (especially France and Britain) would take the 
lead of the military operations. Here, a distinction is in order. President Obama was not reluctant to 
resort to military power tout court. In fact, the US president opted for a selective use of US military 
power. While wary of deploying large numbers of US military assets, particularly ground troops, 
President Obama proved willing to increase US reliance on small special operations forces and 
unmanned aerial vehicles. This was especially evident with regard to US counterterrorism and 
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counter-insurgency policies in Yemen against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and also 
across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.386 
Fourth, in line with his goal of distancing himself from the previous G.W. Bush administrations, 
President Obama was consistent in favoring multilateralism over unilateralism. In 2009, the US 
president announced that the United States stood “ready to begin a new chapter of international 
cooperation -one that recognizes the rights and responsibilities of all nations. And so, with 
confidence in our cause, and with a commitment to our values, we call on all nations to join us in 
building the future that our people so richly deserve.” In Libya, the Obama administration directed a 
diplomatic effort that resulted in a UN-mandated, Arab League-sponsored, and NATO-led 
international military intervention in support of the Libyan uprising against Col. Qaddafi. In Syria, 
US officials coordinated with their European allies to impose economic sanctions on the Assad 
regime, assiduously worked through the United Nations to find a collective solution to the crisis, 
and sponsored the formation of the Friends of Syria Group to facilitate cooperation among countries 
sympathetic to the uprising. In Yemen, the United States backed multilateral initiatives by the 
United Nations Security Council and the Gulf Cooperation Council that eventually led to Yemeni 
President Saleh’s resignation and to a peaceful transition of power to Vice-President Abd Rabbo 
Mansur Hadi. President Obama’s preference for multilateralism was less evident in the US response 
to the Egyptian and Bahraini uprisings. However, this mostly depended on the specific 
characteristics of the two popular uprisings rather than on a US rejection of multilateral action. In 
Egypt, the outcome of the uprising was ultimately decided by domestic actors and dynamics. 
Foreign actors, including the United States, played only a secondary role. Therefore, there was no 
serious concerted international action that convinced Egyptian President Mubarak to step down. In 
Bahrain, given the vital US strategic interests at stake in the bilateral relationship with the Bahraini 
rulers, the Obama administration proved reluctant to bring any significant unilateral or multilateral 
pressure to bear on the Al Khalifas. On the contrary, the US administration acquiesced in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council’s decision to send the Peninsula Shield Force to help the Bahraini government 
to retake control of the country. 
Fifth, President Obama consistently conveyed his willingness to respect the right of other peoples to 
choose their own path of political development. Addressing the United Nations General Assembly 
in 2012, the US president declared that “the United States has not and will not seek to dictate the 
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outcome of democratic elections abroad.” As a result, the Obama administration displayed an 
unusual disposition to engage with non-traditional US interlocutors, in particular with Islamist 
groups. Democratic elections in post-Mubarak Egypt were a case in point. In Egypt, in fact, the US 
administration recognized as legitimate the results of democratic elections that brought to power the 
Islamist Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover, the United States accepted power transition plans that 
markedly increased the presence and influence of Islamists in the post-uprising governments of 
countries such as Libya, Yemen, and Tunisia.387 President Obama’s disposition to engage with non-
traditional US interlocutors also extended beyond the specific events of the Arab Awakening to 
include attempts to start constructive talks with the Islamist government in Iran and the Taliban-led 
Islamist insurgency in Afghanistan.388 
All that considered, we maintain that, in spite of the lack of an all-encompassing doctrine for the 
Greater Middle East, the Obama administration’s response to the Arab Awakening showed more 
consistency than it has been generally acknowledged. 
4) President Barack Obama failed to significantly ameliorate US-Muslim relations 
Throughout history, US foreign policy has sometimes displayed an evident disconnect between 
rhetoric and practice. This has been especially true in the case of US policies toward the region of 
the Greater Middle East.	 US foreign policy rhetoric, in fact, praises the value of promoting 
democracy and contends that ideal interests are US top-priorities as much as realist or socio-
economic (strategic) interests. US foreign policy practice, instead, testifies to the existence of an 
undeniable hierarchy of US national interests where strategic interests carry more importance than 
ideal interests. 
When US officials’ public rhetoric does not match US actual policies on the ground, the United 
States leaves itself open to criticism. Charges of US hypocrisy and US double standards in foreign 
policy have proved particularly popular within Muslim communities. Moreover, criticisms of being 
hypocritical and of having double standards add to unpopular US regional policies (i.e. unwavering 
support for Israel) to negatively affect the image of the United States in the Greater Middle East. 
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In the Introduction, we offered data from different survey polls showing the distinctly tense US-
Muslim relationship inherited by President Obama upon taking office. Since the beginning of his 
presidency, Obama committed his administration to a policy of outreach toward Muslim 
communities aimed at amending US relations with the Muslim world. In his 2009 Inaugural 
Address, the US president directly addressed the issue of the disconnect between rhetoric and 
practice in US foreign policy. On that occasion, President Obama rejected “as false the choice 
between our safety and our ideals […] Those ideals still light the world, and we will not give them 
up for expedience’s sake.” In addition, the US president, in his 2009 Cairo Speech, announced his 
intention to reset those US policies toward the Muslim world that had resulted in “fear and mistrust” 
and in a “cycle of suspicion and discord”. In the Introduction, we also indicated that President 
Obama’s election and early policy of outreach to Muslims were welcomed by many people, 
including in the Greater Middle East, and raised expectations for improved US-Muslim relations.389 
In spite of President Obama’s attempt to align US foreign policy practice more closely with the 
values and ideas traditionally championed by US rhetoric, Chapter Three through Chapter Seven 
established that manifest tensions between words and actions persisted in the Obama 
administration’s response to the Arab Awakening. Bold US statements in favor of the promotion of 
democratic values, in fact, clashed with cautious US policies of qualified support for the popular 
uprisings. In addition, despite the initial optimism, survey polls taken after the outbreak of the Arab 
Awakening showed that President Obama’s policies failed to mend the rift existing between the 
United States and Muslim communities.  
According to a May 2011 poll, majorities in six predominantly Muslim countries (Egypt, Lebanon, 
the Palestinian Territories, Turkey, Pakistan, and Indonesia) said they were very or somewhat 
worried that the United States could become a military threat to their country someday. Likewise, a 
July 2011 poll revealed that Arab favorable attitudes toward the United States (in Morocco, Egypt, 
Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) had dropped to levels lower than they were in 2008, 
the last year of the G.W. Bush administration. This second poll also found out that Arabs generally 
viewed US interference in the Arab world as one of the greatest threats to the region’s peace and 
stability. The findings of another survey poll taken in 2013 held that among the various regions 
surveyed, people in the Greater Middle East expressed the lowest levels of confidence in President 
Obama and gave the US president’s foreign policy agenda very low marks. Even more tellingly, 
when specifically asked if they agreed or disagreed with the statement that Barack Obama had met 
the expectations he had set in his speech at Cairo University in 2009, large majorities in Morocco, 
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Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia (all Muslim-majority countries) disagreed. Such a 
documented persistence of “fear and mistrust” in Arabs’ attitudes toward the United States suggests 
that Arab publics (incidentally the same people who were directly affected by the Arab Awakening 
and the Obama administration’s response to it) did not notice any marked change in the 
fundamentals of US foreign policy toward the Greater Middle East. As for the way Americans 
perceived Muslims and Islam, a number of survey polls carried out between 2011 and 2012 detected 
no sign of improvement but, rather, they showed that Americans’ attitudes toward Muslims and 
Islam had slightly deteriorated. Given the above evidence, we can confidently argue that President 
Obama’s policy of outreach to Muslim communities did not achieve the stated goal of amending 
US-Muslim relations.390 
Now, let us go back to our main research question: “To what extent did President Obama’s foreign 
policy represent a paradigm shift in the traditional US foreign policy toward the Muslim world, and 
especially toward the region of the Greater Middle East?” 
In the Introduction, we stated that in order to offer a more accurate answer we would analyze this 
question at three distinct levels: at the level of the actual US foreign policies implemented on the 
ground, at the level of the rhetoric used by US officials to describe such policies, and at the level of 
the relationship between US practice and US rhetoric. Our research findings have provided 
compelling evidence supporting the argument that President Obama’s foreign policy showed 
considerable continuity with the past at all three levels. First, President Obama continued the 
longstanding US practice of favoring the protection of strategic interests over the promotion of ideal 
interests. Second, Obama’s rhetoric perpetuated the traditional themes of the mainstream brand of 
US foreign policy rhetoric. Third, during the Obama presidency, tensions frequently arose between 
US foreign policies on the ground and US officials’ public statements. All that considered, our final 
assessment is that President Obama’s first term did not yield to any substantial paradigm shift in the 
US foreign policy toward the Muslim world. The ambitious new beginning in US-Muslim relations 
announced by the US president in Cairo in 2009 failed to materialize. Four years into the Obama’s 
                                         
390 Pew Global Attitudes Project, Arab Spring Fails to Improve U.S. Image, May 17, 2011, 
http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2011/05/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Arab-Spring-FINAL-May-17-2011.pdf; Zogby 
International, Arab Attitudes, 2011 (Arab American Institute Foundation, July 2011), 
http://b.3cdn.net/aai/3c5edf53ed2f56e799_5qm6ba4r9.pdf; Pew Global Attitudes Project, America’s Global Image 
Remains More Positive than China’s, July 18, 2013, http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2013/07/Pew-Research-Global-
Attitudes-Project-Balance-of-Power-Report-FINAL-July-18-2013.pdf; Shibley Telhami and Steven Kull, The American 
Public on the 9/11 Decade (Brookings Institution, September 8, 2011), 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2011/9/08-opinion-poll-
telhami/0908_opinion_poll_telhami.pdf; Pew Global Attitudes Project, Muslim-Western Tensions Persist; Arab 
American Institute, The American Divide: How We View Arabs and Muslims, August 23, 2012. 
206 
 
presidency, we can confidently state that traditional features of US foreign policy continued to 
dominate the country’s international relations in the Greater Middle East. 
Moreover, our research findings allow us to offer a categorization of President Obama’s foreign 
policy within the broader tradition of US foreign policy. The multifaceted nature of foreign 
policymaking inevitably makes any attempt to put a US president’s foreign policy into a single 
category a simplification of an otherwise much more complex reality. Aware of the limits of any 
such a categorization, we could generally describe President Obama’s foreign policy as having two 
main souls. A Wilsonian soul, holding that the United States has the special mission of and a 
national interest in spreading its values throughout the world, characterized Obama’s foreign policy 
rhetoric. A realist soul, primarily concerned with issues of realpolitik and power politics, informed 
Obama’s foreign policy practice, especially with regard to the president’s policy toward the Greater 
Middle East. We could consider President Obama’s foreign policy as a clear example of what 
Professor John Mearsheimer accurately describes as “Liberal Talk, Realist Thinking” in US foreign 
policy.391  
That said, the lack of meaningful change in US Middle East policy under President Barack Obama 
should not be ascribed solely to the US president’s personal shortcomings. In fact, the guidelines 
provided by the theories of Foreign Policy Analysis enabled us to detect a number of internal and 
external factors that also accounted for the continuity observed in President Obama’s foreign policy 
toward the region. As already noted, the paramount factor accounting for the Obama 
administration’s cautious and qualified support for the popular uprisings was the presence, in the 
countries affected by the Arab Awakening, of vital US strategic interests. This was generally the 
case of the uprisings in Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria. On the contrary, when the United States 
had no vital strategic interests at stake in the country (as in the case of Libya), the Obama 
administration proved willing to fully back the popular uprising. Although paramount in influencing 
the US administration’s response to the Arab Awakening, the existence of vital US strategic 
interests was not the only factor constraining the ability of the United States to promote change in 
the Greater Middle East.  
Some of these limiting factors predated the outbreak of the Arab Awakening. By early 2011, US 
economic power was declining because of the country’s fiscal problems. As a consequence, the 
economic ability of the United States to sustain transitions to democracy decreased as well. 
Tellingly, by the end of President Obama’s first term, the only region-wide initiative proposed by 
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the US president to foster democratic transitions (the Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund) 
had yet to see the light of day.392 In addition, the protracted and unsuccessful military campaigns in 
Afghanistan and Iraq had cast doubts on what US military power could achieve. Domestically, the 
high costs, both in terms of lives and treasury, of such military campaigns had also made the US 
public extremely wary of new military interventions in Muslim countries. Moreover, diplomatic 
failures early in Obama’s tenure had decreased US political power. The Obama administration’s 
inability to induce any real progress either in the Arab-Israeli peace process or in the negotiations 
on the Iranian nuclear program were cases in point. Finally, US soft power and moral standing in 
the Greater Middle East had been severely tarnished in the eyes of the Arab public by the 
unilateralist policies and the controversial practices of the previous G.W. Bush administrations and 
the US Global War on Terror. Lingering suspicion of US hidden motives and real intentions made it 
harder for the Obama administration to present itself as an honest broker in solving the region’s 
crises.393 
Chapter Three through Chapter Seven showed that other limiting factors emerged after the outbreak 
of the Arab Awakening. As predicted by Foreign Policy Analysis theorists, such factors were both 
external and internal. As for the external factors, concerns of important US regional allies, such as 
Israel and Saudi Arabia, put serious constraints to the Obama administration’s ability to 
wholeheartedly support political change in Egypt, Bahrain, and Syria. Similarly, profound 
disagreement with the governments of Russia and China severely reduced the range of options 
available to the US administration to address the crisis in Syria. Moreover, US leverage in Egypt 
and Yemen was also limited by the mostly local nature of the domestic politics that ultimately 
determined the outcome of these two uprisings. 
As for the internal factors, US domestic political considerations often tilted the balance against 
policies of unconditional support for political change in the Greater Middle East. In this sense, three 
examples mentioned in our work were particularly revealing. In Egypt, US arms manufactures 
openly expressed, through the US Department of Defense, their concern that an abrupt end of the 
regime of President Mubarak could result into the disruption of the profitable contracts existing 
between such US companies and the Egyptian government. In Bahrain, US policymakers worried 
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that the overthrow of the pro-US Al Khalifa royal family would force the United States to relocate 
its military assets away from the island. Such an expensive relocation, especially after having 
invested significant amounts of taxpayers’ money there, would have been hard to explain to a 
budget-wary US public opinion. In Syria, President Obama’s preoccupation with the incoming 2012 
presidential elections made the US president particularly reluctant to increase his administration’s 
involvement in the crisis. In fact, President Obama and his advisers feared that the decision to 
commit the US military in the Syrian armed conflict would result in losing votes and, consequently, 
jeopardize Barack Obama’s chances for reelection.  
To sum up, this research has established that, along with an undeniable and paramount concern for 
the protection of vital US strategic interests, a series of other important factors, internal and 
external, preceding and following the outbreak of the Arab Awakening, accounted for President 
Obama’s failure to substantially reorient the foreign policy of the United States toward the Greater 
Middle East. Our research, therefore, leaves the reader with a sober assessment about the possibility 
to bring about meaningful change in a country’s foreign policy. In fact, high expectations for 
change, originating from the inspiring rhetoric of a new leadership, seem misplaced. Despite the 
admitted potential of human agency and actors specificity to be important drivers of change, this 
research has showed that it takes more than a new leader’s goodwill to alter the fundamentals of a 
country’s international behavior.  
 
Implications for the United States 
The absence of any significant change displayed by the Middle East policy of the first Obama 
administration is in stark contrast with the transformative nature of the events that have upset the 
region since 2011. In the last section of this chapter, we briefly discuss the implications, as of the 
end of 2014, of the Arab Awakening for core US strategic and ideal interests in the Greater Middle 
East. 
1) Access to Middle Eastern energy resources 
The Arab Awakening threatened the US interest of maintaining unhindered access to the region’s 
energy resources by directly affecting oil and gas producing countries in the Greater Middle East. In 
Libya, according to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), exports of energy products 
suffered “near-total disruption” during the months of the armed conflict between Col. Qaddafi’s 
loyalists and Libyan opposition forces. Libya’s production began to recover in 2012. However, 
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labor-related protests and infighting among different armed militias led to the blockade of at least 
four major export terminals in summer 2013. The Libyan government eventually regained control 
of the terminals in mid-2014. Since then, in spite of continued chaos in the country, Libyan 
production and exports have steadily increased. With regard to Syria, the EIA says that the 
country’s “oil and natural gas production has declined dramatically since March 2011”. Two main 
reasons account for the sharp decline. One is the ongoing civil war pitting President Assad’s troops 
against a myriad of armed opposition groups. Another reason is the imposition of international 
sanctions, especially US and European ones, on Syria’s export of energy products. The EIA 
assessment is that given the current situation “Syria’s energy sector is unlikely to recover in the near 
term.” 
Nevertheless, as we have previously explained, the United States has not traditionally relied on 
energy imports from either Libya or Syria. Therefore, disruptions of supply from these two Middle 
Eastern countries have not meaningfully hampered the ability of the United States to satisfy its 
energy needs.394 
Moreover, the Arab Awakening put at risk US energy interests in the Greater Middle East by testing 
US relations with the leaderships of countries in the oil and gas producing region of the Persian 
Gulf. The uprising in Bahrain highlighted differences between the Obama administration and the Al 
Khalifas over the Bahraini authorities’ handling of the popular protests. Such differences resulted in 
open diplomatic incidents, like when, in summer 2014, US Assistant Secretary of State for 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Tom Malinowski was expelled from Bahrain after holding 
an “unauthorized” meeting with members of the Bahraini opposition. Divergent opinions over the 
uprising notwithstanding, US-Bahraini military cooperation has remained strong. The continued 
strength of the bilateral relationship was displayed in September 2014 when Bahrain joined a US-
led military campaign by flying airstrikes against Islamist extremist groups in Syria and Iraq. As for 
Yemen, the Obama administration sponsored a Gulf Cooperation Council transition plan for the 
removal of President Saleh, with whom the United States had had a contentious relationship. Since 
the power transition, the US administration has employed both economic and diplomatic tools to 
shore up the position of newly-elected President Hadi. In return, the new Yemeni president has 
offered unqualified endorsement to US counterterrorism operations in the country. US and Yemeni 
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officials have repeatedly expressed the soundness of the bilateral relationship. For example, during 
a 2012 phone call, President Hadi and US Counterterrorism Advisor John Brennan described as 
“unshakeable” the partnership between the governments of two countries. Although Saudi Arabia 
was not directly affected by meaningful protests, the Saudi kingdom became actively involved in 
the regional dynamics of the Arab Awakening. The view of the Saudi leadership on the popular 
uprisings did not always align with that of the Obama administration. Especially manifest frictions 
broke out in the open after the ouster of Egyptian President Mubarak. Some observers went so far as 
to describe the bilateral relationship as “dramatically deteriorating”. Since then, however, the 
Obama administration has assiduously worked to mend the relationship with its strategic Gulf 
partner, and third largest source of US oil imports. This effort by the US administration has 
included frequent visits by top administration officials and major arms sales. Despite evident 
differences over regional developments, the United States and Saudi Arabia continue to cooperate 
closely on critical issues of regional security and global economic stability. In the words of the 
Saudi foreign minister, “it’s only natural that our [US and Saudi] policies and views might see 
agreement in some areas and disagreement in others. That’s perfectly normal in any serious 
relationship that spans a wide range of issues.” In addition, the Saudi foreign minister downplayed 
the nature of such differences by calling them differences in tactics and not in objectives.395 
2) Containment of hostile powers 
Widespread social and political turmoil in the Greater Middle East had the potential to weaken the 
decades-old US policy of containment of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its nuclear ambitions. In 
fact, the 2011-12 popular uprisings severely challenged, and sometimes removed, a number of 
Middle Eastern regimes that were hostile to Iranian interests (i.e. the regimes of Egypt, Bahrain, and 
Yemen). Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei, declared that the Arab Awakening 
was indeed an “Islamic Awakening” and that the popular protests were a natural extension of the 
1979 Iranian Revolution. However, Khamenei’s attempt to claim the mantle of the Arab Awakening 
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failed, mostly because it lacked credibility. Protesters in the Arab world, in fact, had not forgotten 
the violence unleashed by the Iranian regime in 2009 to crack down on its domestic pro-democracy 
movement.396  
Additionally, the strict regime of sanctions imposed by the United States and other countries on 
Iran’s energy and financial sectors has damaged Iran’s economy. The loss of oil revenues has been 
particularly significant. By late 2013, oil exports, that funded nearly half of the Iranian regime’s 
expenditures, dropped to about 1 million barrels per day from the 2.5 million barrels per day level 
during 2011.397 
Despite a poor reputation as a champion of democracy promotion and a reduced ability to use its 
economic power as a foreign policy tool, real or presumed Iranian influence was often perceived 
across the region. In particular, the governments of Bahrain and Yemen repeatedly accused Iran of 
meddling in their domestic affairs. The Al Khalifas charged Bahraini Shiite protesters of being 
Iranian agents while Yemeni officials claimed that Iran offered support to the Houthis, a 
predominantly Shiite insurgent movement active in northern Yemen. Recently, also senior US 
intelligence officials have openly referred to the fact that Iran “will continue to provide arms and 
other aid” to Shiite militants in Bahrain and Houthi rebels in Yemen. The Iranian regime has 
systematically rejected such accusations.398     
Conversely, there are less doubts with regard to Iran’s involvement in the Syrian uprising. Many 
reports, in fact, describe Iranian diplomatic, economic, and military support for the regime of 
President Assad. Official statements about Iran’s steadfast commitment to the survival of the Assad 
regime have been coupled with substantial economic assistance. Moreover, Iran has also provided 
the Syrian military with weapons, equipment, training, and advice. For example, according to the 
US Department of the Treasury, Iran has been critical to the establishment and training of the Jaysh 
al Sha’bi militia: a 50,000 strong Syrian paramilitary group that fights alongside Assad’s 
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government forces. The prolonged armed conflict in Syria seems to have further strengthened the 
alliance between the leaderships in Damascus and Tehran.399 
3) Policies to counter terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
When the Arab Awakening broke out, Al Qaeda tried to take credit for the popular uprisings that 
were upsetting the Greater Middle East. Al Qaeda leader, Ayman al Zawahiri, stated that the Arab 
Awakening was a direct consequence of the 9/11 terrorist attacks a decade earlier. Al Qaeda and 
other likeminded extremist groups depicted the objectives of the uprisings as in line with their 
rejection of the status quo in the region. Despite their efforts, such groups had a marginal role in the 
initial phases of the uprisings. In fact, political, social, and economic grievances, rather than violent 
extremist rhetoric, were the main reasons that brought millions of people to the streets. Even more 
significantly, from a US counterterrorism perspective, the overwhelmingly peaceful nature of the 
popular protests appeared to have fatally undermined the extremists’ argument that only violence 
could achieve significant change in the Greater Middle East. After all, two weeks of peaceful mass 
protests in Egypt had driven Egyptian President Mubarak out of office; something that extremists 
like Zawahiri had failed to achieve after decades of armed struggle.400  
However, in some of the countries affected by the Arab Awakening, continued instability and the 
collapse of state security organizations relaxed the pressure on extremist groups and provided them 
with more freedom of action. This was especially true in countries that experienced violent armed 
conflict. The transformation of a peaceful uprising into a civil war in Syria offered an opportunity to 
extremist organizations, like Jabhat al Nusra and the Islamic State, to marginalize the “moderate” 
opposition and increase their appeal among the populace. Post-uprising Libya is another telling 
example. After the forced removal of Col. Qaddafi, the country has plunged into a state of 
lawlessness and conflict. According to a US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s 2014 
declassified report, Libya has dangerously turned into a safe haven, training ground, and travel 
route for extremist fighters and weapons. Also post-Mubarak Egypt has not been exempt from 
terrorist activity. A group called Ansar Bayt al Maqdis, in particular, has become active across the 
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Sinai Peninsula. Since 2013, Ansar Bayt al Maqdis operatives have claimed responsibility for a 
number of terrorist attacks especially targeting Egyptian authorities.401   
As for Yemen, President Hadi has so far proved more forthcoming than his predecessor Saleh in 
cooperating with the United States on issues of counterterrorism. In April 2012, US special 
operations forces backed the Yemeni military in launching a joint offensive against AQAP and 
likeminded groups in the south of the country. A US official involved in counterterrorism 
operations in Yemen defined Hadi as “everything his predecessor wasn’t in terms of his 
determination, his understanding of the threat [...] his determination to destroy Al Qaeda”. Despite 
increased US-Yemeni cooperation and some ostensible success on the ground, the intelligence 
community in the United States still considers AQAP a “significant threat” that “remains intent on 
targeting the United States and US interests overseas.”402 
The Arab Awakening also added uncertainty to the US regional policy of non-proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. US officials had two major concerns. First, they feared that autocratic 
leaders would resort to the use of WMDs in a desperate attempt to cling to power. Second, and 
perhaps even more alarming, US officials worried that the regimes would lose control of their 
WMD stockpiles which could eventually fall into the hands of extremist groups with anti-American 
agendas. Libya and Syria were cases in point. Since 2004, Libya had started to destroy its WMDs 
under the supervision of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). This 
process was abruptly interrupted by the 2011 uprising and ensuing war. After the overthrow of Col. 
Qaddafi, the US administration and other foreign governments have assisted Libya to restart its 
operations aimed at securing and eliminating the country’s remaining WMDs. Despite continued 
instability, the OPCW has recently expressed positive assessments about Libya’s ongoing non-
proliferation effort. As for Syria, following credible reports of attacks using WMDs, the United 
Nations Security Council unanimously approved a resolution in September 2013 requiring the 
Syrian government to dismantle its chemical weapons program. President Assad agreed to 
cooperate with the OPCW to destroy Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles. Such a process 
successfully ended in summer 2014 when the last of Syria’s chemicals were neutralized on board of 
a US military vessel stationed in the Mediterranean Sea. Some observers, however, have claimed 
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that the Assad regime has intentionally failed to disclose a number of still functioning chemical 
weapons facilities.403           
4) The special relationship with Israel 
US longstanding concerns about the security of Israel only grew with the beginning of the Arab 
Awakening. Over the years, in fact, successive Israeli governments had advanced Israel’s national 
interest by carefully nurturing a delicate modus vivendi with many of Israel’s neighboring Arab 
governments. Israeli officials had even managed to establish a live-and-let-live relationship with the 
openly hostile Assad regime in Syria. Nevertheless, the unexpected 2011-12 popular uprisings 
threatened the stability of Israel’s neighbors and cast serious doubts on the future viability of such a 
system of bilateral relationships on which Israel had long relied for its security.404  
As of 2014, all the countries sharing borders with Israel have felt the shockwaves of the Arab 
Awakening. In Egypt, the toppling of President Mubarak has been followed first by the election of 
an Islamist government led by the Muslim Brotherhood and then by a coup d’état that has 
established a regime controlled by the Egyptian military. Despite initial US and Israeli concerns, 
post-Mubarak Egyptian leaders have publicly expressed their commitment to the continuation of the 
1979 peace treaty with Israel. On the Egyptian front, the major current threat to Israel’s security 
comes from growing unrest and extremist groups’ activity in the Sinai Peninsula. Arguably, the 
situation in Syria is more worrisome and has more far-reaching effects. For the third consecutive 
year, President Assad faces an armed opposition that controls large swaths of the country. Although 
the Syrian-Israeli border has remained relatively calm, the growing role in the conflict of extremist 
organizations, like Jabhat al Nusra and the Islamic State, represents a very dangerous long-term 
menace to Israel. Furthermore, protracted civil war in Syria is also threatening the stability of the 
governments in Lebanon and Jordan. The costs of assisting millions of Syrian refugees have put 
huge strains on Lebanese and Jordanian finances, to the frustration of local populations. In addition, 
there is the risk of the Syrian conflict spilling over into its neighbors along sectarian lines. Lebanon, 
in particular, has already experienced violent clashes between Lebanese Sunnis supporting the 
Syrian opposition and Lebanese Shiites backing the Assad regime. A final threat to the stability of 
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Israel’s neighbors is represented by those people that have traveled to Syria to participate to the 
civil war and that are likely to return to their home countries inspired by radical ideas. So far, 
around 2,000 Jordanians have reportedly joined different militant groups fighting in Syria (one of 
the largest contingents of foreign fighters involved in the country).405      
5) Democracy promotion 
The Arab Awakening offered the United States a unique opportunity to advance its longstanding 
ideal interest of promoting democratic values in the Greater Middle East. Demands for democratic 
reform, in fact, ranked high in the agenda of the protesters that took to the streets in 2011-12. Large 
protests challenged many Middle Eastern autocratic regimes and, sometimes, even achieved the 
goal of overthrowing their leadership. The United States welcomed the transitions to more 
democratic forms of government that began in countries like Egypt, Yemen, and Libya. However, 
history teaches us that the path toward democracy can be long and grueling. Processes of 
democratic transition are usually fraught with difficulties and setbacks. In this sense, the Arab 
Awakening has proved to be no exception. 
In order to assess the advancement of democratic values in the five Muslim-majority countries 
under analysis in this research, we primarily relied on the Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices (CRHRP) and the World Report (WR) issued in 2014 by the US State Department’s 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor and by the non-governmental organization Human 
Rights Watch, respectively.406  
In July 2013, the Egyptian armed forces staged a coup d’état that removed from power an elected 
Islamist president. Since then, with the stated objectives of fighting terrorism and restoring law and 
order in the country, a military-backed government has carried out a systematic crackdown on the 
opposition. Restrictive measures have especially targeted the local branch of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. According to credible estimates, since the July coup, clashes involving protesters and 
state security forces have resulted in between 1,000 and 2,500 dead, more than 17,000 wounded, 
and between 16,000 and 19,000 arrests. The CRHRP and the WR identified major issues that still 
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hinder Egypt’s transition toward a more democratic form of government: the excessive use of force 
by state security forces, including unlawful killings and torture; the suppression of civil liberties, 
including societal and government restrictions on freedom of expression, press, and assembly; 
arbitrary arrests; and impunity for state security forces.407 
After the March 2011 Gulf Cooperation Council military intervention, the Bahraini government and 
the opposition have tried to resolve their differences through two national dialogues. Neither 
attempt (the first in July 2011 and the second from February to December 2013) was successful in 
finding a political solution to the ongoing low-intensity unrest in the country. So far, the 
government has enacted only modest reforms that have neither significantly diluted its authority nor 
addressed the demands of the opposition for a fairer distribution of political and economic 
opportunities. According to the CRHRP and WR, the most serious democracy problems faced by 
Bahrain include: the inability of Bahraini citizens to change their government peacefully; the 
continued discrimination against the Shiite population; the lack of consistent accountability for 
security officers accused of committing human rights violations; politically motivated arrests; and 
restrictions on civil liberties.408 
As part of a US-backed and GCC-brokered transition plan, Yemen embarked on a comprehensive 
national dialogue that lasted from March 2013 to January 2014. The so-called National Dialogue 
Conference concluded with a blueprint for far-reaching reforms. However, clear consensus has not 
been reached on a number of contentious and potentially destabilizing issues, such as a power-
sharing agreement between North and South and the disarmament of non-state actors. The physical 
integrity of Yemen continues to be challenged by the Houthi insurgency in the north, the 
secessionist aspirations of the South, and the presence of extremist groups like AQAP. 
Additionally, arbitrary killings and other human rights abuses committed by government and non-
government groups; widespread corruption at all levels of government, including a corrupt judicial 
system that is unable to ensure the rule of law; the lack of civilian oversight on state security forces; 
and a weak central government represent persistent obstacles to Yemen’s process of 
democratization.409 
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Three years after the ouster of Col. Qaddafi, Libya’s interim authorities have failed to form a stable 
government and to assert uncontested control over much of the country’s territory. Tellingly, Libya 
currently displays two opposing national assemblies both claiming to be the legitimate 
representative of the Libyan people. Moreover, the east and the west of the country, in particular, 
are plagued by continued fighting among heterogeneous coalitions of rival armed groups. The 
United Nations has documented the indiscriminate use of military weaponry, abductions, unlawful 
killings, and the internal displacement of hundreds of thousands of Libyans during the fighting. As 
of 2014, the absence of a single legitimate political authority, coupled with a marked deteriorating 
security situation, makes the possibility of enacting meaningful democratic reforms in Libya very 
unlikely.410 
The uprising in Syria has not led to either regime change as in Egypt, Yemen, and Libya or to a 
national dialogue as in Bahrain. The Syrian uprising has instead plunged the country into a 
protracted state of civil war. Although the Syrian regime has lost control of large parts of the 
country, President Assad has not been overthrown. In addition, within the anti-Assad opposition, 
extremist groups with radical agendas have gained the upper hand. Both government loyalists and 
opposition forces have been accused of perpetrating human rights abuses, carrying out massacres, 
and engaging in torture. The current situation of lawlessness, instability, and violence in Syria does 
not allow for any serious discussion on democratic reforms.411 
All that considered, in the past four years, the Arab Awakening has provided the United States with 
both challenges and opportunities to advance the US national interest in the Greater Middle East. 
However, we believe that the failure of the popular uprisings to resolve the political, economic, and 
social grievances that brought millions of people to the streets in 2011 should be of special concern 
to US policymakers. In fact, by suppressing or ignoring popular demands for democratic reform, 
autocratic Middle Eastern regimes may have survived this latest wave of protests but they have not 
eliminated the root causes at the origin of the unrest. Consequently, the political, economic, and 
social grievances that went unanswered in 2011 have the potential to reemerge and ignite new 
protests in the future. Moreover, the 2011 uprisings overwhelmingly started as peaceful protest 
movements. As illustrated by this research, in most cases such movements did not succeed in 
achieving meaningful change. Disillusioned protesters may draw the dangerous conclusion that 
change in the Greater Middle East cannot be achieved by peaceful means; they may in fact buy into 
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the extremists’ narrative that only by resorting to violence Middle Eastern people have a chance to 
improve their conditions. As a result, there is the concrete risk that prospective protest movements 
will show a more violent nature than those of 2011. Finally, anti-American sentiments were 
marginal and certainly did not drive the 2011 uprisings. However, the Obama administration’s 
cautious policy of qualified support for the Arab Awakening was seen, particularly by Muslim 
public opinions, as partly responsible for the inability of the uprisings to fulfill Middle Eastern 
people’s demands for change. This, along with perceived US ongoing close association with local 
autocratic regimes, and their repressive policies, is likely to increase popular antipathy toward the 
United States.  
In other words, the hitherto overall lack of success of the Arab Awakening has sowed the seeds for 
future, and possibly more violent and more anti-American, instability and disorder in a region of 
vital importance to the global advancement of the US national interest. There is some irony in the 
fact that foreign policies carefully crafted by national policymakers with the primary objective of 
advancing their country’s national interests can in fact contribute to an outcome that will threaten 
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